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Abstract 
 
The Latin principality of Antioch was founded during the First Crusade (1095-1099), 
and survived for 170 years until its destruction by the Mamluks in 1268. This thesis offers the 
first full assessment of the thirteenth century principality of Antioch since the publication of 
Claude Cahen’s La Syrie du nord à l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque 
d’Antioche in 1940. It examines the Latin principality from its devastation by Saladin in 1188 
until the fall of Antioch eighty years later, with a particular focus on its relationship with the 
Armenian kingdom of Cilicia. This thesis shows how the fate of the two states was closely 
intertwined for much of this period. The failure of the principality to recover from the major 
territorial losses it suffered in 1188 can be partly explained by the threat posed by the Cilician 
Armenians in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. King Leon I of Cilicia attacked 
the Latin polity on numerous occasions during this period, making any expansion of the 
principality almost impossible. In the 1250s the two states entered into a long-term alliance 
following the marriage of the Antiochene prince with the daughter of the Armenian king. The 
prince of Antioch subsequently followed his father-in-law by submitting to the Mongols in 
1260. However, this had disastrous consequences as the Latin principality became a target for 
the Mamluks – the chief opponents of the Mongols in the Near East. Antiochene-Cilician 
relations were almost continuously shaped by the geopolitics of northern Syria and southern 
Anatolia. All the alliances and conflicts between the Latin principality and the Armenian 
kingdom were heavily influenced by the non-Christian powers of the region. In sum, this 
thesis argues that the principality of Antioch’s most important relationship during its final 
eight decades was undoubtedly with the kingdom of Cilicia. 
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Introduction 
The city of Antioch was captured by Latin Christians on 3 June 1098, during the First 
Crusade (1095-1099). Bohemond of Taranto took possession of Antioch after the other 
crusaders had continued on their journey to Jerusalem in 1099. He founded a principality that 
would survive for 170 years. The early Latin rulers of Antioch were able to annex a great 
number of towns and fortresses in Cilicia and northern Syria by pursuing an aggressive 
military strategy. This expansive phase in the history of the principality was brought to an 
abrupt end by a disastrous defeat at the battle of the Field of Blood in 1119. Thereafter, it was 
a struggle for the princes and regents of Antioch to hold on to their possessions on the eastern 
side of the Orontes River due to the aggression of the Aleppan rulers Zengi and Nūr al-Dīn. 
Nevertheless, the Latin principality remained significant in size until 1188 when Saladin 
captured numerous Antiochene strongholds and settlements, including the coastal cities of 
Jabala and Latakia, in one swift summer campaign. 
Antioch remained under Latin control until 1268, but the principality which existed 
after 1188 was much smaller and weaker than the entity which preceded it. The Antiochenes 
recovered very little territory during the Third Crusade (1189-1192) and its aftermath. In fact, 
there was no significant expansion in the size of the Latin principality until 1260. Some of the 
reasons for this – such as lack of manpower – are obvious. However, historians have thus far 
under appreciated the influence of the Cilician Armenians on the principality of Antioch, 
even though their involvement in the Antiochene succession dispute of the early thirteenth 
century is well-known. 
The relationship between the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia and the Latin principality 
of Antioch reveals much about both states and the thirteenth century Near East more 
generally. However, a comprehensive study examining diplomatic relations between them 
remains a noticeable absence in the historiography of the Cilician Armenians and the Latin 
East. Thus, some fundamental questions remain unanswered. How did the principality of 
Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia interact with each other? Why was the Latin principality 
the first crusader state to be destroyed in the thirteenth century, and how was this influenced 
by its relationship with the Armenian kingdom? Which individuals, groups, institutions, and 
polities had the greatest impact on relations between the two states? How did the religious 
similarities and differences between the Armenians of Cilicia and the Latins of Antioch affect 
their diplomatic relations? This thesis directly addresses these issues by analysing 
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Antiochene-Cilician relations in detail. It analyses the relationship primarily from an 
Antiochene perspective, considering how it affected the Latin principality over the course of 
eight decades. 
This thesis examines the principality of Antioch and its relationship with the kingdom 
of Cilicia between 1188 and 1268. These dates have been chosen because they mark key 
moments in the history of the Latin principality. In 1188 it was dramatically reduced in size 
when Saladin conquered a large number of settlements and strongholds. Saladin’s attack on 
the principality of Antioch heralded a new phase in Antiochene-Cilician relations. Previously, 
the princes of Antioch had enjoyed a position of superiority over their Armenian counterparts 
in Cilicia, but after 1188 the rulers of Armenian Cilicia became the dominant partners in the 
relationship. The city of Antioch was seized and destroyed by the Mamluks in 1268. The 
Latin principality effectively ceased to exist from that moment on, although a handful of 
settlements and fortresses in the vicinity of Antioch remained under Latin control for several 
years afterwards. 
Modern Historiography 
Most studies of the Latin East tend to focus on the kingdom of Jerusalem and 
therefore the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, and the county of Tripoli have 
received relatively little attention in comparison. Claude Cahen produced the last major 
historical work which surveyed the principality of Antioch during both the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.
1
 Cahen’s book provides an excellent narrative history of the Latin 
principality, but it lacks extensive analysis in certain areas and is based upon research 
undertaken during the 1930s. Its existence certainly does not preclude a new study on the 
thirteenth century principality of Antioch, with a specific focus on Antiochene-Cilician 
relations. 
For decades after the publication of Cahen’s magnum opus Antioch was neglected in 
crusading historiography. The principality’s castles were studied by Deschamps and 
Kennedy,
2
 while Metcalf examined Antiochene coinage.
3
 Some attention was given to the 
                                                          
1
 C. Cahen, La Syrie du nord à l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque d’Antioche (Paris, 1940). 
2
 P. Deschamps, Les Châteaux des Croisés en Terre Sainte III: La défense du comté de Tripoli et de la principauté 
d’Antioche (Paris, 1973); H. Kennedy, Crusader Castles (Cambridge, 1994). 
3
 D.M., Metcalf, ‘Three Recent Parcels of Helmet Deniers of Bohemund III of Antioch Concealed at about the 
Time of Saladin’s Conquests’, in P.W. Edbury and D.M. Metcalf (ed.), Coinage in the Latin East: The Fourth 
Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History (Oxford, 1980), pp. 137-145; D.M., Metcalf, Coinage of 
the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, 2nd edition (London, 1995). 
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Latin Church at Antioch,
4
 but other aspects of the principality received very little serious 
analysis until Mayer produced a collection of twelve essays on Antiochene history.
5
 In one 
essay he argues that thirteenth century charters granting privileges to the Genoese in the 
principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli are actually forgeries,
6
 but the rest of the 
book is predominantly focused on Antiochene affairs in the twelfth century. 
The twenty-first century has heralded a new wave of scholarship on Antioch in the 
crusading era. The most important of these publications is a monograph by Asbridge which 
examines the early development of the principality from its creation in 1098 until the death of 
Prince Bohemond II in 1130.
7
 Furthermore, a recently completed PhD thesis analyses the 
evolution of the Latin principality during the remainder of the twelfth century, with a 
particular focus on rulership, lordship, and Antioch’s relationships with the Byzantine Empire 
and the kingdom of Jerusalem.
8
 
In the last decade two important collections of essays have been published on the 
principality of Antioch, based on the proceedings of conferences held at Hernen Castle in the 
Netherlands. The first includes scholarship on Antioch’s status as a centre for the production 
and translation of intellectual texts, the growth of the Latin Church at Antioch, and the role of 
Syriac Orthodox Christians in the Latin principality.
9
 The second contains studies of the 
castle of Margat and a mill at Baniyas.
10
 Both volumes shine further light on the history of 
Antioch in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but none of the essays specifically examine 
the principality’s relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia or refer to it in any detail. 
The focus of Asbridge and others on Antiochene history prior to the Third Crusade 
has left a distorted picture of the principality – much more has been written about the first 
nine decades of the Latin state than its final eighty years. Edbury has recently examined the 
                                                          
4
 B. Hamilton, The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church (London, 1980); J.C. Moore, ‘Peter of 
Lucedio (Cistercian Patriarch of Antioch) and Pope Innocent III’, Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 29 (1987), 
pp. 221-249. 
5
 H.E. Mayer, Varia Antiochena: Studien zum Kreuzfahrerfürstentum Antiochia im 12. und frühen 13. 
Jahrhundert (Hanover, 1993). 
6
 Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 203-217. 
7
 T.S. Asbridge, The Creation of the Principality of Antioch 1098-1130 (Woodbridge, 2000). 
8
 The author is unable to release this material before publication, but he has discussed some of his findings 
with me on a personal level. A.D. Buck, On the Frontier of Latin Christendom: the Principality of Antioch 
ca.1130-ca.1193 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2014). 
9
 S.B. Edgington, ‘Antioch: Medieval City of Culture’, EWMEM, 1, pp. 247-259; B. Hamilton, ‘The Growth of the 
Latin Church of Antioch and the Recruitment of its Clergy’, EWMEM, 1, pp. 171-184; D. Weltecke, ‘On the 
Syriac Orthodox in the Principality of Antioch during the Crusader Period’, EWMEM, 1, pp. 95-124. 
10
 J. Burgtorf, ‘The Hospitaller Lordship of Margat’, EWMEM, 2, pp. 11-50; B. Major, ‘The Medieval Mill of 
Bānyās and some Notes on the Topography of the Town of Valenia’, EWMEM, 2, pp. 367-390. 
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Assises d’Antioche and briefly considered how feudal law was practiced in the principality,11 
while Burgtorf has written about the War of Antiochene Succession.
12
 Both these articles 
contribute to our understanding of Latin Antioch after the principality was dramatically 
reduced in size by Saladin in 1188. Nevertheless, no historian has properly surveyed the 
evolution of the Latin principality from the beginning of the thirteenth century until 
Antioch’s fall in 1268 since the publication of Cahen’s La Syrie du nord. 
Armenian Cilicia, on the other hand, has been the subject of numerous general 
histories and rigorous studies, which have examined its political development from the 
founding of the Armenian principalities in the eleventh century until the destruction of the 
Cilician kingdom in the late fourteenth century. A considerable amount of scholarship has 
been devoted to Armenian Cilicia since Der Nersessian wrote two important contributions on 
the formation and development of the realm. Both her essay in Setton’s A History of the 
Crusades and chapter on Cilicia in The Armenians offer a rather generalised account of the 
Armenian kingdom, but they have inspired more in-depth research.
13
 For example, a 
collection of essays edited by Boase includes detailed discussions of Baghras castle and the 
role of the military orders in Cilicia.
14
 
In recent decades Claude Mutafian and Gérard Dédéyan have been at the forefront of 
research on Armenian Cilicia. Mutafian’s first book on Cilicia examines the region over a 
particularly long period of time, with only one large chapter dedicated to the history of the 
Armenian kingdom formed there.
15
 His second major work in this field focuses completely 
on the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, but it does not contain a comprehensive analysis of the 
state’s political history.16 Mutafian’s most recent book, entitled L’Arménie du Levant, also 
concentrates on the kingdom of Cilicia. However, despite examining the Armenian 
kingdom’s Church, diplomacy, and political development in detail, he devotes less than two 
pages to its relationship with the principality of Antioch.
17
 In this short summary of 
                                                          
11
 P.W. Edbury, ‘The Assises d’Antioche: Law and Custom in the Principality of Antioch’, in K.J. Stringer and A. 
Jotischky (ed.), Norman Expansion: Connections, Continuities and Contrasts (Farnham, 2013), pp. 241-248. 
12
 J. Burgtorf, ‘Der antiochenische Erbfolgekrieg’, Ordines Militares: Colloquia Torunensia Historica, 18 (2013), 
pp. 219-239. 
13
 S. Der Nersessian, ‘The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia’, in K.M. Setton (ed.), A History of the Crusades, 6 vols 
(Madison, WI, 1969-1989), 2, pp. 630-659; S. Der Nersessian, The Armenians (London, 1969), pp. 44-53. 
14
 A.W. Lawrence, ‘The Castle of Baghras’, in T.S.R. Boase (ed.), The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia (Edinburgh, 
1978), pp. 34-83; J.S.C. Riley-Smith, ‘The Templars and the Teutonic Knights in Cilician Armenia’, in T.S.R. Boase 
(ed.), The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 92-117. 
15
 C. Mutafian, La Cilicie au Carrefour des Empires, 2 vols (Paris, 1988), 1, 405-475. 
16
 C. Mutafian, Le Royaume Arménien de Cilicie: XIIe-XIVe siècle (Paris 1993). 
17
 C. Mutafian, L’Arménie du Levant (XIe-XIVe siècle), 2 vols (Paris, 2012), 1, pp. 382-383. 
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Antiochene-Cilician relations, he claims that in the thirteenth century the Latin principality 
became increasingly dependent on an alliance with the Armenian kingdom in order to 
survive.
18
 Mutafian also briefly refers to the relationship between these two states in an essay 
on the diplomacy of the Cilician Armenians.
19
 He observes that King Leon I ‘paid a heavy 
toll for his Antiochene policy’ as it allowed the Seljuks to impose their suzerainty on 
Cilicia.
20
 
Dédéyan has written a monograph on the Armenian lordships and principalities of the 
Near East in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.
21
 He has also published studies on 
the interaction between Armenians and the twelfth century crusader states, and the early 
history of the Roupenid principality.
22
 In an essay on the Armenians and Lebanon, he 
provides a simplistic analysis of the relationship between Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch 
and count of Tripoli, and King Hethoum I of Cilicia.
23
 Neither Dédéyan nor Mutafian have 
written extensively about the relationship between Armenian Cilicia and the principality of 
Antioch. Furthermore, when they have referred to Antiochene-Cilician relations in their 
research, it tends to be from an Armenian perspective. 
Armenian Cilicia has also received detailed coverage from other scholars. 
Ghazarian’s book on the kingdom of Cilicia has a somewhat erratic structure, but it 
essentially covers the entire history of the Armenian kingdom and the Roupenid principality 
which preceded it.
24
 Rüdt-Collenberg has produced a comprehensive genealogical survey of 
the Armenian dynasties that ruled Cilicia during the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.
25
 He uses a multitude of tables to list all the known members of the Roupenid and 
Hethoumid families, showing who they married and who succeeded them. This research 
                                                          
18
 Mutafian, L’Arménie du Levant, 1, p. 383. 
19
 C. Mutafian, ‘The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia’, in R.G. Hovannisian and S. Payaslian (ed.), 
Armenian Cilicia (Costa Mesa, CA, 2008), pp. 93-110. 
20
 Mutafian, ‘Brilliant Diplomacy’, p. 103. 
21
 G. Dédéyan, Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés: étude sur les pouvoirs arméniens dans le 
Proche-Orient méditerranéen (1068-1150), 2 vols (Lisbon 2003). 
22
 G. Dédéyan, ‘Le rôle politique et militaire des Arméniens dans les Etats croisés pendant la première partie du 
XIIe siècle’, in H.E. Mayer and E. Müller-Luckner (ed.), Die Kreuzfahrerstaaten als multikulturelle Gesellschaft: 
Einwanderer und Minderheiten im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1997), pp. 153-163; G. Dédéyan, ‘The 
Founding and Coalescence of the Rubenian Principality, 1073-1129’, in R.G. Hovannisian and S. Payaslian (ed.), 
Armenian Cilicia (Costa Mesa, CA, 2008), pp. 79-92. 
23
 G. Dédéyan, ‘Les Arméniens au Liban (X-XIII siècle)’, in G. Dédéyan and K. Rizk (ed.), Le Comté de Tripoli : État 
Multiculturel et Multiconfessionnel (1102-1289) (Paris, 2010), pp. 83-90. 
24
 J.G. Ghazarian, The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia during the Crusades: The integration of Cilician Armenians 
with the Latins 1080-1393 (Richmond, 2000). 
25
 W.H. Rüdt-Collenberg, The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans: The Structure of the Armeno-Cilician 
Dynasties (Paris, 1963). 
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clearly demonstrates the strong dynastic links between Armenian Cilicia and the principality 
of Antioch. Hodgson has also highlighted the high levels of intermarriage between Latins and 
Armenians, and analysed the links between these matches and the diplomacy of the Christian 
states in the Near East.
26
 
Some recent studies of the kingdom of Cilicia have concentrated on the realm’s 
diplomatic relations with other powers in the Near East. Amitai and Stewart have both 
written about the Mamluk threat to Cilicia in the late thirteenth century and how the Cilician 
Armenians responded to it.
27
 Stewart has produced detailed analysis of the relationship 
between the Mongols and the Armenian kings of Cilicia in two essays.
28
 Bayarsaikhan has 
also examined Mongol-Armenian relations, but his work focuses on the former’s impact in 
the Caucasus as well as Cilicia.
29
 Yildiz has considered how the interaction between the 
Latins, Cilician Armenians, and Seljuk Turks affected the fortunes of the Armenian kingdom 
in the early thirteenth century.
30
 Such scholarship provides useful analysis of the geopolitical 
environment in which Antiochene-Cilician relations took place. 
The only study which directly examines the relationship between the principality of 
Antioch and Armenian Cilicia is an economic study by Scott Redford.
31
 He argues that the 
economies of northern Syria and Cilicia were interlinked, and were not separated by the 
frontiers which divided the polities in the region. For example, he suggests that Port Saint 
Symeon Ware was produced at sites in both the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of 
Cilicia.
32
 This fine essay demonstrates how geography tied the Latin principality and the 
Armenian kingdom together, but it does not analyse the political links between these states. 
Vorderstrasse also observes that the principality of Antioch was a major producer of pottery 
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during the crusading era, but suggests that it also imported pottery from Muslim controlled 
sites in Syria.
33
 Jacoby and others have suggested that the port of Ayas in Cilicia was a major 
trading centre, but only in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, after the Mamluk 
conquest of Antioch.
34
 
Primary Source Material 
A large number of primary sources provide information about the principality of 
Antioch or the kingdom of Cilicia during the thirteenth century, although there is much less 
evidence about these two states than the contemporary kingdom of Jerusalem. Many different 
chronicles, histories and annals help to provide a rough narrative of Antiochene and Cilician 
Armenian politics during this period. The most valuable of these are the Old French 
continuations of William of Tyre’s history and the Armenian chronicle attributed to Sempad 
the Constable. A detailed discussion of these two sources will follow as they provide more 
information about Antiochene-Cilician relations than any other history, and in both cases 
there is more than one version of the source. The chronicle attributed to Sempad is an account 
of the kingdom of Cilicia from a senior figure within the realm, and thus it supplies some 
evidence that cannot be found elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are no surviving narrative 
sources written by someone based in the principality of Antioch during the thirteenth century. 
Therefore, our knowledge of the Latin principality after 1188 comes from those who lived 
outside the territory and did not have strong personal knowledge of Antiochene affairs. 
In 1959 Der Nersessian argued that there were three known manuscripts of an 
Armenian chronicle written by Sempad the Constable, brother of King Hethoum I of Cilicia. 
In the nineteenth century two editions of this chronicle were published and two partial French 
translations were subsequently made.
35
 These publications were based on two manuscripts of 
‘fairly late date’ that were then stored in Etchmiadzin Cathedral and now reside at the 
Matenadaran in Yerevan.
36
 A third manuscript, dating from the late thirteenth or early 
fourteenth century, emerged in the 1870s and has been kept at the Library of San Lazzaro in 
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Venice ever since. Akelian published a copy of the Venice text in 1956, but Der Nersessian 
notes with some disappointment that it was not a critical edition.
37
 
There are quite a number of differences between the Etchmiadzin texts and the Venice 
manuscript. Both versions primarily follow the work of Matthew of Edessa and his 
continuator, Gregory the Priest, in their coverage of events between 951 and 1162. However, 
the Venice manuscript, which is longer in length, offers a fuller summary of Matthew’s 
chronicle and contains more than a dozen passages which are missing from the Etchmiadzin 
texts. The latter abbreviate Matthew of Edessa more often, but they still include two excerpts 
of his work which cannot be found in the longer redaction.
38
 
The contrast between the Etchmiadzin texts and the Venice manuscript is far more 
important when considering how they record the history of Armenian Cilicia between 1165 
and 1272, because this material is unique and is not found in any other chronicle. Dédéyan 
has outlined the events of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries that are described in the 
former, but are absent from the latter. Overall though, the Venice manuscript relates the 
history of this period in much greater detail than the Etchmiadzin texts, particularly for the 
years 1251-1272.
39
 This led Der Nersessian to conclude that the Etchmiadzin texts contain an 
abbreviated version of the content found in the Venice manuscript.
40
 Dédéyan, on the other 
hand, believes that both redactions derive from an older source and were written 
independently of each other.
41
 He also argues that Sempad the Constable may not be the 
author of this chronicle because most of the Armenian language used in the three surviving 
manuscripts is very different from the Cilician dialect used by King Hethoum I’s brother in 
his other works, such as the Assises d’Antioche.42 While Der Nersessian claims that the 
Venice manuscript ‘faithfully’ preserves a chronicle written by Sempad the Constable, 
Dédéyan suggests that it was actually composed by an anonymous senior figure within the 
kingdom of Cilicia, possibly from the royal chancery.
43
 
This thesis utilises the testimony of both versions of the chronicle attributed to 
Sempad the Constable via the French translations available. Unfortunately there is a 
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particularly large lacuna in the Venice manuscript which means the folios covering events 
between 1230 and 1251 are missing.
44
 Thus, the evidence of the Etchmiadzin texts for this 
period is of great importance. Both redactions contain some factual errors, notably when 
dating events related to the Byzantine Empire. Nevertheless, the evidence of the Venice 
manuscript is particularly valuable because of the detailed and relatively unpartisan way in 
which it records the history of Armenian Cilicia.
45
 
The chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable is the most significant work on 
Cilicia in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but several other key Armenian sources 
have aided the research of this thesis. The histories of Vardan the Great, Samuel of Ani, and 
Vahram of Edessa supply useful supplementary information about Cilicia and the Armenian 
monarchy.
46
 Furthermore, the work of Kirakos of Ganjak provides unique detail about some 
important events in the Armenian kingdom during the late twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries.
47
 These chroniclers were not from Cilicia, but the fact that most of their testimony 
is supported either by each other or by other sources suggests that they were relatively well 
informed of the situation there. The histories of Gregory of Akner, Hethoum II, and Hayton 
have also been used.
48
 
The chronicle of William of Tyre is the most detailed account of the Latin East in the 
twelfth century.
49
 William’s narrative ends in 1184, but his work was continued by various 
writers who wanted to update Western audiences on later events in the eastern Mediterranean. 
In the early thirteenth century William’s Latin chronicle was translated into Old French. 
Fifty-one manuscripts of the Old French translation dating from before 1500 have survived to 
the present day, and forty-five of these contain a continuation.
50
 Some of these manuscripts 
provide a narrative of events until 1277, while others end in 1231. 
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The Old French continuations of William of Tyre, usually known as Eracles, are 
some of the most important sources for those researching the thirteenth century Latin East, 
but there has been some debate amongst historians about which version is the oldest and most 
authoritative. Morgan argues that the Lyon manuscript is closer to a now lost original version 
of Eracles than any of the other surviving manuscripts, particularly for the period 1184-1197, 
and therefore its account is superior to the others.
51
 Edbury profoundly disagrees and asserts 
that it was ‘almost certainly’ produced later than other manuscripts, probably in the late 
1240s. He also suggests that the Lyon Ercales provides the longest account of events between 
1184 and 1197 because its compiler inserted original material of his own and not because the 
other versions contain an abbreviated form of this text.
52
 
Edbury’s research into the origins and development of the continuations of William of 
Tyre highlights the link between Eracles and another history of the Latin East – the chronicle 
of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer, often abbreviated as Ernoul-Bernard. There are eight 
surviving manuscripts of Ernoul-Bernard: five which end in 1227 or 1229 and identify 
Ernoul, the squire of Balian of Ibelin, as the author of a section relating to an incident which 
occurred in 1187; and three – two of which refer to Bernard, who may have been a monk at 
the abbey of Corbie – which end in 1231. Edbury observes that forty-one of the forty-five 
manuscripts containing an Old French continuation of William of Tyre include a narrative 
that is very similar to Ernoul-Bernard for the period 1184-1231. It would appear that in the 
1230s most translators of William of Tyre chose to insert an edited version of Ernoul-
Bernard onto the end of William’s chronicle in order to extend the narrative. These writers 
chose to jettison the material from Ernoul-Bernard covering events before 1184.
53
 
The four manuscripts containing a significantly different version of Eracles to 
Ernoul-Bernard can be divided in two. The aforementioned Lyon Eracles provides a similar 
narrative to a Florence manuscript for the years 1190-1197, although both are unique. While 
Morgan felt these texts were closest to the original version of Eracles, Edbury argues that 
these continuations were actually the last to be produced. Furthermore, Edbury points out that 
while the Lyon and Florence manuscripts include unique material in their coverage of events 
prior to 1197, they both follow the Ernoul-Bernard continuation from 1197 to 1231.
54
 The 
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other version of Eracles is known as the Colbert-Fontainebleau continuation, which survives 
in two manuscripts. Edbury suggests that it was produced in the early 1240s by a writer who 
decided to considerably expand the Ernoul-Bernard continuation. The author of the Colbert-
Fontainebleau version interwove new information with the Ernoul-Bernard narrative for the 
period after 1187 and wrote a completely new account of events between 1205 and the late 
1230s.
55
 
Edbury has noted that scholars are ‘ill-served by the printed editions’ of Eracles and 
Ernoul-Bernard as none of them are based upon the oldest and most authentic surviving 
manuscripts.
56
 The editors of the Recueil des historiens des croisades chose to base their 
edition of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre on the Colbert-Fontainebleau 
texts, while Morgan has composed an edition of the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of 
Eracles.
57
 Unfortunately, the most recent edition of Ernoul-Bernard, published in 1871 by de 
Mas Latrie,
58
 is based upon a fourteenth century manuscript and ignores earlier versions of 
the chronicle.
59
 
Edbury’s argument that the Ernoul-Bernard continuation is the oldest version is 
convincing, but this thesis still makes use of evidence from the Colbert-Fontainebleau, Lyon, 
and Florence manuscripts via the Recueil and Morgan editions because they contain valuable 
information that cannot be found in the chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer. For 
example, only the Lyon and Florence Eracles provide a detailed account of the Roupenid 
attempt to seize control of Antioch in c.1193. This testimony may have been written in the 
late 1240s, long after the events described, but that does not mean it should be disregarded. 
All versions of Eracles and Ernoul-Bernard focus primarily on the main crusading 
expeditions and the kingdom of Jerusalem. Therefore, all references within them to the 
principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia are significant because those states are 
only mentioned when events there were deemed interesting enough by the authors of the 
continuations to temporarily shift their focus away from the main subject. 
The narrative histories of Arabic and Persian writers are also of great importance 
because they offer an external perspective of events involving the Antiochenes and Cilician 
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Armenians. Furthermore, they often provide a more detailed description of military 
campaigns than Latin and Old French sources. For example, Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād and 
‘Imād ad-Dīn al-Isfahānī wrote fairly comprehensive accounts of Saladin’s incursion into 
northern Syria in 1188.
60
 Ibn al-Athīr’s major chronicle contains valuable information about 
that campaign and several other events relating to the principality of Antioch and the 
kingdom of Cilicia in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.
61
 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s 
history of the Mamluk sultan Baibars supplies crucial evidence about Mamluk attacks on the 
Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom in the 1260s.
62
 The chronicles of Ibn al-‘Adīm 
Kamāl al-Dīn and Ibn Bībī provide vital information over a longer period of time.  
Kamāl al-Dīn came from an elite family in Aleppo and held a number of senior 
positions within the city. Thus, his chief work – a history of Aleppo from the early Islamic 
period until 1243 – gives an Aleppan viewpoint of events in northern Syria.63 He is well 
informed on Aleppo’s relationship with the principality of Antioch in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. Kamāl al-Dīn’s insight into Aleppan involvement in the Antiochene 
succession dispute has been particularly useful for this thesis. Relevant extracts from Kamāl 
al-Dīn’s Aleppan history have been translated into French.64 Unfortunately, however, this 
translation has been criticised for its ‘poor quality’.65 Ibn Bībī was a high-ranking official in 
the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm in the thirteenth century. His history of the Seljuks provides a 
detailed account of Anatolian politics and events during the period 1190-1280 and is 
available in a respected German translation.
66
 Ibn Bībī’s knowledge of the Seljuk invasions of 
the kingdom of Cilicia make this work a vital source. 
The most detailed sources apart from chronicles are the letters written by or addressed 
to political and ecclesiastical leaders in the Near East. They provide evidence about the 
activities of rulers in northern Syria and southern Anatolia, and they also offer the perspective 
of men who were involved in the events taking place. This is particularly evident in the 
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correspondence between King Leon I of Cilicia and Pope Innocent III during the Antiochene 
succession dispute. All letters composed by the papacy which refer to the Armenian king or 
his people are vital for understanding the attitude of the Latin Church towards the Armenians 
– a theme explored in this thesis. 
The papal registers of Pope Gregory IX were published in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.
67
 Several scholars have been involved in editing the letters of 
Innocent III since the first volume was released in 1964, but unfortunately they have not yet 
published the correspondence for the latter part of his pontificate.
68
 Therefore, the Patrologia 
Latina is also used.
69
 Pressutti’s Regesta Honorii Papae III provides a summary of the letters 
of Honorius III.
70
 
Other letters which contain important information about the Antiochenes and their 
prince include those written by Thomas Bérard, the master of the Temple, and Thomas Agni, 
papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem in 1260.
71
 They describe how Antioch reacted to the 
arrival of the Mongols in northern Syria. The letters of Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre, 
provide some evidence about the activities of Bohemond IV in the early thirteenth century.
72
 
Charters – the legal documents which provide an official record of transactions such 
as the granting of property or rights – are another important source of information. 
Depending on how detailed these are they can be used identify the location of key figures on 
specific dates. Such data is extremely useful when trying to determine when the princes of 
Antioch were absent from their principality. Charters are also a good indicator of the state of 
relations between different individuals or institutions. For example, in 1207 Raymond-
Roupen granted Jabala to the Hospitallers, even though the town was actually in Ayyubid 
hands at that time. This arrangement reveals more about the Hospital’s position during the 
Antiochene succession dispute than it does about who actually possessed Jabala.
73
 The 
witness lists of charters also supply evidence about senior figures within the principality of 
Antioch, such as who supported Raymond-Roupen prior to his investiture as prince in 1216. 
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Unfortunately, the number of surviving charters relating to the principality of Antioch 
and the kingdom of Cilicia within the time period covered by this thesis is extremely small 
when compared to that of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.
74
 They can be found in collections 
such as the Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani and the Cartulaire de la Chancellerie Royale des 
Roupéniens.
75
 The cartularies of the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights provide evidence 
about the extent of their involvement in the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom.
76
 
The records of the Pisans and Genoese also contain documents recording the agreements that 
the princes of Antioch and kings of Cilicia made with these groups.
77
 
The Assises d’Antioche is a treatise on the law of the principality of Antioch. The 
original Old French version has not survived, but it was translated into Armenian by Sempad 
the Constable before the fall of Antioch in 1268.
78
 This demonstrates that senior figures in the 
kingdom of Cilicia were interested in Antiochene law and perhaps hoped that similar legal 
customs could be established in their own realm. The Assises d’Antioche was originally 
composed ‘at some point between the end of the twelfth century and the year 1219’.79 
Therefore, it provides evidence about the Latin principality after it was substantially reduced 
in size by Saladin’s conquests in 1188. The Assises d’Antioche is available in a French 
translation of the Armenian text made by Alishan in the nineteenth century.
80
 
All these sources have been used to gain an understanding of the principality of 
Antioch and its relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia for the years 1188-1268. However, 
there are some gaps in the source material which make it difficult to properly assess the 
political situation in both states for the whole period. There is relatively little evidence about 
events in the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom during the 1230s and 1240s 
compared to earlier and later decades. This can be partly explained by a large lacuna in the 
Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable. However, another 
reason why the narrative histories offer such scant coverage of the principality of Antioch and 
the kingdom of Cilicia in the years prior to King Louis IX of France’s arrival in the Near East 
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may be that the political and territorial situation was relatively stable in these states and 
therefore chroniclers felt there was little of interest to record. 
Another concern is that the surviving sources may offer a distorted picture of what 
actually happened and the attitudes of important individuals. For example, during the 
Antiochene succession dispute Pope Innocent III corresponded with Count Bohemond of 
Tripoli and King Leon I of Cilicia. However, the pontiff’s letters to and from the Tripolitan 
count have not been preserved, whereas his correspondence with the Armenian king has. 
Thus, Leon’s testimony on developments in the conflict is not balanced by evidence from 
Bohemond. The Armenian king may not have lied in his correspondence with Innocent, but it 
is likely that he was selective in what he reported to the pope and he certainly presented his 
role in events in a favourable light. The absence of Bohemond’s perspective diminishes our 
understanding of the Antiochene succession dispute. Furthermore, if Innocent’s letters to the 
Tripolitan count had survived then it would be possible to contrast the manner in which the 
pope addressed these adversaries. 
The Principality of Antioch and Its Relationship with the Kingdom of 
Cilicia, 1188-1268 
A brief historical overview of the Latin principality will now be provided in order to 
contextualise the events that are subsequently discussed in this thesis. The Armenians of 
Cilicia and the Latins of Antioch fought against each other on several occasions prior to 
1188, and they also allied together in order to resist common enemies. Much of the early 
conflict between them was due to their divergent interests – the Antiochenes sought to 
incorporate Cilicia into their principality, while the Armenians living in the region wanted to 
establish their own independent lordships or principalities. In the early twelfth century, 
Tancred of Antioch led several campaigns into Cilicia in order to capture the towns of Tarsus, 
Adana and Mamistra. He was eventually successful in establishing Latin rule over them and 
for a short period they were part of the principality of Antioch.
81
 In the long term, however, 
the Cilician plain did not remain under Antiochene control and it was the Armenians who 
came to dominate this region. 
The Roupenids gradually established themselves as the most powerful Armenian 
dynasty in Cilicia, but others, such as the Hethoumids of Lampron, also maintained small 
lordships in the area for much of the twelfth century. The Roupenid principality was initially 
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based around the mountain fortress of Vahka after it was captured by Constantine, son of 
Roupen I, in the 1090s. The conquests made by Thoros I and Leon I significantly expanded 
the Roupenid principality, but many of these gains were lost to the Byzantines during 
Emperor John I Comnenus’ campaign in 1137-1138. Thoros II and Mleh recovered this 
territory and consolidated their hold over it so that by 1174 Roupenid rule ‘was firmly 
established over nearly the whole of Cilicia’.82 Leon II made further conquests, including the 
Hethoumid fortress of Lampron, after inheriting the Roupenid principality in 1187. Thus, by 
the end of the twelfth century all the most important castles and cities in Cilicia were under 
Roupenid control. 
While the Roupenid principality expanded significantly during the second half of the 
twelfth century, the Latin principality of Antioch was considerably reduced in size by one 
military campaign in the summer of 1188. Saladin captured the coastal cities of Jabala and 
Latakia in July and followed this success by taking several fortresses, including Bourzey, 
Saône, and Darbsak.
83
 After the annexation of Baghras on 26 September, Saladin agreed to 
an eight month truce with Prince Bohemond III of Antioch.
84
 
In c.1191 Leon II of the Roupenid principality occupied the castle of Baghras after it 
had been abandoned by the garrison left in place by Saladin.
85
 For more than two decades he 
was able to use his possession of this fortress to the detriment of the Latin rulers of Antioch. 
In 1193 the Roupenid prince invited Bohemond III to meet him at Baghras. Shortly after 
arriving at the castle, however, Bohemond was arrested and tortured by Leon.
86
 The latter 
then sent Hethoum of Sassoun to capture Antioch, but the Roupenid army was rebuffed by 
the Antiochenes, who subsequently established a commune.
87
 Bohemond was taken to Sis 
where he was imprisoned for several months.
88
 
Bohemond III was released in 1194 after making a number of concessions to the 
Roupenids, including an agreement that his eldest son, Raymond, was to be married to 
Leon’s eldest niece, Alice. The marriage, which took place shortly after Bohemond’s release, 
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was to have profound repercussions for the future of the principality of Antioch.
89
 The 
chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable recorded that it was agreed that the eldest born 
son of this union would be the heir of Leon and he would eventually succeed his father as 
prince of Antioch.
90
 The future of the Latin principality was thus entwined with that of 
Armenian Cilicia. Antiochene succession plans were then severely disrupted when Raymond 
died just a few years after his marriage to Alice.
91
 To complicate matters further, Raymond’s 
widow was pregnant and she later gave birth to a son. Leon welcomed the arrival of his great-
nephew, known to modern historians as Raymond-Roupen, and instantly recognised him as 
his heir.
92
 The death of Raymond left Bohemond III with two possible successors – his 
second son, Count Bohemond of Tripoli, or his newly born grandson, Raymond-Roupen. 
On 6 January 1198 Leon was crowned king of the Armenians and therefore the 
Roupenid principality in Cilicia became an Armenian kingdom.
93
 His coronation was 
attended by Conrad, archbishop of Mainz, who subsequently baptised Raymond-Roupen.
94
 
Shortly after the christening Prince Bohemond III of Antioch decided to designate Raymond-
Roupen as his lawful heir and ordered his barons to swear allegiance to the boy.
95
 Thus, in 
1198 a baby less than a year old stood to inherit the kingdom of Cilicia from his great-uncle 
and the principality of Antioch from his paternal grandfather. 
Count Bohemond of Tripoli hoped to succeed his father as prince of Antioch and 
decided to take matters into his own hands after Raymond-Roupen was designated the lawful 
heir to the Latin principality. In the winter of 1198-1199 the Tripolitan count expelled Prince 
Bohemond III from Antioch and took control of the principality with the support of the 
Antiochene commune. Bohemond III regained power at Antioch with the assistance of a 
Cilician Armenian army after three months in exile, but his restoration merely delayed a 
prolonged conflict between Count Bohemond of Tripoli and King Leon I of Cilicia.
96
 
The Tripolitan count took control of the Latin principality and was recognised as 
Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch by the Antiochene commune shortly after his father’s death 
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in 1201.
97
 After learning that Bohemond of Tripoli had claimed the principality, Leon sent a 
Cilician Armenian army to besiege Antioch.
98
 The Armenian king was determined to ensure 
that Raymond-Roupen succeeded Bohemond III as prince, and he was prepared to forcibly 
remove Bohemond IV from Antioch in order to achieve that objective. However, in July 1201 
the Seljuks invaded Cilicia and Leon was forced to withdraw his troops from the Latin 
principality in order to defend the Armenian kingdom.
99
 
From 1202 onwards, Pope Innocent III tried to peacefully resolve the Antiochene 
succession dispute. He was in regular contact with Bohemond IV and King Leon I, and the 
papal legates trying to mediate between the two of them. However, the Tripolitan count 
consistently refused to countenance relinquishing control of the principality of Antioch. Leon 
engaged with Innocent and his legates in the hope that they would support Raymond-
Roupen’s claim to the Latin principality. After becoming frustrated by the early lack of 
diplomatic progress the Armenian king took military action. In November 1203 a Cilician 
Armenian army entered Antioch during the night and came very close to capturing the city.
100
 
Leon’s men were then attacked by the Templars and forced to retreat back to Cilicia when an 
Aleppan force advanced towards Antioch and reached the Orontes River.
101
 
Bohemond IV appears to have spent the whole of 1205 in the county of Tripoli after 
becoming embroiled in a conflict with Renaud of Nephin over the baron’s marriage to the 
daughter and heiress of the lord of Gibelcar without Bohemond’s permission.102 During the 
Tripolitan count’s absence from the Latin principality the Cilician Armenians ransacked the 
area around Antioch and laid siege to the city, seemingly with the intention of trying to starve 
the garrison into surrender. However, the Aleppans hindered the blockade by resupplying 
Antioch and Leon’s forces were unable to capture the city.103 
In 1206 the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, was excommunicated by 
Peter of Saint Marcellus, a papal legate. Bohemond IV subsequently installed the Greek 
patriarch of Antioch, Simeon II, in the cathedral of St Peter, thereby effectively replacing 
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Peter of Angoulême.
104
 The Tripolitan count ignored calls to expel Simeon and restore Peter 
of Angoulême after the latter had resolved his differences with the papacy.
105
 The Latin 
patriarch responded by participating in a revolt against Bohemond in late 1207. However, the 
rebels were crushed at Antioch by the count of Tripoli’s forces and Peter of Angoulême was 
imprisoned.
106
 The Cilician Armenians continued to raid the Latin principality during this 
period,
107
 but there is no evidence that King Leon I was involved in Peter’s rebellion. 
In late 1210 or early 1211 the Cilician Armenians marched into the Amanus 
Mountains, on the frontier between the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality, and 
seized land and property belonging to the Order of the Temple. Leon’s troops subsequently 
attacked a force of Templar knights led by William of Chartres, the Master of the Temple.
108
 
Pope Innocent III excommunicated the Armenian king after news of these events reached 
Rome.
109
 The pontiff lifted the sentence of excommunication against Leon in March 1213, 
but his behaviour had discouraged the papacy from supporting Raymond-Roupen’s claim to 
the principality of Antioch.
110
 A major breakthrough in the Antiochene succession dispute 
finally arrived in February 1216 when King Leon I led an army to Antioch and entered the 
city during the night. The Armenian king swiftly secured control of the metropolis by 
stationing soldiers throughout the streets of Antioch while most Antiochenes were still 
asleep. Raymond-Roupen was hastily invested as the prince of Antioch and within a few days 
Bohemond IV’s supporters, who had sought refuge in the Antiochene citadel, surrendered.111 
King Leon I appears to have remained at Antioch until the autumn of 1216, but the 
kingdom of Cilicia suffered in his absence. The Seljuk sultan, ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I, 
marched south with a large Turkish army and laid siege to the fortress of Gaban in eastern 
Cilicia.
112
 Kay-Kāwūs I eventually withdrew from the Armenian kingdom after becoming 
frustrated by his inability to capture Gaban, but he did manage to inflict a serious defeat on a 
Cilician Armenian army during the campaign.
113
 There was little collaboration between the 
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principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia in military and diplomatic affairs after 
1216. This may be explained by Bar Hebraeus’ account of a quarrel between Leon and 
Raymond-Roupen, caused by the ambitions of the latter.
114
 In the spring of 1219 Bohemond 
IV travelled north from the county of Tripoli and seized control of Antioch.
115
 His return to 
power effectively marked the end of the Antiochene succession dispute. Raymond-Roupen 
fled to Cilicia and quickly became embroiled in the politics of the Armenian kingdom. 
Bohemond IV’s right to rule the principality of Antioch was unchallenged thereafter. 
The death of King Leon I in May 1219 sparked a succession dispute in Cilicia.
116
 
Constantine, baillie of the Armenian kingdom, was at the head of a group of Cilician 
Armenian barons that were determined to ensure that Isabel, Leon’s designated heir and 
youngest child, inherited the throne. Raymond-Roupen sailed from Damietta, where he had 
won the backing of the Hospitallers and the papal legate Pelagius, to Tarsus in order to claim 
the Armenian kingdom for himself.
117
 Leon’s great-nephew received some support from 
within Cilicia, but his forces were crushed by Constantine in 1221. Raymond-Roupen was 
then imprisoned and appears to have died shortly afterwards, although the exact date and 
cause of his death are unclear.
118
 John of Brienne briefly emerged as a third candidate for the 
crown of Armenian Cilicia, but he dropped out of contention after his wife – Leon’s eldest 
daughter, Stephanie – and child suddenly died.119 
In 1222 Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, was married to Philip, son of Prince 
Bohemond IV.
120
 Her husband was subsequently crowned king of Cilicia, and the Armenian 
kingdom entered into a formal alliance with the neighbouring principality of Antioch. Peace 
and co-operation between the two states had finally been established, but it lasted less than 
three years. After a short spell as king consort of Cilicia, Philip was arrested and imprisoned 
by a group of Cilician Armenian barons in late 1224.
121
 Bohemond IV was angered by the 
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treatment of his son and responded by invading the Armenian kingdom and encouraging the 
Seljuks to do the same.
122
 The Seljuks captured several fortresses in Cilicia in 1225, but the 
count of Tripoli failed to make any conquests or liberate his son. Philip was murdered and a 
new dynasty seized power in the Armenian kingdom. In 1226 Hethoum, son of Constantine, 
married Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, and was crowned king of the Armenians at 
Tarsus.
123
 
The deposition and murder of Philip damaged Antiochene-Cilician relations for a 
generation and both sides appear to have remained hostile to each other for more than twenty 
years. There is no record of an alliance or co-operation of any kind between the principality 
of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia during this period. However, there was also relatively 
little military conflict between them – Hethoum did not besiege Antioch or pillage the Latin 
principality for long periods as King Leon I had done. Bohemond IV died in early 1233 and 
was succeeded by his eldest son, Bohemond V, as prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli.
124
 
The evidence about Bohemond V is quite limited, but he appears to have made preparations 
to invade Cilicia with Templar support in the 1230s. He chose not to attack the Armenian 
kingdom, however, after Constantine, the father of King Hethoum I, negotiated a peace 
agreement with the Templars.
125
 
In the late 1230s Bohemond V tried to damage the monarchy of the Armenian 
kingdom through diplomacy, rather than invading Cilicia. In April 1237 Pope Gregory IX 
wrote to the archbishop of Nazareth asking him to investigate whether the marriage of King 
Hethoum I and Queen Isabel of Cilicia should be annulled on the grounds of consanguinity. 
The pontiff suggested that he had been inundated with requests from the prince of Antioch to 
dissolve their union.
126
 Hethoum fiercely protested against the threat of annulment to his 
marriage and Gregory IX’s decree that the Cilician Armenians should recognise the 
supremacy of the Latin patriarch of Antioch. In 1239 the pope reversed his decision to reduce 
the autonomy of the Armenian Church and acknowledged that the marriage of Hethoum and 
Isabel was legitimate.
127
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There is very little evidence about the affairs of the principality of Antioch in the 
1240s, but towards the end of the decade steps were taken to heal its hostile relationship with 
the kingdom of Cilicia. Shortly after King Louis IX of France had arrived at Cyprus in 
September 1248 he was approached by Cilician Armenian envoys who informed him of the 
animosity that existed between Hethoum and Bohemond V. The French king subsequently 
helped to improve Antiochene-Cilician relations by bringing representatives of the Latin 
principality and the Armenian kingdom together, and encouraging them to make peace.
128
 
However, an alliance between the two states was not established until after Bohemond V’s 
death in 1252. Bohemond VI had not reached the age of majority, but he succeeded his father 
as the prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli after being knighted by King Louis IX of 
France.
129
 King Hethoum I used the opportunity provided by this change of leadership to 
strengthen ties between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. In 1254 Bohemond 
VI married Hethoum’s daughter, Sibylle, thereby cementing an alliance between the two 
states which would last until the fall of Antioch in 1268.
130
 
King Hethoum I travelled to Karakorum in 1253 and arrived back in Cilicia in 1256 
after submitting to Möngke Khan and strengthening ties between the Mongols and the 
Cilician Armenians.
131
 There is some evidence of an improved relationship between the 
rulers of the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom following Hethoum’s return. 
Bohemond VI journeyed to Cilicia in November 1256 in order to witness the Armenian 
king’s eldest son, Leon, being knighted at Mamistra.132 Hethoum subsequently travelled to 
Tripoli in 1259 to meet with the prince of Antioch.
133
 
Both King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI appear to have met and collaborated 
with the Mongols who conquered most of Syria in the first half of 1260.
134
 During this 
period, Bohemond VI submitted to Hülegü, the younger brother of Möngke Khan, and 
Mongol suzerainty was established over both the principality of Antioch and the county of 
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Tripoli.
135
 With the support of the Mongols, the Antiochene prince was subsequently able to 
reconquer a substantial amount of territory which had belonged to the Latin principality prior 
to 1188. The prince’s forces seized Darkoush and a number of other fortresses to the east of 
Antioch, and they were also able to capture the coastal city of Latakia.
136
 The principality of 
Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia initially benefitted from the Mongols’ arrival in the Near 
East, but they both suffered immensely after a Mongol army was massacred by the Mamluks 
at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260.
137
 
In the 1260s the Antiochenes and Cilician Armenians found themselves under threat 
from an aggressive Mamluk enemy. The Mamluks invaded the principality of Antioch in 
1262, capturing the port of St Simeon and plundering the surrounding area.
138
 They may even 
have besieged the city of Antioch itself, but their departure was hastened by the arrival of a 
Mongol army.
139
 The Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians continued to align themselves 
with the Mongols, with King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI visiting the court of 
Hülegü in Azerbaijan in 1264.
140
 After they had returned to the Near East, the Armenian king 
led an army into northern Syria in the winter of 1264-1265.
141
 The Cilician Armenians were 
joined by Mongol and Antiochene troops, but they were forced to abandon the campaign 
because of severe weather.
142
 
In August 1266 the Mamluks invaded Cilicia, comprehensively defeated a Cilician 
Armenian army, and sacked several cities and fortresses in the Armenian kingdom.
143
 
Hethoum’s realm was severely weakened, but it survived because the Mamluk force 
withdrew in September, rather than seeking to hold its conquests and permanently occupy 
Cilicia. On the other hand, the principality of Antioch crumbled when it was attacked two 
years later. In May 1268 the Mamluks surrounded the city of Antioch and easily 
overwhelmed the garrison after deciding to attack. They massacred many of the city’s 
inhabitants and imprisoned or enslaved the others.
144
 The Mamluk conquest ended 170 years 
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of Latin rule at Antioch and without this metropolis the surrounding principality effectively 
ceased to exist. Bohemond VI continued to rule the county of Tripoli, but he made no serious 
effort to re-occupy Antioch and rebuild his northern polity. 
The Principality of Antioch’s Most Important Relationship 
This thesis concentrates on the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the 
relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. Consideration is also 
given to economic and religious matters where they impact on relations between the political 
elites of these two states. This study examines the principal factors influencing Antiochene-
Cilician relations between 1188 and 1268 in six thematic chapters. Such an approach 
provides a thorough analysis of the relationship and demonstrates why it was so significant. 
The activities of the Cilician Armenians had a massive impact on the principality of Antioch 
during this period. They hindered the Latin principality’s recovery from the territorial losses 
it suffered in 1188 by attacking Antioch in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and 
they encouraged Bohemond VI and the Antiochenes to align with the Mongols in the 1260s. 
By analysing Antiochene-Cilician relations between 1188 and 1268, this thesis offers a new 
perspective on the thirteenth century principality of Antioch. 
This study begins with an analysis of the Antiochene nobility. The territorial losses 
suffered by the Latin principality in 1188 dramatically reduced the number of major lordships 
within its frontiers. The effect of this transformation on the nobility is considered. 
Furthermore, a small prosopographical study, using the limited evidence available, shows 
how some previously influential noble families appear to have fallen out of favour in the 
thirteenth century, while others remained part of the principality’s elite. The role of the 
nobility in the Antiochene succession dispute is also analysed in detail. Antiochene nobles are 
hardly mentioned, either individually or collectively, in the narrative sources after Bohemond 
IV reclaimed the principality of Antioch in 1219. This suggests that their influence on the 
relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom was at its greatest 
during the Antiochene succession dispute, when many joined the Cilician Armenians in 
trying to seize control of Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as prince. The impact of the 
Cilician Armenian nobility on their kingdom’s relationship with the principality of Antioch is 
also examined. 
The second chapter provides a detailed analysis of the commune of Antioch. It charts 
the development of the commune from its foundation in c.1193 to the end of the Antiochene 
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succession dispute in 1219, when it is last mentioned in the sources. The question of what 
happened to the commune beyond 1219 is also contemplated. The structure of the Antiochene 
commune is examined and compared with the Italian communes that rose to prominence in 
the Middle Ages. Finally, the commune’s role in the Antiochene succession dispute is 
analysed, and consideration is given as to how much influence the institution actually had on 
the political affairs of the Latin principality in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
The military orders had a strong presence in both the principality of Antioch and the 
kingdom of Cilicia, and therefore their impact on the relationship between these two states is 
assessed. The Templars possessed several castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains on the 
frontier between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. Thus, the Order was well 
positioned to intervene when these territories were in conflict. The Hospitallers and the 
Teutonic Knights were major landowners in Cilicia because of their strong links with the 
Armenian monarchy. This thesis provides a brief summary of the possessions of the three 
largest military orders in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. It then 
examines their role in the Antiochene and Cilician succession disputes. The activities of the 
Templars on the frontier between the two states in the 1230s are also considered. The military 
orders appear to have had little involvement in Antiochene-Cilician relations in the three 
decades before the fall of Antioch. 
The principality of Antioch was under the control of Bohemond IV between 1201 and 
1216, and from 1219 until his death in 1233. His son, Bohemond V, and grandson, 
Bohemond VI, subsequently ruled the state until the fall of Antioch in 1268. Throughout the 
thirteenth century this dynasty also ruled the county of Tripoli, which lay further south on the 
eastern coastline of the Mediterranean. This meant that the Antiochene prince was often 
absent from his principality and he was not solely focused on its governance. This thesis 
considers whether Bohemond IV and his successors spent more of their time at Antioch or 
Tripoli and analyses the effect that their absences had on Antiochene-Cilician relations. 
The principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia did not exist in isolation, and 
therefore their relationship must have been at least partly shaped by the actions of other rulers 
in northern Syria and southern Anatolia. In the first half of the thirteenth century the 
Ayyubids of Aleppo and the Seljuks of Rūm were the other major powers in this region. Both 
were involved in the Antiochene succession dispute and so their role in this conflict and its 
aftermath has been examined in detail. The power balance of this region was altered by the 
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arrival of the Mongols in the Near East. King Hethoum I of Cilicia and Prince Bohemond VI 
of Antioch submitted to the Mongols, and both suffered the wrath of the Mamluks of Egypt, 
who attacked the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom several times during the 
1260s. After assessing the impact on these four non-Christian powers on Antiochene-Cilician 
relations, this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical environment of 
northern Syria and southern Anatolia, explaining how the princes of Antioch interacted with 
other rulers in the region. 
The final chapter considers the influence of ethnicity and religion on the relationship 
between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. The former was a state 
governed by Latin Christians originally from western Europe, while the latter was dominated 
by Armenian Christians whose roots lay in the Caucasus. This thesis contemplates how the 
Antiochenes interacted with the Armenians of the Near East. It then examines the levels of 
intermarriage between Latins and Armenians, with a specific focus on the matrimonial unions 
made between the ruling dynasties of Antioch and Cilicia. The relationship between the 
papacy and the Cilician Armenians is subsequently analysed. This thesis argues that 
Antiochenes did not oppose King Leon I because of their ethnic and religious differences 
with the Cilician Armenians. In many respects, the kingdom of Cilicia was treated the same 
as the Latin states in the Near East by the papacy and the military orders. 
 
37 
 
Chapter One: The Nobility of the Principality of 
Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia 
Numerous studies have been made of the nobility in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but it 
would be mistaken to assume that their conclusions also apply to the rest of the Latin East.
1
 
Much less research has been conducted into the nobility of the principality of Antioch. Cahen 
has investigated the relationship between Antiochene lords and vassals, largely by focusing 
on the provisions of the Assises d’Antioche.2 He has also tried to locate the principality’s 
landed fiefs and identify which noble families possessed them.
3
 Asbridge has identified the 
Antiochene landowners in the earliest years of the principality and examined the nature of 
lordship prior to 1130.
4
 Furthermore, several historians have analysed the names of 
Antiochene nobles and concluded that a large proportion of them probably had Norman 
origins.
5
 However, the question of how the nobility was affected by the loss of numerous 
lordships in 1188 remains unanswered. The existing scholarship on the Antiochene nobility is 
overwhelmingly focused on the twelfth century and does not properly consider how it may 
have evolved in the thirteenth century. 
This chapter examines the scale of the territorial losses suffered by the principality of 
Antioch in 1188 and considers how this affected the composition of the nobility thereafter. A 
small prosopographical study will also show how some longstanding noble families remained 
part of the principality’s political elite, while others appear to have fallen out of favour. The 
nobility seems to have been weakened by Saladin’s campaign in 1188 and become more 
dependent on the patronage of the prince. This helps to explain the behaviour of the Latin 
knights who supported Raymond-Roupen during the Antiochene succession dispute and the 
lack of evidence for any challenge to the authority of the prince after the conflict ended in 
1219. The role of the Cilician Armenian barons in shaping their kingdom’s relationship with 
the principality of Antioch will also be analysed. 
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The Composition of the Antiochene Nobility after 1188 
During the summer of 1188 Saladin captured a large number of Antiochene towns and 
fortresses, beginning with the annexation of Jabala on 15 July and ending with the occupation 
of Baghras on 26 September.
6
 The author of the Historia de Expeditione Friderici 
Imperatoris reflected upon the scale of the devastation by writing that ‘almost the whole 
principality apart from our mighty castle of Margat has been laid waste and lost’.7 In late 
September, Prince Bohemond III of Antioch sent messengers to Saladin requesting peace. 
The sultan reluctantly agreed to an eight month truce with the prince because his troops were 
tired and some of the emirs in his service wished to return to their homes.
8
 Saladin then 
withdrew to Aleppo, before eventually heading south to Damascus.
9
 
Bohemond III subsequently led a number of raids into lands that had previously been 
part of the Latin principality. However, these expeditions were unsuccessful and the prince’s 
army returned to Antioch having suffered heavy casualties.
10
 The Antiochenes probably 
realised that they would be unable to recapture the castles and port cities that Saladin had 
conquered and therefore Bohemond decided to meet the sultan in person to try and negotiate 
their return. In 1192 the prince of Antioch travelled to Beirut, where he was granted an 
audience with Saladin.
11
 According to Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, the sultan bestowed the 
Amouq valley, the fortress of Arzghan ‘and farms whose produce was worth 15,000 dinars’ 
upon Bohemond III.
12
 However, ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, Abū Shāma, and ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn 
Shaddād recorded that the prince was actually given a pension of 20,000 dinars which would 
come from the revenues of land in the vicinity of Antioch.
13
 
If Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād is correct then Bohemond III did manage to recover 
some of the principality’s former territory through diplomacy. Nevertheless, by the time of 
Saladin’s death in 1193 the Latin principality was reduced to little more than a rump around 
Antioch and therefore there was a shortage of land which could be held by knights as fiefs. 
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The sources do not record any further expansion in the size of the principality, either though 
diplomacy or conquest, until 1260 when the arrival of the Mongols in Syria helped 
Bohemond VI to occupy ‘fortresses and lands’ which had formerly belonged to Antioch.14 
Thus, the principality of Antioch remained small for most of the thirteenth century and it 
could not have sustained many knights through landed fiefs alone. 
There were 700 knights in the Antiochene force which fought at the battle of the Field 
of Blood in 1119, according to Walter the Chancellor.
15
 This figure has been accepted by 
Smail and Asbridge as a realistic number.
16
 However, Smail argues that the number of 
knights in the principality of Antioch would probably have declined ‘considerably’ over the 
course of the twelfth century due to territorial losses.
17
 This contention is based on the idea 
that as the principality shrank in size there would be less land available to grant to knights as 
fiefs, and without land to provide an income knights would have to leave and find another 
lord. In the thirteenth century, the Antiochenes tended to avoid pitched battles and thus few 
sources provide evidence about the number of knights in the principality. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir 
recorded that in the winter of 1263-1264 150 knights were sent from Antioch to join the 
Cilician Armenian army which had marched into northern Syria in order to confront the 
Mamluks.
18
 This was not necessarily the full military strength of the principality because 
some knights may have remained at Antioch in order to defend the city. Nevertheless, the 
plausible account given by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir suggests that in the 1260s the principality of 
Antioch was still able to sustain at least 150 knights, despite its relatively small size. 
After losing so much territory in 1188 it seems improbable that there was enough land 
in the Latin principality to provide each of the 150 knights with their own landed fief. 
Therefore, it is possible that there was a growth in the use of money fiefs after 1188 in order 
to provide an income for the knights that did not possess much land. Money fiefs were widely 
used in the neighbouring kingdom of Jerusalem after it was devastated by invasion in 1187.
19
 
                                                          
14
 IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647. See also DSN, p. 45. 
15
 Walter the Chancellor, ‘Bella Antiochena’, RHC Occ V, pp. 108-109; Walter the Chancellor’s The Antiochene 
Wars, trans. T.S. Asbridge and S.B. Edgington (Aldershot, 1999), p. 128. 
16
 T.S. Asbridge, ‘The significance and causes of the battle of the Field of Blood’, Journal of Medieval History, 23 
(1997), p. 307; R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1995), p. 90. 
17
 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 90. Marshall suggests that feudal service in the principality of Antioch would 
still have produced ‘several hundred knights’ in the late twelfth century. C. Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, 
1192-1291 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 51-52, n. 20. 
18
 IAZ, 2, p. 505. 
19
 Prior to attacking the principality of Antioch in 1188, Saladin had conquered most of the kingdom of 
Jerusalem. H.E. Mayer, The Crusades, trans. J.B. Gillingham, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1988), pp. 135-136; S. 
Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1951-1954), 2, pp. 460-473. 
40 
 
In the Latin kingdom there were three types of money fief: first, a lord paid a vassal a fixed 
sum each year; second, a lord made an annual payment to a vassal on the rents and revenues 
of a village; third, a lord granted the income from one of his sources of revenue, such as a 
gate or a group of markets, to a vassal.
20
 Furthermore, Riley-Smith asserts that ‘many vassals 
held mixed fiefs, consisting partly of land and partly of rents in money or kind’.21 
The kingdom of Jerusalem appears to have experienced an expansion of the money 
fief system in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Both the Latin kingdom and the 
principality of Antioch lost vast swathes of land and numerous fortresses and towns after 
being invaded by Saladin in the late 1180s. However, the kingdom of Jerusalem made a 
partial recovery during the Third Crusade (1189-1192) and its aftermath.
22
 The composition 
of the nobility of the Latin kingdom was shaped by the reconquest of the coastline between 
Tyre and Jaffa. Several historians have identified two tiers in the nobility of the thirteenth 
century kingdom of Jerusalem – first, a small number of elite barons, and second, a 
considerable array of simple knights. The great lords of the realm controlled wealthy cities on 
the Palestinian coast, which provided them with very large revenues. Many knights were 
financially dependent on these affluent barons and provided them with military service in 
return for cash payments.
23
 Donnachie argues that a ‘social and political gulf’ developed 
between the elite barons and lesser knights based on ‘economic might’.24 
It seems unlikely that a division on this scale emerged amongst the Antiochene 
nobility because the Latin principality did not recover much territory after it had been 
decimated by Saladin in 1188. Apart from the possessions of the military orders, Qusair is the 
only fortress that was definitely under Antiochene control during the first half of thirteenth 
century, but it belonged to the patriarch of Antioch.
25
 If Arzghan was given to Bohemond III 
after his meeting with Saladin in 1192, as Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād suggests, then there is no 
evidence that any prince subsequently chose to bestow the stronghold on one of his vassals as 
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a fief.
26
 Antioch – the only city in the Latin principality between 1188 and 1260 – had been 
part of the princely demesne since Bohemond of Taranto took full control of the metropolis 
in early 1099.
27
 The port of St Simeon also remained in Antiochene hands throughout the first 
half of the thirteenth century, but the sources give no indication that it belonged to any noble 
during this period.
28
 Charter evidence confirms that some knights continued to hold estates in 
the rural areas which remained part of the principality of Antioch,
29
 but the lordships based 
around castles such as Saône and Bourzey were destroyed and it is unlikely that any noble 
had extensive landholdings in the thirteenth century. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest 
that any Antiochene noble enjoyed the high levels of income necessary to act as the patron of 
a large number of knights. 
The contraction of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 and its subsequent expansion in 
the decade that followed actually weakened the position of the king within the realm. The 
royal demesne was reduced to Acre and Tyre while the rest of the Latin Kingdom’s key 
coastal cities, such as Jaffa and Caesarea, came into the possession of a small number of elite 
barons.
30
 Consequently, a group of prosperous lords emerged that had enough strength 
collectively to challenge the power of the king. Indeed, these barons actually fought and 
defeated the forces of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II during a bitter civil war that 
lasted from 1229 to 1243.
31
 There is no evidence that an elite faction of nobles emerged in the 
thirteenth century principality of Antioch that was capable of seriously undermining the 
prince’s authority. The prince’s possession of the only large city in a small principality 
almost certainly ensured that his income was considerably higher than any other Antiochene 
lord and this meant that he could act as the patron of far more knights than anyone else. 
The prince of Antioch had not always been in such a dominant position. Prior to 1188, 
several Antiochene nobles possessed significant lordships and when they united together they 
posed a serious threat to the power of the prince or regent. In the 1130s King Fulk of 
Jerusalem’s regency of Antioch was severely undermined by Princess Alice and her 
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supporters,
32
 while Bohemond III faced a baronial revolt in c.1181 after he confiscated 
Church property and became embroiled in a dispute with the patriarch of Antioch.
33
 Many 
Antiochene nobles lost their lordships in 1188 and as a result their ability to challenge the 
authority of the prince would have been reduced, especially if some former lords 
subsequently became his vassals in return for money fiefs because he would then have had 
the power to withdraw their source of income if they opposed him. During the Antiochene 
succession dispute many nobles resisted Bohemond IV’s rule of the Latin principality, but 
that was because they were able to serve under King Leon I of Cilicia before Raymond-
Roupen was invested as prince in 1216.
34
 The Armenian king almost certainly provided his 
great-nephew’s Antiochene supporters with an income during the conflict as it is difficult to 
see how they could have collected revenue from any estates or property they possessed within 
the principality. There is no record of any attempt to challenge the power of the prince after 
Bohemond IV regained control of Antioch in 1219. 
The Tripolitan nobles seem to have been much more assertive and rebellious than 
their Antiochene counterparts. For example, in the early thirteenth century Renaud of Nephin 
married the daughter and sole heir of the lord of Akkar without the permission of Bohemond 
IV.
35
 The count of Tripoli later seized the lordships of Nephin and Akkar after he became 
embroiled in a military conflict with Renaud.
36
 The fact that Renaud was willing to defy and 
fight against Bohemond demonstrates the power and independence of the Tripolitan nobility. 
Several decades later, Bohemond VI also faced revolts from the barons in the county of 
Tripoli, notably in 1258.
37
 
The charter evidence supports the view that thirteenth century Antiochene nobles 
possessed considerably less land and property than their twelfth century predecessors. 
Asbridge has used charters and the testimony of chroniclers to produce a database of all the 
identifiable lay landholders in the principality of Antioch for the period 1098-1130.
38
 Some 
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of these men and women held substantial lordships and therefore they were willing and able 
to donate land and villages to religious institutions and the military orders. For example, in 
1114 Roger of Salerno, prince of Antioch, confirmed in a charter the grants made to the 
monastery of Notre-Dame de Josaphat by Robert of Laitor and several other lords.
39
 Later in 
the twelfth century, some Antiochene nobles, such as Roger of Saône and Reynald Masoir, 
issued their own charters without referring to the prince.
40
 Such behaviour suggests that the 
most powerful lords in the principality acted independently and did not need the consent of 
the prince to make donations. In the thirteenth century, on the other hand, no charters issued 
by Antiochene nobles have survived and the princes of Antioch only confirmed a handful of 
endowments made by their vassals in the principality.
41
 This may simply be because the 
relevant charters have not survived, but it does indicate that considerably fewer donations 
were made after 1188 because the nobility did not have as much land to give away. In the 
county of Tripoli, several different barons issued their own charters granting land, money, 
and rights to the military orders and Italian communes during the thirteenth century.
42
 It is 
surely not a coincidence that there is more evidence of donations made by the Tripolitan 
nobles than their Antiochene counterparts – it is almost certainly because they made more 
grants. Several major lordships in the thirteenth century county of Tripoli, such as Jubayl and 
Batroun, were in the hands of the nobility and therefore the barons of this polity possessed 
the wealth and property to make substantial donations. 
The Antiochene Noble Families 
It is difficult to identify many nobles in the thirteenth century principality of Antioch 
because most of the witnesses to charters issued by Bohemond IV, Bohemond V, and 
Bohemond VI appear to have been lords and vassals from the county of Tripoli, even when 
they were making an agreement about the principality.
43
 Of the charters issued by Bohemond 
V and Bohemond VI between the former’s accession in 1233 and the fall of Antioch in 1268, 
only eight containing witness lists have survived. Only one of these eight documents, 
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originally written in 1262, includes the names of men that were definitely from the Latin 
principality on the witness list. Furthermore, references to notable Antiochene individuals in 
the chronicles are few and far between, apart from the prince and the patriarch. Thus, with 
such limited evidence only tentative conclusions can be made about which Antiochene nobles 
had a high political standing in the thirteenth century and whether or not they came from 
families that had traditionally played a prominent role in the principality’s affairs. 
The charter issued by Bohemond VI in 1262 was witnessed by several men who came 
from families that had resided within the principality since at least the mid-twelfth century.
44
 
The first witness listed on the 1262 charter is John of Angerville, baillie of Antioch. John 
may have been related to Richard of Angerville, who was present in the principality during 
the final years of Bohemond III’s rule,45 and Hugh of Angerville, who witnessed a charter 
issued by Bohemond II in 1127.
46
 
The second name on the witness list of the 1262 charter is Simon Mansel, constable of 
Antioch. According to the Assises d’Antioche, Simon was the son of ‘Mancel the 
constable’.47 This must be a reference to Robert Mansel – the constable of Antioch who 
witnessed charters issued by King Leon I of Cilicia and Raymond-Roupen between 1207 and 
1219.
48
 Robert and Simon were probably descendants of Mansel,
49
 whose first recorded 
presence in the principality was as a witness to a charter issued in 1135 at Latakia by Walter 
of Sourdeval.
50
 William, son of Mansel, who also witnessed the 1135 charter, is referred to as 
‘once of Jerusalem’ in a charter recording an agreement between the abbey of Venosa in 
southern Italy and John, son of Hugh Mansel, in the 1140s.
51
 This suggests that the Mansels 
may have held fiefs in the kingdom of Jerusalem before establishing themselves in the 
principality of Antioch. 
Another witness to Bohemond VI’s charter of 1262 was Bartholomew Tirel, marshal 
of Antioch. In 1186, Bohemond III’s ratification of Bertrand Mazoir’s donation to the 
Hospitallers was also witnessed by a Bartholomew Tirel, marshal of Antioch.
52
 They cannot 
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be the same man because there is a gap of more than seventy years between their recorded 
appearances, but the fact that they have the same name and held the same office in the 
principality of Antioch suggests they were related. Cahen and Edbury have asserted that 
Thomas the Marshal was also a member of the Tirel family,
53
 but he is not given a surname 
nor described in relation to anyone else in the sources where his name is mentioned. Several 
Tirels served as the marshal of Antioch so it is possible that Thomas was part of the family, 
but it is dangerous to make such an assumption when men from other families, such as 
William de Cava and Hugh de Flauncurt, also held the position.
54
 William Tirel was the first 
Tirel to be described as the marshal of Antioch in a charter issued in 1149.
55
 
Two other Antiochenes can be clearly identified on the witness list of the 1262 
charter. Peter de Hazart and John de Hazart appear to be from the same family, although the 
source does not specify their relationship with each other. They were probably descended 
from William de Hazart,
56
 who witnessed several charters issued by Raymond-Roupen,
57
 and 
another Peter de Hazart, whose earliest recorded appearance in the principality is in 1167.
58
 
John of Angerville, Simon Mansel, Bartholomew Tirel, and Peter and John de Hazart were 
certainly part of the Antiochene political elite in the 1260s, with four of them holding 
important titles. However, it is impossible to know which other nobles obtained grand offices 
and political influence after Bohemond V succeeded his father as prince of Antioch in 1233 
because so few charters were issued and because so many  of the charter witnesses were from 
the county of Tripoli. 
Other noble families that were so prominent in the principality of Antioch until 
Saladin’s devastating campaign in northern Syria almost completely disappear from the 
sources in the thirteenth century. For example, Robert of Sourdeval participated in the First 
Crusade (1095-1099) and helped to establish the Latin principality after the capture of 
Antioch in 1098. He subsequently gained control of the lordship of Laitor and his 
descendants remained part of the Antiochene political elite for many decades afterwards.
59
 
Members of the Sourdeval family regularly witnessed princely charters prior to 1188, 
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including one of the last surviving charters issued by Bohemond III before Saladin invaded 
the principality.
60
 However, the only mention of the Sourdevals in the witness lists of 
princely charters after 1188 is in 1215, when Walter of Laitor witnessed two charters issued 
by Raymond-Roupen in the kingdom of Cilicia.
61
 The family definitely remained in 
possession of landholdings in the principality because in 1262 Bohemond VI confirmed a 
donation of land near Antioch to the Hospitallers made by Walter’s daughter, Sibylle.62 The 
fact that members of the Sourdeval family witnessed just two of the surviving princely 
charters issued after 1188 when they had been such regular charter witnesses prior to that 
date suggests that Saladin’s conquests in northern Syria had a damaging impact on the 
Sourdevals and dented their standing within the principality. Just as their regular appearance 
on the witness lists of twelfth century princely charters indicates that they were part of the 
Antiochene political elite, their absence from such documents after 1188 suggests that they 
were no longer an influential noble family.
63
 The disappearance of the Sourdevals from the 
sources could be partly explained by other reasons: Walter of Laitor may have been exiled 
from the principality after Bohemond IV recaptured Antioch in 1219 because of his support 
for Raymond-Roupen in the Antiochene succession dispute, or he may have died without 
male heirs shortly after 1215. Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that this family had much 
less influence over the affairs of the principality in the thirteenth century than it had done 
prior to 1188. 
There is reason to think that after he reclaimed the Latin principality in 1219, 
Bohemond IV chose not to exile the nobles who had backed Raymond-Roupen during the 
Antiochene succession dispute. William of the Island was an Antiochene noble who entered 
the service of King Leon I in 1201 and later witnessed several charters issued by Raymond-
Roupen.
64
 William subsequently witnessed two of Bohemond IV’s charters in 1228. 
Similarly, Thomas the Marshal’s name appears on the witness lists of Raymond-Roupen’s 
charters in 1215 and 1216, but also on those of Bohemond IV in 1231.
65
 Edbury asserts that 
Thomas ‘evidently lived in exile after Bohemond IV’s restoration’ at Antioch in 1219.66 
However, there is no evidence that the count of Tripoli exiled anyone and the sources clearly 
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demonstrate that in 1231 Thomas was still recognised as the marshal of Antioch. If any exile 
did occur it was temporary and Thomas was able to resume his position. The fact that 
William of the Island and Thomas the Marshal witnessed agreements made by Bohemond IV 
long after the conclusion of the Antiochene succession dispute indicates that the nobles who 
had supported Raymond-Roupen were not permanently excluded from the principality’s 
political elite after 1219. The count of Tripoli seems to have been able to reconcile with those 
who previously opposed him. 
It would appear that the prince had a large degree of control over which nobles 
obtained positions of power and influence within the principality in the thirteenth century, 
and he could ignore those whom he viewed unfavourably. This would explain why there is no 
mention of anyone from Angerville in the charters issued by Raymond-Roupen, Bohemond 
IV, and Bohemond V. Richard of Angerville witnessed Bohemond III’s final surviving 
charter in June 1200,
67
 while John of Angerville’s name appears on the charter issued by 
Bohemond VI in 1262.
68
 It is highly likely that members of the Angerville family remained in 
the principality of Antioch during the first half of the thirteenth century. Their absence from 
the documentary evidence between 1200 and 1262 suggests that Richard and his heirs were 
not of such a high status that the prince needed their support and they did not have strong 
personal connections with Raymond-Roupen, Bohemond IV, and Bohemond V. Thus, the 
Angervilles were not part of the political elite that was close to the prince and they were not 
required to act as witnesses when he was issuing charters. The disappearance of the 
Angervilles could also be explained by the lack of source material, although if a member of 
the family had occupied a grand office or been close to the prince they would probably have 
been mentioned in the charters which have survived. 
It is clear that some Antiochene noble families were able to adapt to the post-1188 
principality better than others, although it is impossible to know whether the members of any 
family remained part of the Antiochene political elite throughout the thirteenth century due to 
the paucity of evidence. The contrast in fortunes between the Mansels and the Sourdevals is 
particularly indicative. Robert Mansel obtained the office of constable and was evidently one 
of the most powerful men in the principality during Raymond-Roupen’s short tenure in 
charge of Antioch, even becoming mayor of the Antiochene commune.
69
 Furthermore, by the 
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1260s Simon Mansel had also been recognised as the constable of Antioch and appears to 
have established himself as one of the leading figures in the principality. The Sourdevals, on 
the other hand, were one of many noble families that seem to have fallen out of the political 
elite after the principality was devastated by Saladin. 
Murray and Asbridge have tentatively concluded that most of the nobility in the 
twelfth century principality of Antioch could trace their ancestry back to Normandy and the 
surrounding areas of northern France.
70
 However, very few of the individuals and families 
which they identify as having Norman origins appear on the witness lists of the princely 
charters after 1188. For example, both Asbridge and Murray agree that the Fresnel family 
was probably from La Ferté-Fresnel in Normandy,
71
 but none of the charter witness in the 
period 1188-1268 have the surname Fresnel.
72
 The Sourdevals were almost certainly from 
Normandy,
73
 but it is difficult to identify the origins of the other noble families that remained 
in the principality of Antioch after 1188. The Angervilles may also have been from 
Normandy, although Asbridge suggests they came from Angreville, south of Paris.
74
 
Edbury has shown that some elements of Antiochene law reflected legal practice in 
the contemporary kingdom of England, but were completely different from the customs of the 
kingdom of Jerusalem.
75
 He suggests that ‘the Norman element in Antiochene society’ 
introduced certain customs regarding the possession of fiefs.
76
 The argument is that England 
and Antioch shared some legal customs because of the Norman origins of their nobility. It is 
perfectly possible that the thirteenth century Antiochene nobility adhered to laws that 
originated in Normandy, but that does not mean Norman identity persisted in the principality 
of Antioch. The evidence of chronicles and charters demonstrates that the Normans who 
settled in southern Italy in the eleventh century maintained their Norman identity for several 
generations, even as they intermarried with the native population.
77
 However, Murray has 
convincingly argued that those settled in the Latin East, including the principality of Antioch, 
swiftly adopted a common identity and did not distinguish between men whose origins lay in 
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different parts of northern and central France.
78
 Chroniclers who lived in the principality of 
Antioch or the kingdom of Jerusalem, including Walter the Chancellor and William of Tyre, 
refer to the Europeans who settled in Syria and Palestine after the First Crusade as Franks 
(Franci) or Latins (Latini) and never use the term ‘Normans’ to describe members of the 
Antiochene nobility.
79
 None of the princely charter witnesses in the period 1188-1268 are 
described as Normans and there is no evidence to suggest that any thirteenth century 
Antiochene noble identified himself as Norman or emphasised his Norman roots. 
The Influence of the Antiochene Nobility on the Principality of Antioch’s 
Relationship with the Kingdom of Cilicia 
In 1199 King Leon I of Cilicia wrote to Pope Innocent III stating that shortly after the 
birth of Raymond-Roupen, Prince Bohemond III publicly recognised the boy as his ‘lawful 
heir’ at a ‘plenary court’ and declared to the ‘barons’ that his grandson should succeed him as 
prince of Antioch by ‘hereditary right’. Furthermore, Bohemond made ‘all his liege men’ 
swear an oath of allegiance to Raymond-Roupen.
80
 This evidence is not contradicted by any 
other source and suggests that Raymond-Roupen should have received a lot of support from 
the Antiochene nobility, if these men remained true to their word. According to the chronicle 
attributed to Sempad the Constable, many ‘warriors’ and six ‘princes’ left the principality of 
Antioch and entered into the service of King Leon I after the death of Bohemond III in 
1201.
81
 The men described as ‘princes’ were nobles of a high political standing. Three of 
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them – Oliver the chamberlain, Roger of the Mountains, and William of the Island – had 
previously witnessed charters issued by Bohemond III.
82
 These men had clearly decided to 
honour the oath they made in c.1198 and support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the 
principality of Antioch. It is unclear whether they were exiled by Bohemond IV, who seized 
control of Antioch shortly after his father’s death, or voluntarily chose to depart the Latin 
principality in order to join Raymond-Roupen’s Cilician Armenian supporters. 
The documentary evidence confirms that many other Antiochene nobles supported 
Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality and served under King Leon I as he attempted to 
wrest control of Antioch from Bohemond IV. A charter composed in 1210, in which 
Raymond-Roupen granted the castle of Bikisrail to the Hospitallers, was witnessed by six 
men who appear to be Antiochene rather than Cilician Armenian.
83
 Similarly, two charters 
issued by Raymond-Roupen in 1215 were witnessed by twelve men whom he described as 
‘my loyal barons’.84 These men may have appeared at the court of King Leon I soon after the 
death of Bohemond III, but it is also possible that some of them switched sides as the 
Antiochene succession dispute progressed. Either way, Raymond-Roupen had little trouble in 
establishing himself as the prince of Antioch in 1216 because he already had the support of 
much of the Antiochene nobility. The oath they had taken in the presence of Bohemond III 
was probably a key factor in their decision, but these nobles must also have felt that the 
principality would benefit from a more co-operative relationship with the Armenian kingdom. 
Bohemond IV retained control of the Latin principality for fifteen years after the 
death of his father in 1201, but his rule over the polity was undermined by those who resided 
at Antioch. King Leon I and his troops entered the city during the night in 1203,
85
 and they 
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did so again in 1216.
86
 The fact that the Cilician Armenians were able to get into Antioch 
under the cover of darkness suggests that treachery was involved. Indeed, the chronicle 
attributed to Sempad the Constable confirms that in 1216 a gate was opened for Leon’s men 
when they were outside the city.
87
 The Annales de Terre Sainte and the Gestes des Chiprois 
indicate that it was Acharie the Seneschal who betrayed Antioch to the Armenian king.
88
 This 
evidence suggests that some of the nobility which remained at Antioch throughout the 
succession dispute supported Raymond-Roupen. The treachery of these men was significant 
as it allowed King Leon I to enter the city in 1216 and install his great-nephew as prince 
without having to besiege it first. However, the Cilician Armenians were unable to secure 
control of Antioch and establish Raymond-Roupen in power after entering the city in 1203 so 
clearly other factors contributed to their success in 1216. 
Another incident provides further evidence that some of Raymond-Roupen’s 
supporters remained at Antioch throughout the Antiochene succession dispute. In late 1207 
the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, was involved in an unsuccessful 
rebellion against the prince, which led to his imprisonment and, ultimately, his death.
89
 
Several sources record that the commune and a group of knights were at the forefront of the 
uprising.
90
 However, they all provide extremely concise accounts of the event and do not 
name any of the rebels or say how many there were. It is therefore impossible to know which 
individuals were involved in the revolt or fully appreciate the scale of the insurrection. The 
wording of the sources suggests that it was an internal matter, with no mention of external 
participation in the rebellion.
91
 It appears that a group of Antiochene knights, in collaboration 
with Peter of Angoulême and members of the commune, tried to overthrow Bohemond IV 
without any help from the Cilician Armenians. However, the Tripolitan count evidently 
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retained the support of some of the Antiochene nobility because he had the military strength 
to crush the uprising and maintain his grip on Antioch until 1216. 
The Influence of the Cilician Armenian Nobility on the Kingdom of 
Cilicia’s Relationship with the Principality of Antioch 
The barons of Armenian Cilicia were predominantly loyal to King Leon I following 
his coronation in 1198 which allowed him to concentrate on external matters.
92
 If Leon’s 
reign had been plagued by rebellions, he would not have been able to pursue his dual aims of 
expanding the Armenian kingdom and overseeing the investiture of Raymond-Roupen as 
prince of Antioch. It was important, therefore, for the king of Cilicia to clamp down on any 
noble who dared to challenge his authority. Leon acted ruthlessly to imprison barons who he 
thought were acting treacherously. Both Hethoum of Lampron and Constantine, son of 
Vasak, were dealt with in this manner.
93
 The loyalty of the Cilician Armenian nobility to 
King Leon I allowed him to concentrate on campaigning in northern Syria. This eventually 
bore fruit when he was able to secure control of Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as 
prince in 1216. 
A sizeable proportion of the Cilician Armenian nobility seem to have fought for their 
king during the early thirteenth century because he campaigned almost relentlessly during 
this period and he could not have done so without a large number of troops. Armenian 
chroniclers tend not to describe the composition of Leon’s armies in any detail so it is 
difficult to know which nobles were present amongst them. However, the Etchmiadzin 
version of the chronicle attributed to Sempad records that the king of Cilicia sent two of his 
most powerful barons, Constantine of Babaron and Adam of Baghras, to relieve the siege of 
Gaban in 1216 after the fortress was attacked by the forces of ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I.94 The 
Armenians were outmanoeuvred and easily defeated by the Seljuks, who captured several 
members of the Cilician Armenian nobility including Constantine himself.
95
 This incident 
highlights the importance to Leon of maintaining loyalty amongst his vassals, even if Adam 
and Constantine were beaten on the battlefield. The Armenian king may have been able to 
spend many months helping Raymond-Roupen establish his authority over the principality of 
Antioch because Leon knew that he could rely on his barons to defend Cilicia in his absence. 
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The Cilician Armenian nobility supported King Leon I in his attempts to put 
Raymond-Roupen on the throne of Antioch in the diplomatic sphere as well as in the military 
arena. For example, in September 1204 the Armenian king sent Constantine of Camardias to 
Acre to negotiate with the papal legate Soffredus of Santa Prassede, who hoped to peacefully 
resolve the Antiochene succession dispute.
96
 Many Cilician Armenian barons were content to 
fight for their king or represent him in peace talks during the struggle for control of Antioch, 
but that does not mean they were ardent supporters of Leon’s great-nephew. Their behaviour 
after Raymond-Roupen’s investiture as prince in 1216 actually suggests the opposite. 
The Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad records that shortly after 
Raymond-Roupen took control of the principality, Leon decided to make Isabel, the newly-
born daughter of his second wife, the heir to the throne of the kingdom of Cilicia and thereby 
disinherit his great-nephew.
97
 The Armenian king was apparently advised by his barons that 
he should be succeeded by his own child rather than his brother’s grandson. It is intriguing 
that the Cilician Armenian nobility appear to have preferred Isabel to be their next monarch, 
even though Leon was an elderly man with health problems and she was a baby who would 
not be able to participate in the governance of the kingdom for many years. They evidently 
did not want Raymond-Roupen to be their next king despite the problems that a potentially 
lengthy period of regency would bring. 
There are two possible reasons for the stance of the barons who encouraged Leon to 
change his succession plans: either they had a strong personal dislike of Raymond-Roupen 
and thought he would be a bad king, or they were worried by the prospect of Armenian 
Cilicia being ruled by the prince of Antioch. The commune of Antioch supported Bohemond 
IV during the Antiochene succession dispute because they wanted to preserve the 
principality’s status as an independent Latin state.98 Similarly, many Cilician Armenian 
nobles may have feared that their own privileged positions within an independent Armenian 
kingdom would be threatened under the governance of a man who also ruled over Antioch 
and its environs. On the other hand, later events suggest that Raymond-Roupen was an 
unpopular figure amongst both Latins and Armenians so their decision to support Isabel’s 
claim to the throne may have been for personal reasons. 
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The death of King Leon I in 1219 sparked a succession dispute in the Armenian 
kingdom which bears some resemblance to the quarrel which broke out at Antioch almost 
two decades earlier.
99
 An elderly ruler died at a time when his designated heir was still an 
infant, and therefore an adult kinsman claimed the deceased man’s territory. However, unlike 
the crisis which engulfed the Latin principality, the nobility played the decisive role in the 
Cilician succession dispute. Most Cilician Armenian barons supported Isabel’s claim to the 
throne, and her guardian, Adam of Baghras, ruled Cilicia as regent in the months after Leon’s 
death.
100
 According to Eracles, Adam was murdered by the Assassins, and replaced as the 
regent and baillie of the Armenian kingdom by the constable, Constantine of Babaron. It is 
even suggested that Constantine arranged the assassination in order to usurp his rival.
101
 
Regardless of the veracity of this claim, it is clear that the ambitious constable sought fill the 
power vacuum created by the passing of the king. 
When Raymond-Roupen arrived at Tarsus in 1220 to pursue his claim to the 
Armenian kingdom, he received the support of a number of Cilician Armenian barons. The 
most notable of these was Vahram – a prominent vassal of King Leon I who held the office of 
marshal.
102
 The partisans of the former prince of Antioch were opposed by a group of nobles 
determined to ensure that Isabel, Leon’s designated heir and youngest child, inherited the 
throne. They were led by the baillie of the Armenian kingdom, Constantine of Babaron. 
According to the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad, which provides 
the most detailed account of these events, Raymond-Roupen’s army was defeated by Isabel’s 
supporters between Adana and Mamistra.
103
 The beaten force retreated to Tarsus, but the city 
was betrayed to Constantine, who had all his chief opponents imprisoned. Raymond-Roupen 
seems to have died in prison soon afterwards.
104
 
The factionalism of the nobility in this conflict undoubtedly demonstrates that the 
public designation of an heir in Armenian Cilicia was largely ineffectual. Both Constantine 
and Vahram witnessed a number of charters issued by King Leon I, and both held important 
offices of state, yet they took opposing sides in the Cilician succession dispute.
105
 This 
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indicates that men who had loyally served under Leon chose to back Raymond-Roupen’s 
claim to the Armenian kingdom. He was not simply drawing his support from barons bearing 
a grudge against his great-uncle. 
Some Cilician Armenian nobles were willing to ignore the designation of Isabel as the 
heir to the throne because they wanted to avoid the difficulties that her reign would bring. 
They seem to have hoped that Raymond-Roupen’s status as an adult male, with experience of 
ruling a sovereign state, would bring stability to the Armenian kingdom. These men may 
have been averse to a potentially lengthy period of regency until Leon’s young daughter 
reached the age of majority, particularly after Adam’s murder when Constantine took power 
on her behalf. 
After crushing Raymond-Roupen’s attempt to seize control of Cilicia, Constantine of 
Babaron did not remain regent of the kingdom for long. In 1222 Isabel, daughter of King 
Leon I, was married to Philip, son of Prince Bohemond IV.
106
 Her husband was subsequently 
crowned king, and the Armenian kingdom entered into a formal alliance with the 
neighbouring principality of Antioch. The decision to marry the young queen was taken by 
the Cilician Armenian clergy and nobility.
107
 Bar Hebraeus wrote that Constantine of 
Babaron intended to pair her with one of his sons, but when this plan received little support 
he agreed to the subsequent arrangement with the Antiochenes.
108
 Although this information 
is not corroborated by other sources, it would help to explain both previous and subsequent 
events. 
After a short spell as king consort of Cilicia, Philip was arrested and imprisoned by a 
group of barons in late 1224.
109
 There is a consensus among the chroniclers who recorded 
these events that he made a number of unpopular decisions which angered his subjects. Some 
historians recorded that the new king began to replace Cilician Armenian nobles with his own 
men.
110
 The exact nature of this policy is unclear, but there is no doubt that the nobility of 
Cilicia were concerned about the influx of Latins into their kingdom and that this was one of 
the causes of the rebellion against him. Other writers reported that, as well as behaving 
disrespectfully towards the Armenians, Isabel’s husband sent some of the kingdom’s wealth, 
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including the crown and royal throne, to his father, Bohemond IV.
111
 Philip was overthrown 
because he alienated many of the barons who had crowned him just a few years earlier and 
they felt no compunction about dethroning a monarch that threatened their interests. 
The insurrection was led by Constantine of Babaron, who exploited Philip’s 
unpopularity by taking full control of the Armenian kingdom. After imprisoning the king, the 
baillie seems to have ruled Cilicia as the de facto regent for many years. Isabel’s husband 
died less than two years after his incarceration, apparently due to poisoning.
112
 It is highly 
likely that Constantine was behind Philip’s murder as the baillie was the leader of the revolt 
that deposed the king and his family benefitted most from Philip’s death. By eliminating 
Isabel’s husband, Constantine reopened the possibility of marrying the queen to one of his 
children. The baillie was prepared to force Leon’s daughter to wed Hethoum, his son and 
heir, against her will. 
Both Isabel and her mother were against the proposed union, and they took refuge in 
Silifke when it became clear that their opposition to the match was likely to be ignored.
113
 
After briefly laying siege to Silifke, Constantine began negotiating with the Order of the 
Hospital, which owned the fortress. The Hospitallers refused to evict the women, but instead 
agreed to surrender the castle to the baillie while they were still inside.
114
 The queen was 
subsequently escorted to Tarsus and married to Hethoum, son of Constantine, apparently 
against her will.
115
 Although Hethoum and Isabel were crowned king and queen of Cilicia 
after their wedding ceremony, Constantine of Babaron continued to rule the kingdom for 
several years after the coronation. 
The nobility played a key role in Cilician Armenian politics between 1219 and 1226. 
Constantine of Babaron profited most from the instability of this period, but he did not 
initially get his own way. His primary motive for ensuring that Isabel succeeded her father 
cannot have been a desire to hand the Cilician crown to a man from another ruling dynasty by 
matrimony. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the baillie felt compelled to aid the young 
queen because she had been publicly designated as the heir to the kingdom. Constantine 
seems to have planned to marry Isabel to one of his sons soon after King Leon I’s death in 
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1219.
116
 However, a majority of the barons appear to have favoured a marriage alliance with 
the principality of Antioch so the queen was paired with Philip.
117
 In the early 1220s it was 
the actions of the Cilician Armenian nobility which strengthened the Armenian kingdom’s 
relationship with its Latin neighbour. 
Constantine could not have succeeded in deposing Philip and putting Hethoum on the 
throne without the support of a large number of barons. Once the son of Bohemond IV had 
alienated most of the Cilician Armenian nobility, the baillie acted swiftly to capture and 
imprison the king. He was subsequently able to persuade many nobles that it would be better 
to marry the young queen to a man from within the kingdom, rather than someone from a 
different ruling dynasty. It is important to stress that while most of the Armenian kingdom’s 
elite appear to have supported Hethoum’s coronation, it did not receive unanimous support. 
Kirakos of Ganjak recorded that there was some early opposition to the new regime and 
Constantine responded by brutally crushing a revolt – exiling or killing most of the rebels.118 
However, the Hethoumids could surely not have established themselves in power if a 
majority of the barons had resisted them. 
Conclusion 
The surviving evidence suggests that the strength of the Antiochene nobility was 
weakened by the major territorial losses suffered by the Latin principality in 1188 and 
consequently that the prince’s power increased. An elite group of barons did not emerge at 
Antioch, as they did in the kingdom of Jerusalem, and after the conclusion of the Antiochene 
succession dispute in 1219 there is no evidence of any challenge to the prince’s authority by 
the nobility. Some Antiochene noble families that had played a prominent role in the affairs 
of the principality prior to 1188 continued to do so, while others seem to have lost influence. 
The principality’s nobility were involved in the Antiochene succession dispute, with 
many men choosing to support Raymond-Roupen and enter into the service of King Leon I of 
Cilicia. Others appear to have backed Leon’s great-nephew but remained at Antioch. These 
nobles undermined Bohemond IV’s rule at Antioch and helped the Cilician Armenians gain 
access to the city in 1203 and 1216. On the latter occasion, King Leon I established full 
control of Antioch and oversaw Raymond-Roupen’s investiture as prince. The Antiochene 
nobility clearly played a crucial role in finally settling the succession dispute, but other 
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factors must also have been significant. The Cilician Armenian nobility supported King Leon 
I during this conflict, and were subsequently highly influential in shaping their kingdom’s 
relationship with the principality of Antioch between 1219 and 1226. 
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Chapter Two: The Commune of Antioch 
One of the most significant groups operating in the principality of Antioch in the late 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries was the Antiochene commune. It was the first commune 
to be established in the Latin East and it appears to have been the most enduring. The 
institution was apparently created in c.1193, following the capture of Bohemond III by the 
Cilician Armenians, but it is unclear when the commune was abolished and it may even have 
survived until the destruction of the Latin principality in 1268. Cahen and Prawer have 
provided the most detailed studies on the commune of Antioch thus far, but neither fully 
considered its impact upon the course of Antiochene history.
1
 This chapter will chart the 
development of the commune, provide a detailed examination of its structure and functions, 
and demonstrate its significance during the early stages of the Antiochene succession dispute. 
The Development of the Commune 
In 1193 Leon II of the Roupenid principality lured Bohemond III to the castle of 
Baghras and captured the Antiochene prince.
2
 According to the Lyon and Florence 
manuscripts of Eracles, he then sent Hethoum of Sassoun to Antioch with a Cilician 
Armenian army and two Antiochene nobles – Bartholomew Tirel and Richier d’Erminat. 
Bohemond III had agreed to surrender the city to Leon and therefore the Cilician Armenians 
probably expected to take control of Antioch with relative ease.
3
 Bartholomew and Richier 
helped Hethoum and his men to enter the city, but the populace reacted angrily at the 
prospect of Roupenid rule and it was at this moment that a commune was formed: 
Immediately they assembled together in the cathedral church of Antioch, and the 
Patriarch Aimery was with them and they ordered among themselves and made a 
commune, which they had not had at all before, and it lasted thence onward until 
today. And they came to Raymond, the eldest son of the prince, and told him that 
they would hold him as lord in place of his father, until his father was freed.
4
 
There is no mention of the social or religious background of those who established the 
commune. It is clear, however, that the commune was comprised of Antiochene inhabitants 
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that opposed Roupenid control of their city. Hethoum and the Cilician Armenian troops were 
seized and expelled from Antioch.
5
 Raymond and the commune appear to have governed the 
Latin principality until Bohemond III was freed from captivity in 1194,
6
 but the commune did 
not disband once the prince had returned to rule his principality. Instead this institution 
remained in existence for decades afterwards and it would play a significant role in the 
Antiochene succession dispute. 
On 5 January 1199 Pope Innocent III wrote to the patriarch of Antioch, Peter of 
Angoulême, in response to complaints about the new commune. The pontiff states that he has 
been informed that the commune ‘improperly subverts the customary rights of the Latin 
Church’ in the principality.7 This suggests that the number of Latin clerics in the Antiochene 
commune was small, or perhaps non-existent, as they were unable to prevent it from pursuing 
policies which undermined their Church. Thus, although the institution was formed in St 
Peter’s cathedral and in the presence of Aimery of Limoges, the Antiochene patriarch at the 
time,
8
 it seems to have been a largely secular body dominated by the laity. Innocent’s letter 
also mentions that the commune of Antioch ‘burdens the churches, the clerics and their men, 
of whatever status or language they may be, with the exaction of a tallage contrary to ancient 
custom’, in order to raise revenue for its own spending purposes, thereby ignoring the 
privileged position of the Latin Church.
9
 The commune had evidently developed into a 
powerful institution in a short period of time if it had the ability to tax the Antiochene clergy. 
Prawer links the commune’s tallage on the churches and clerics of Antioch to the time 
when Count Bohemond of Tripoli seized his father’s principality.10 If, however, Cahen is 
correct in dating Bohemond’s arrival at Antioch at the very end of 1198 then the commune 
actually began undermining the Latin Church before the Tripolitan count reached the city.
11
 
News of the tallage had reached Innocent III by 5 January 1199 and therefore it must have 
been introduced before the preceding November because it took more than two months for 
messengers to travel from the Latin East to Italy. 
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Count Bohemond of Tripoli took control of the principality of Antioch for more than 
three months in the winter of 1198-1199.
12
 He was unhappy that Prince Bohemond III had 
designated Raymond-Roupen as his lawful heir shortly after the boy’s birth in early 1198.13 
Rather than accepting that he was to be excluded from his father’s inheritance, the Tripolitan 
count travelled to Antioch and claimed that he was the rightful successor to the principality. 
The Antiochene commune decided to support Bohemond of Tripoli – ‘the commune excluded 
the lord prince’ from the city and declared that ‘the count is the lawful heir of the prince’.14 
Bohemond III was forced into exile, as his son took control of Antioch, and he was only 
restored to power with the assistance of the Cilician Armenians. When the events of c.1193 
are taken into consideration, it is difficult to see how the count of Tripoli could have seized 
Antioch and ruled the principality without the support of the commune. Even in its earliest 
years this institution had considerable influence over who controlled this Latin state. 
In 1199 the commune joined the patriarch of Antioch, the prince of Antioch, and the 
count of Tripoli in calling for King Leon I of Cilicia to give the castle of Baghras to the 
Templars. The source for this information is a letter sent by Innocent III to the Armenian king 
so it is not absolutely clear if they were lobbying individually or collectively.
15
 The fact that 
the pope viewed the Antiochene commune as an important institution, to be listed alongside 
the patriarch and prince of Antioch, once again demonstrates just how influential it had 
become in a short period of time. The commune’s hostility to any Roupenid presence in the 
principality is also clear – it opposed Leon’s occupation of Baghras, just as it opposed his 
attempt to seize Antioch in c.1193. 
Two years later, the Antiochene commune played a leading role in the transfer of power 
following the death of Bohemond III in 1201. Count Bohemond of Tripoli arrived at the city 
of Antioch on the day of his father’s burial and took control of the principality: 
He sounded the bell of the commune and assembled all the people, knights and 
other good men; then he begged and requested that they received him as lord, and 
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invested and held him as the lawful heir of the principality, whilst his father was 
dead. They received him and ensured that he remained as lord and prince.
16
 
By recognising the Tripolitan count as Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch, the commune 
directly contradicted the wishes of his father who had specifically designated Raymond-
Roupen as the heir to the principality.
17
 Winning and retaining the support of the commune 
was even more essential to Bohemond IV in 1201 than it had been in 1198. As the ruler of the 
county of Tripoli – another fragile state with problems of its own – he could not permanently 
reside in his new principality. If Bohemond IV was to establish himself as the successor of 
Bohemond III then he would need a strong base of supporters at Antioch who would defend 
the city against King Leon I. Considering the number of attacks that the Armenian king made 
on the Latin principality in the early thirteenth century, it seems unlikely that the Tripolitan 
count could have retained control of Antioch until 1216 without the support of the commune. 
The next references to the Antiochene commune in the primary sources concern the 
events of 1207-1208 when the principality was engulfed in both political and ecclesiastical 
disputes. In March 1208 Pope Innocent III wrote a letter to the patriarch of Jerusalem in 
which the ‘mayor and consuls of Antioch’ were threatened with the sentence of 
excommunication if they helped to maintain the presence of a Greek patriarch at Antioch.
18
 
Innocent wanted Simeon II, the Greek patriarch, to be removed from his position in the 
cathedral of St Peter and replaced with the Latin patriarch, Peter of Angoulême.
19
 Bohemond 
IV had appointed Simeon to minister at Antioch after Peter of Saint Marcellus, a papal legate, 
had suspended Peter of Angoulême in 1206.
20
 
Innocent’s letter suggests that Simeon II enjoyed the backing of the Antiochene 
commune and this was almost certainly the case because Bohemond IV could not have 
imposed an unpopular patriarch upon the citizens of Antioch without seriously jeopardising 
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his status as prince. Bohemond spent much of his time in the county of Tripoli and he needed 
to maintain the support of the commune, and the Antiochene populace more generally, if he 
was to retain control of his principality. Prawer argues that there was a strong Greek presence 
in the commune of Antioch and that Bohemond installed Simeon II in St Peter’s cathedral in 
order to placate them.
21
 There are other reasons, however, for thinking that the commune 
would be glad to see Peter of Angoulême replaced, aside from a desire to see Antioch served 
by a patriarch of the Greek Orthodox faith. Peter had been a firm opponent of the commune’s 
tallage on the churches and clerics of Antioch, and therefore the commune may have found it 
easier to raise cash if he was ousted from his position. More importantly, the Latin patriarch 
favoured Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality. He willingly negotiated with the 
Cilician Armenians after they had seized control of Antioch in 1203, but they were forced to 
withdraw from the city before anything was achieved.
22
 The commune was a firm supporter 
of Bohemond IV and could not countenance his replacement by Raymond-Roupen because 
this would give King Leon I enormous influence over the Latin state during his great-
nephew’s minority. It was resolutely opposed to any Roupenid presence in the principality so 
Peter’s scheming was a direct threat to the aims of the commune. 
In late 1207 there was a major rebellion against the rule of Bohemond IV in the city 
of Antioch. Peter of Angoulême was a key figure in the uprising, and Bohemond had the 
Latin patriarch imprisoned after quelling the revolt.
23
 Several sources indicate that the 
commune participated in this insurrection.
24
 However, it is almost inconceivable that the 
same members of the commune who had consistently opposed Leon’s attempts to increase 
Roupenid influence over the principality, and had given their full backing to the count of 
Tripoli in 1198 and 1201, could suddenly turn against Bohemond IV and try to overthrow 
him. Innocent III clearly believed that the mayor and consuls of the commune were 
supporters of the Greek patriarch Simeon II so it would be surprising if they plotted with the 
Latin patriarch Peter of Angoulême against the de facto prince.
25
 Cahen explains the situation 
by arguing that the Latin patriarch allowed exiled knights – presumably supporters of 
                                                          
21
 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp. 69-73. 
22
 PL, 215, Col. 689, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, p. 214. 
23
 ATS, p. 436; Eracles, pp. 313-314; GC, p. 664; HII, p. 481; PL, 215, Col. 1322, No. 214; Reg. Inn. III, 10, No. 
214, p. 383; Smbat, pp. 84-85. 
24
 ‘A M CC VIII desconfist le prince Baymont d’Antioche les chevaliers et la coumune qu’il aveent faite, et prist 
le patriarche quy estoit lor consentant, et le mist en sa prizon ou il morut, et vindrent les chevaliers a sa 
mercy’. GC, p. 664; ‘Bohémond, prince d’Antioche, défit ses troupes de cavalerie, et la commune d’Antioche, 
insurgées contre lui. Il fit arrêter le patriarche, qui mourut dans sa prison’. HII, p. 481. Both versions of the 
Annales de Terre Sainte provide a similar account of events. ATS, p. 436. 
25
 PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11. 
64 
 
Raymond-Roupen – into Antioch who overthrew the commune and took control of the city 
while Bohemond IV sought refuge in the citadel. The rebels then established a new 
commune, but its existence was short-lived as the count of Tripoli reassembled his forces and 
crushed the revolt.
26
 It is perhaps more likely that a faction within the commune, which had 
never been particularly supportive of Bohemond, decided to join forces with Peter when the 
Latin patriarch began planning the uprising. 
The principality of Antioch remained under the control of Bohemond IV until 1216, 
and the commune was definitely still in existence at this point, so it would appear that its 
original anti-Roupenid members reasserted their dominance over the institution after the 
count of Tripoli had defeated his Antiochene opponents in 1207-1208. However, they were 
unable to prevent the Cilician Armenians from seizing Antioch in February 1216 and 
installing Raymond-Roupen as the new prince.
27
 Leon’s great-nephew was fully aware of the 
importance of the commune and of the potential threat it posed to his rule at Antioch because 
of its support for Bohemond IV. Nevertheless, rather than abolishing the commune, 
Raymond-Roupen tried to neutralise this hostile institution by infusing it with his own 
supporters. The first charter he issued after his investiture as prince in February 1216 was 
witnessed by Acharie, seneschal of Antioch, who is also described as the ‘mayor of the 
commune’.28 Acharie was a loyal vassal of Raymond-Roupen who witnessed two charters 
issued by Leon’s great-nephew when the Latin principality was still under the control of 
Bohemond IV in 1215.
29
 By occupying such a key role within the commune, Acharie would 
have been able to ensure that the institution supported the new prince, rather than working 
against him. 
It is possible that Acharie the Seneschal was already a member of the commune when 
the Cilician Armenians seized control of Antioch in 1216, and that the institution had already 
transferred its allegiance from Bohemond IV to Raymond-Roupen. However, if the commune 
did switch sides during the succession dispute it could only have done so shortly before King 
Leon I’s troops occupied Antioch because it is highly unlikely that the count of Tripoli could 
have maintained his grip on the Latin principality for a substantial amount of time without the 
support of this institution. The commune had historically been an anti-Roupenid organisation 
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so it would be unwise to insist that it had come out in favour of Raymond-Roupen before he 
was anointed as prince of Antioch. 
A charter issued by Raymond-Roupen in March 1219 was witnessed by Robert 
Mansel, who is described as ‘constable and mayor of Antioch’.30 Robert’s name also appears 
on the charters of the young prince which were issued in the kingdom of Cilicia before 
1216.
31
 It is surely not coincidental that the only two men known to have held the position of 
mayor of the commune between 1216 and 1219 were also longstanding supporters of 
Raymond-Roupen. The prince must have had some influence over their presence at the 
forefront of the commune – either through direct appointment or encouraging his supporters 
to join the institution. 
The fate of the commune beyond 1219 is almost completely unknown because of the 
lack of evidence. Richard asserts that the commune ‘vanished’ after the conclusion of the war 
of succession and that ‘normal institutions reappeared’.32 The commune may have been 
abolished by Bohemond IV soon after he recovered the Latin principality in 1219.
33
 He may 
have decided that it served no purpose because the internal problems that plagued the 
kingdom of Cilicia after the death of King Leon I meant that there was little prospect of the 
Cilician Armenians seriously threatening his hold on Antioch. Alternatively, the commune 
may simply have slowly withered away after 1219, declining in importance once the 
Antiochene succession dispute had been resolved. 
On the other hand, letters sent by Thomas Agni and Thomas Bérard in 1260 hint at 
the existence of the commune and suggest that it may actually have survived until the 
principality’s destruction in 1268. On 4 March, Bérard, the master of the Temple, wrote of 
how the ‘Antiochene people’ responded to the threat posed by the Mongols, who were 
campaigning in northern Syria at that time.
34
 Later, on 22 April, Thomas Agni, papal legate 
and bishop of Bethlehem, suggested that Bohemond VI was ‘following in the footsteps of the 
Antiochenes’, when he submitted to the Mongols.35 The fact that neither letter refers to a 
specific individual, but instead mentions the people of Antioch suggests that decisions in the 
principality were being taken collectively by a group of men. It cannot be confidently 
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asserted that Thomas Agni and Thomas Bérard were referring to the commune of Antioch, 
but there is a strong possibility that they were alluding to the institution first established in 
c.1193. The commune may have governed the principality in the absence of the prince as 
Bohemond IV, Bohemond V and Bohemond VI spent a considerable amount of their time in 
the county of Tripoli. 
The Membership, Structure and Functions of the Commune 
In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries Antiochene princes donated properties to the 
Pisans, Venetians and Genoese which enabled them to form their own communities within 
the city of Antioch. The Genoese received the church of St John, a trading post and thirty 
houses in Antioch in 1098 as a reward for their role in capturing the city during the First 
Crusade.
36
 The Pisans were originally given a neighbourhood in Antioch named Sancti 
Salvatoris in 1108, as well as their own quarter in the city of Latakia,
37
 but according to 
Favreau-Lilie these possessions were confiscated by the regent of the Latin principality, 
Roger of Salerno, a few years later.
38
 It appears that the Pisans had to wait until 1154 before 
they were granted new properties in Antioch and Latakia.
39
 The Venetians were granted a 
trading post, a garden and some houses in Antioch by Prince Raymond in April 1143,
40
 but 
they were not subsequently given any further property and this remained their only 
stronghold in northern Syria.
41
 The Italian presence in the Latin principality was diminished 
by the loss of Latakia and Jabala in 1188, but the Pisan and Genoese quarters in the city of 
Antioch appear to have survived until the fall of the metropolis in 1268. 
The Pisans, Venetians and Genoese were also granted various privileges by the 
princes of Antioch, such as a share of the revenues of a particular city or exemptions from 
customs duties.
42
 Concessions of this kind continued to be granted to the Pisans and the 
Genoese after 1188,
43
 but no charters in favour of the Venetians are extant for the period 
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1188-1268. Bohemond III and his successors clearly thought it was important to remain on 
good terms with Pisa and Genoa because the Pisans and Genoese sought and obtained new 
privileges in the principality after it had been devastated by Saladin, even though they had 
already acquired a number of special rights and their own semi-autonomous quarters in the 
city of Antioch. For example, Raymond-Roupen issued charters giving legal privileges to the 
Genoese and a wide range of concessions to the Pisans within three months of his investiture 
as prince of Antioch in 1216.
44
 
Venice, Pisa and Genoa were part of the communal movement that flourished in 
northern Italy in the Central Middle Ages. Communes or proto-communes also existed in 
central and southern Italy,
45
 as well as other parts of Europe,
46
 but they were more numerous 
and more autonomous in the north of the Italian peninsula. Communes emerged in the cities 
of northern Italy in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries following the decline of the 
German monarchy’s authority over the region. Most German kings of this era rarely visited 
northern Italy and allowed local bishops to oversee the governance of Italian cities on their 
behalf. However, the ecclesiastical reform movement of the late eleventh century seriously 
undermined ‘episcopal lordship’ by calling into question whether bishops should have control 
over judicial and military matters. During this period, communes seem to have emerged in 
several Italian cities and over the course of several decades they gradually assumed the 
powers that had previously been exercised by bishops.
47
 This transfer of power did not 
happen overnight. Indeed, in cities such as Cremona the bishop retained a prominent political 
role throughout the twelfth century by closely associating himself with the commune.
48
 
Cahen argues that the presence of the Italian quarters in the city of Antioch influenced 
the establishment and organisation of the Antiochene commune.
49
 This is highly likely 
considering that the communes of Lombardy and Tuscany developed similar political 
structures because officials from different cities shared ideas about governance with one 
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another.
50
 The Antiochenes certainly knew that Venice, Pisa and Genoa had their own 
communes. A charter issued by Bohemond III in 1169 refers to Lanfranco di Alberico as an 
ambassador of ‘the whole senate and the consuls’ of the Genoese ‘commune’.51 Many of the 
charters issued in favour of the Pisans or Genoese refer to the commune of Pisa or Genoa, but 
none mention the commune of Antioch apart from the one issued by Raymond-Roupen in 
February 1216, which describes Acharie the Seneschal as ‘mayor of the commune’.52 The 
analysis below demonstrates that the Antiochene commune had a number of similarities with 
the political bodies that governed many of the cities of northern Italy in the twelfth century. 
According to Eracles, when Count Bohemond of Tripoli arrived at Antioch in 1201 to 
claim the Latin principality members of the commune assembled after the ringing of a bell.
53
 
This was probably the bell of St Peter’s cathedral – the building in which the institution had 
been founded.
54
 In northern Italy, communal ‘assemblies were normally summoned by the 
ringing of bells’.55 Furthermore, many of them met in front of their city’s cathedral because it 
was a convenient location with the necessary space for large numbers of people.
56
 It is highly 
likely that the assembly of the Antiochene commune regularly convened in or close to St 
Peter’s cathedral and that it was summoned by the sound of bells. 
A common feature of all Italian communes was an assembly, which was supposed to 
be attended by all the citizens of the city.
57
 In December 1199 Innocent III wrote to King 
Leon I about his dispute with the Templars over possession of Baghras. The pope stated that 
the Armenian king had encouraged the patriarch and prince of Antioch to speak at the 
‘colloquium’ of the commune.58 This is the only time that the assembly is explicitly 
mentioned in the primary sources which record the existence of the Antiochene commune. It 
echoes the first reference to an Italian communal assembly in 1081 when the German king 
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Henry IV issued a diploma to the Pisans which mentioned the colloquium civium.
59
 The 
suggestion that the patriarch and prince of Antioch addressed the communal assembly 
indicates that this was a body of importance where the principality’s leading secular and 
ecclesiastical figures discussed the future of Baghras in order to win the support of 
Antiochene citizens. 
A citizen was not merely an urban inhabitant, but a person of privileged legal status. 
Coleman suggests that in twelfth century Italy the term ‘citizens’ (cives) may have referred to 
privileged non-noble groups such as merchants and notaries.
60
 The citizens who attended the 
communal assembly at Antioch were probably of a similar socio-economic background to 
their Italian counterparts. When Count Bohemond of Tripoli rang the bell of the commune in 
1201, ‘toute la gent, chevaliers et autres bons homes’ subsequently assembled.61 The Old 
French term ‘gent’ may in this context correspond with the Latin word ‘cives’, while 
‘chevaliers’ and ‘bons homes’ are almost certainly the equivalent of ‘milites’ and ‘boni 
homines’. Individuals described as ‘worthy men’ (boni homines) appear to have been civic 
office-holders who were particularly prominent in many Italian cities in the transitional phase 
from episcopal to communal governance in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.
62
 
The consuls created by the communes of Lombardy and Tuscany seem to have replaced the 
boni homines to some extent and probably assumed some of the powers previously exercised 
by them.
63
 It is impossible to know with any degree of certainty whether a similar process 
occurred in the principality of Antioch. 
Cahen highlights that the nobility of both northern Italy and northern Syria was, for 
the most part, located in urban areas and this affected the composition of the communes that 
were formed in these regions.
64
 Certainly the communes of Italian city-states were plutocratic 
institutions dominated by an urban elite of noble or privileged background.
65
 The nobles of 
the Levantine principality were predominantly based in the city of Antioch following the 
major territorial losses of 1188 and it would be remarkable if none of them joined the 
resistance against the Cilician Armenians in c.1193 and helped to establish the new 
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commune. Some of the principality’s elite must have been opposed to a Roupenid takeover of 
Antioch because otherwise the city would surely have fallen while Bohemond III was in 
captivity. Thus, the Antiochene commune probably contained nobles who had lost their 
lordships to Saladin and saw the creation of this new institution as a means of increasing their 
power within the principality. It is highly likely that the ‘chevaliers’ who assembled in 1201 
after Count Bohemond of Tripoli had rang the communal bell were men of noble background 
who were members of the commune of Antioch.
66
 Raymond-Roupen’s charters confirm that 
two nobles, Acharie the Seneschal and Robert Mansel, were definitely part of the commune. 
As previously mentioned, a letter written by Pope Innocent III in March 1208 
confirms that the existence of a mayor and a group of consuls at Antioch.
67
 This is the first 
time that these offices are mentioned and therefore it is possible either that they were formed 
at the inception of the commune in c.1193, or created later in a change to the structure of the 
institution. The description of Acharie the Seneschal as ‘mayor of the commune’ confirms 
that the mayor was part of the commune,
68
 while consuls were an integral part of Italian 
communes for much of the twelfth century so there can be little doubt that the consuls 
mentioned by Innocent were also part of the Antiochene commune. The number of consuls 
within a commune varied over time and between different cities. They appear to have been 
selected from distinct social groups to ensure that the consulate was representative of the 
whole commune. In most Italian communes, consuls were responsible for all the most 
important aspects of city governance, including justice, defence, and the public finances.
69
 In 
Genoa, for example, they were the leaders of the commune, which effectively made them the 
most powerful men in the city. The number of Genoese consuls fluctuated between four and 
eight, and they served for fixed terms, which after 1122 was usually one year.
70
 
Unfortunately, none of the sources indicate how many consuls there were at Antioch, but it is 
highly likely that these officials were modelled on their counterparts in Genoa and Pisa. 
The precise role of the mayor of Antioch is unclear. Innocent III clearly considered 
the mayor to be a powerful figure at Antioch because he was listed alongside the consuls and 
Bohemond IV as someone who should be excommunicated if he maintained his support for 
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the Greek patriarch Simeon II.
71
 Thus, the mayor appears to have occupied a leading position 
within the commune, but the post does not seem to have been copied from the Pisans or 
Genoese. For example, there are no obvious parallels between the Antiochene mayor and the 
office of podestà that became popular in northern Italy during the late twelfth century when it 
was felt that factionalism was rendering the consulate ineffective. The podestà was ‘a single 
supreme official’ who was responsible for many aspects of governance that had previously 
been undertaken by the consuls.
72
 The Antiochenes are unlikely to have appointed consuls 
after the creation of the commune if they intended to imitate the contemporary Italian trend of 
concentrating power in the hands of one individual. Therefore, the mayor of Antioch 
probably had considerably less authority than a podestà, unless the first mayor was installed 
some years after a consular commune had been established. The fact that Acharie the 
Seneschal and Robert Mansel are both identified as the mayor in the witness lists of charters 
issued by Raymond-Roupen suggests that it was a role of importance because otherwise this 
detail would not have been recorded.
73
 The mayor may have been the head of the commune, 
but there is simply not enough detail in the sources to know how his powers and 
responsibilities differed from those of the consuls. 
The Italian communes differed from the one at Antioch because they did not operate 
under the direct rule of a prince. In many cities in northern Italy, communal officials were 
responsible for all aspects of governance and their decisions were unlikely to be challenged 
by the distant German king. At Antioch, however, the prince remained the most powerful 
secular figure, although Bohemond IV and his successors must have delegated power to their 
officers and to the Antiochene commune because they were often absent from the Latin 
principality. The commune may never have been founded if Bohemond III had not been 
captured by Leon in 1193. Nevertheless, this new institution remained in existence long after 
the prince had been ransomed and returned to Antioch. Therefore, either the commune had 
acquired so much power in a short space of time that Bohemond did not have the authority to 
abolish it, or he recognised the value of the institution and was content for it to oversee some 
aspects of administration with the principality. 
Raymond-Roupen appears to have had some influence over the appointment of the 
mayor and it would not be surprising if the prince of Antioch gradually acquired the ability to 
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pick men to fill important communal positions. There is no evidence that the Antiochene 
mayor and consuls were elected, but in its earliest years the commune was a powerful 
institution that acted independently and therefore it seems likely that originally the prince had 
little say over the selection of these officials. Waley and Dean observe that ‘little is known of 
how the consuls were chosen’ in the communes of northern Italy.74 In most Italian cities, the 
consuls needed the support of the assembly, but that does not mean they were elected by it. 
Methods of election to important communal councils were diverse and even included 
sortition,
75
 but consuls were almost certainly not selected by a ‘free vote’ because as 
Coleman explains ‘a cursory examination of the early consular lists of any [Italian] city will 
reveal that office-holding was the preserve of a small group of families’.76 No Antiochene 
consul can be identified because of the paucity of the primary sources, but it would hardly be 
surprising if key positions within the commune of Antioch were dominated by men of 
privileged kin. 
The commune of Antioch evidently had extensive administrative powers, although the 
prince may have been able to overrule its decisions if he disagreed with them. It had the 
ability to raise taxes and presumably it was also responsible for how the revenue was spent. 
Both the clergy and the laity were expected to pay the communal tallage, despite the 
traditional exemptions of the Latin Church.
77
 The consuls oversaw tax policy in Genoa, and it 
is highly likely that their Antiochene counterparts did the same in the Latin principality. The 
power to increase taxes and introduce new ones was particularly significant in a maritime 
trading city like Genoa because while the commune needed to collect money to pay for 
defence and administration the consuls did not want to inhibit the commerce that was so vital 
for the city’s economy by making it more expensive to do business in Genoa than Pisa or 
Barcelona.
78
 Trade was also vital to the prosperity of Antioch so high taxes on the buying or 
selling of goods could have been counterproductive. Instead, the only surviving evidence 
about the tax policy of the Antiochene commune is the tallage imposed on the clergy in 1198, 
which brought a different set of problems. 
The commune of Antioch was also involved in the dispensation of justice, either by 
establishing its own court or introducing Byzantine procedures into the existing legal 
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system.
79
 The commune itself is not mentioned in the Assises d’Antioche, but the preface 
records that the authors of the legal treatise gave a copy to Robert Mansel,
80
 who was, as 
previously noted, mayor of the commune in 1219.
81
 The exact nature of the commune’s 
judicial role is unclear, but the Italian influence upon this aspect of the institution is evident. 
In many cities in northern Italy the commune was responsible for upholding the law. Thus, 
the consuls of Genoa swore to dispense justice equally to all Genoese citizens and served as 
judges in peacetime.
82
 It is possible that the Antiochene consuls played a key role in their 
principality’s judicial system. 
Apart from taxation and justice, the sources are silent on the areas of governance that 
were overseen by the commune of Antioch. It was not formed, however, as merely an 
administrative body, but in opposition to a Roupenid attempt to occupy the city of Antioch.
83
 
From the very beginning, therefore, it was a political institution with a military purpose. The 
founders of the commune violently expelled Cilician Armenian soldiers from Antioch in 
c.1193 and it is quite possible, as Cahen argues, that they maintained a militia to defend the 
city from invaders thereafter.
84
 The priority for any Italian commune was to defend its own 
city and secure control of the surrounding countryside. Thus, most of them spent a majority 
of their income on war and all maintained a communal militia to undertake the fighting, 
although the use of mercenaries became popular in the thirteenth century.
85
 The situation 
cannot have been quite the same at Antioch because the Antiochene commune operated under 
the direct rule of a prince. It is possible that Bohemond IV and his successors were content to 
let this institution finance and organise a militia to defend Antioch, but ultimately these 
soldiers must surely have had to swear their allegiance to the prince and obey his orders. 
The Antiochene commune was also deeply involved in the internal politics of the 
principality. In theory, the commune should have followed legal custom and supported the 
succession of Raymond-Roupen, whom Bohemond III had designated as his heir.
86
 In 
practice, however, this institution rapidly acquired power and legitimacy within the 
principality, which it exploited by installing Count Bohemond of Tripoli as the prince of 
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Antioch in 1201. The description of this event in Eracles suggests that the communal 
assembly approved the Tripolitan count’s investiture as prince.87 The assemblies of Italian 
communes were often required to give their vocal backing to crucial decisions before they 
could be implemented so it would not be surprising if Bohemond needed the endorsement of 
the whole assembly before he could rely on the support of the Antiochene commune.
88
 
Both Prawer and Cahen agree that Greeks were part of the commune of Antioch and 
therefore its membership was not exclusively Latin.
89
 The main evidence for this belief is a 
letter written by Innocent III on 5 January 1199, which suggested that the commune was 
using ‘Greek customs’ when dealing with the possessions of the Latin Church.90 This implies 
that the commune’s policies – the imposition of a tallage on all churches, including those of 
the Latins, and the subjection of the clergy to the justice of the commune – were of Byzantine 
origin. No source specifically states that Greeks were part of the commune, but Prawer’s 
contention that this institution would not have adopted Byzantine customs and undermined 
the traditional privileges of the Latin Church without the influence of Greek members is 
convincing.
91
 The commune’s support for the Greek patriarch Simeon II, which led Innocent 
III to order the patriarch of Jerusalem to threaten the mayor and consuls of Antioch with 
excommunication in 1208,
92
 adds further weight to this argument. 
While Prawer stresses the importance of the Greeks in the Antiochene commune, he 
appears to dismiss the possibility that Syriac Christians were part of the institution by 
asserting that ‘the Jacobites at no time became a political factor in the life of the Frankish 
capital’.93 However, Jacobite representatives were among the envoys sent by the Antiochenes 
to submit to Hulagu in 1260 in order to avert a Mongol offensive on the city of Antioch.
94
 
This activity may be indicative of the Syriac Christian populace, but it is impossible to 
accurately gauge their level of political engagement because of their absence from much of 
the surviving primary source material. The commune had authority over all the inhabitants of 
Antioch – for example, in 1198 it imposed a tallage on Antiochenes regardless of their ‘status 
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or language’ – and it is possible, therefore, that non-Greek “minorities” secured 
representation in the communal assembly.
95
 
The Commune and the Cilician Armenians 
For almost three decades the Antiochene commune had a major influence on the 
principality’s relationship with Armenian Cilicia. Indeed the institution was formed to 
prevent Leon’s troops from seizing Antioch. Without the intervention of those who founded 
the commune in c.1193, the principality of Antioch would probably have been absorbed into 
the Roupenid principality and ceased to exist as an independent Latin state. The commune 
certainly maintained an anti-Roupenid stance in the first decade after its creation – whether 
its position softened after that is a matter for debate. 
In his study of the commune of Antioch, Prawer suggests that the institution was 
‘anti-Armenian’,96 but this is a misrepresentation of the views of communal members. The 
founders of the Antiochene commune were not opposed to the Armenians as an ethnic group 
or religious minority – they opposed Leon’s attempts to capture and hold the city of Antioch 
because they wanted to preserve the Latin principality and prevent the Roupenids from 
annexing it. They were anti-Roupenid rather than anti-Armenian.
97
  The commune supported 
Count Bohemond of Tripoli’s claim to the principality of Antioch because it feared the 
consequences of investing his young nephew as prince. Both King Leon I, who had no sons 
of his own, and Prince Bohemond III named Raymond-Roupen as the heir of their territories 
shortly after his birth.
98
 There was, therefore, a strong possibility that the two states would 
have unified if Raymond-Roupen had succeeded his great-uncle and his grandfather. The 
commune was evidently opposed to such an outcome as it took the extraordinary step of 
forcing Bohemond III into exile and recognising the count of Tripoli as the heir to the 
principality in 1198.
99
 
The commune’s decision to recognise Bohemond IV as their prince following the 
death of Bohemond III had a major impact on the relationship between the principality of 
Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. If Raymond-Roupen had succeeded his paternal 
grandfather as prince in 1201 then the ties between these two states would have been 
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considerably strengthened, although they would probably have remained separate entities 
initially. King Leon I would almost certainly have acted as regent for the young prince, who 
was only an infant at the time, and the principality would temporarily have fallen under 
Roupenid control. By supporting Bohemond of Tripoli, the commune consciously rejected 
this scenario. Having opposed Roupenid control of Antioch in c.1193, the behaviour of the 
commune in 1201 was perfectly logical. 
The founders of the commune ultimately failed to prevent Raymond-Roupen from 
becoming prince of Antioch, but they did help to delay his succession until 1216. By the time 
Bohemond IV was ousted from power, his nephew had reached the age of majority and was 
able to rule in his own right. Furthermore, the impetuous young prince quarrelled with Leon 
and therefore Antioch’s relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia became distinctly cool 
during his short reign.
100
 Raymond-Roupen infused the commune with his own supporters 
after taking power, but he may also have won the support of some of the anti-Roupenid 
members of the institution by maintaining the Latin principality’s independence and not 
collaborating too closely with King Leon I. 
Conclusion 
 The surviving evidence suggests that the commune of Antioch was a powerful 
institution which had a significant impact on the Latin principality in the late twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries. Its founders repulsed a Roupenid army from Antioch in c.1193 and 
endorsed Count Bohemond of Tripoli’s claim to be the legitimate heir to the principality even 
before his father’s death. The commune’s support for the Tripolitan count in 1201 was crucial 
in allowing him to seize control of Antioch and establish his authority as prince. The revolt of 
1207 suggests that some members of the commune opposed Bohemond’s rule, but the 
institution as a whole appears to have backed him until 1216. It is unlikely that the count of 
Tripoli could have held the principality for fifteen years without the commune’s support. 
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Chapter Three: The Military Orders in the 
Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia 
The Military Orders had a significant presence in the principality of Antioch and the 
kingdom of Cilicia during the thirteenth century, although the number of possessions under 
their control in these states increased and decreased at various points in time. The 
Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights acquired castles and a considerable number of estates 
in Cilicia, while the Templars dominated the frontier between the Latin principality and the 
Armenian kingdom, possessing several strongholds in the Amanus Mountains. 
There are now a large number of studies examining the involvement of the Military 
Orders in these states.
1
 Some of this research does discuss the role of the Templars and the 
Hospitallers in the Antiochene succession dispute, but for the most part historians have 
concentrated on how the Orders developed links with the principality of Antioch and the 
kingdom of Cilicia, and acquired lands and castles within them. This chapter provides a 
summary of the possessions of each Military Order in these territories, but the main focus is 
on how the Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights influenced Antiochene-Cilician 
relations. Unlike previous studies, it analyses the diplomatic and military activities of the 
major military orders in both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom from the late 
twelfth century until the fall of Antioch in 1268, and fully considers their influence on the 
relationship between these states. Other military-religious institutions which had connections 
to these states, such as the Orders of St Lazarus, Santiago, and Calatrava, have not been 
considered because their presence in this region was much too small to have had any 
meaningful impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations. 
The Hospitallers in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia 
The Order of the Hospital began acquiring assets in the principality of Antioch from 
the very beginning of the twelfth century, long before it developed a military vocation. By 
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1118 the Hospitallers had already received numerous houses and plots of land in donations 
from the Antiochene princes and their barons.
2
 Over the course of several decades the Order 
amassed dozens of estates within the principality, including a large number close to the 
Orontes River. However, as the Latin state decreased in size following the conquests of 
Muslim rulers, such as Nūr al-Dīn, the Hospitallers lost many of their possessions. 
In 1186 the Hospitallers acquired the impressive fortress of Margat on the southern 
frontier of the principality of Antioch after agreeing to pay Bertrand Mazoir an annual rent of 
2,200 bezants.
3
 With Margat, the Order obtained a large lordship which included the town of 
Valenia, the smaller castles of Brahim and Popos, and many estates in the south of the 
principality. The Mazoirs were forced to relinquish Margat because they could not afford to 
maintain and defend the stronghold in the face of increasing aggression from their Muslim 
neighbours. Bohemond III did not have the money and manpower needed for the upkeep of 
the castle so Bertrand turned to the Hospital, which did have the necessary resources. The 
prince of Antioch encouraged the Hospitallers to take the lordship by granting them a number 
of special privileges, including an exemption from the military service that the holder of 
Margat traditionally owed to him, thereby reducing his own sovereignty over the area.
4
 
The Hospitallers’ ability to retain Margat was tested just two years later when Saladin 
led a large army into northern Syria. During the summer of 1188 the Ayyubid sultan captured 
a large number of Antiochene towns and fortresses, including Jabala and Latakia in the south 
of the principality.
5
 However, Saladin avoided making a direct attack on Margat and instead 
marched straight from Tortosa to Jabala. Wilbrand of Oldenburg claimed that the Hospitallers 
kept enough provisions at Margat to sustain a garrison for five years so it is unlikely that the 
castle could have been taken after a short siege.
6
 The strength of the garrison and the 
abundance of supplies at Margat may, therefore, have played a key role in deterring Saladin 
from besieging the fortress because the Ayyubid sultan desired a swift campaign in northern 
Syria and the prospect of a lengthy blockade was distinctly unappealing. 
Margat remained in the hands of the Hospitallers until 1285, but it was cut off from 
the rest of the principality of Antioch for most of the thirteenth century because Latakia was 
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under the control of the Ayyubids between 1188 and 1260. Riley-Smith characterised the 
Hospitaller lordship of Margat as ‘semi-independent palatinate’,7 and it certainly appears to 
have had little effect on the course of Antiochene history during the thirteenth century. 
However, Burgtorf rightly points out that the Order must have had a substantial presence in 
Antioch itself because Raymond-Roupen entrusted the Hospital with the defence of the city’s 
citadel in 1219.
8
 The Hospitallers were able to influence events in the principality not only 
militarily and diplomatically, but also through their banking activities. The Hospital lent 
money to political leaders and safeguarded valuable possessions. For example, Peter of Ivrea, 
the Latin patriarch of Antioch, received items from the Hospitallers at Antioch in 1209 which 
his predecessor had given them to look after.
9
 
The Order of the Hospital was also granted land and property in Cilicia in the early 
twelfth century, when much of the region was under the control of the princes of Antioch. In 
1149, Raymond of Poitiers issued a charter which confirmed earlier donations made to the 
Hospitallers by Antiochene barons and previous princes.
10
 The Order had been endowed with 
villages near Mamistra and Harunia. Chevalier asserts that such grants were ‘more charitable 
than strategic’, highlighting that the monastery of Notre-Dame de Josaphat also received 
estates in these areas.
11
 The initial existence of the Hospital in Cilicia was small and did not 
include any castles or fortified settlements because it was viewed as a religious institution. 
The Hospitallers did not become a major force in Cilicia until after Leon II inherited 
the Roupenid principality in 1187. In the early thirteenth century, the Armenian king made 
several large donations to the Order. The Hospitallers received the fortresses of Silifke, 
Camardias, and Norpert in western Cilicia in April 1210.
12
 These castles and their 
appurtenances formed part of a powerful lordship which historians such as Cahen and Riley-
Smith have described as a ‘march’ – a barrier between the Seljuk Turks of Anatolia and the 
Armenian kingdom.
13
 King Leon I also granted Laranda, which lay halfway between Silifke 
and Konya, to the Hospital in August 1210, despite the fact that the town was under Seljuk 
control at the time.
14
 The number of Hospitaller possessions in Cilicia was then swelled even 
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further by the villages and their appurtenances which the Armenian king bestowed upon them 
in April 1214.
15
 
The Hospital became a major landowner in Cilicia during the reign of King Leon I, 
but it held the most important of these donations for less than twenty years. In 1226 the Order 
was pressured into selling Silifke to Constantine of Babaron, constable and baillie of the 
Armenian kingdom, in highly unusual circumstances. Isabel, the recently widowed queen of 
Cilicia, had sought refuge in the fortress after refusing to marry Constantine’s son, Hethoum. 
The baillie, however, was determined to forcibly wed the couple, and he led a cavalry 
contingent into western Cilicia in order to pursue the queen. The Hospitallers refused to evict 
her, but instead agreed to surrender the stronghold to Constantine while Isabel was still 
inside.
16
 They clearly considered Silifke to be an important fortress because all their assets in 
Cilicia were managed by the castellan that resided there.
17
 Molin, however, suggests that the 
Order may not have been ‘entirely unhappy’ about losing the castle because of the financial 
costs of defending it against Seljuk aggression.
18
 The Hospitallers retained most of their other 
lands and properties in the Armenian kingdom, but they did not receive any significant new 
grants of territory from King Hethoum I.
19
 
The Templars in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia 
Renaud Mazoir, lord of Margat, sold a gastina located in the mountains above 
Valenia to the Templars in 1160.
20
 Burgtorf claims that this information is included in the 
first surviving charter which records the transfer of property in the principality of Antioch to 
the Order of the Temple. However, he suggests that the Templars had established a presence 
in the city of Antioch much earlier.
21
 For example, in 1140 two knights of the Temple 
witnessed charters issued by Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch.
22
 Thus, it seems likely 
that the Order was stationing men at Antioch and acquiring property in the principality in the 
first half of the twelfth century. 
The Order also appears to have possessed four castles in the Amanus Mountains – on 
the frontier between Armenian Cilicia and the principality of Antioch – during the late 
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twelfth century. Two of these strongholds are clearly identifiable – Baghras, which guarded 
the south-eastern entrance of the Belen Pass; and Darbsak, which stood further north, at the 
eastern edge of the mountain range. Latin and Old French primary sources mention two other 
fortresses which appear to have been situated in the Amanus Mountains and garrisoned by the 
Templars – La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol. However, archaeologists and 
historians have only been able to locate one other contemporary castle in the area, known 
today as Chivlan Kale. This stronghold, which overlooks the Hajar Shuglan Pass, has been 
identified as La Roche de Roissol by Cahen, Molin and Boas, but Deschamps and Chevalier 
argue that it is actually La Roche de Guillaume.
23
 
There is also some uncertainty over when the Temple acquired these castles. Riley-
Smith argues that the Order had established a march in the Amanus before the area was 
conquered by Byzantine Emperor John II Comnenus in early 1138.
24
 Chevalier contends that 
this theory is flawed because of its reliance on the Armenian version of the chronicle of 
Michael the Syrian, which she claims has been incorrectly translated into French by 
Dulaurier.
25
 The Dulaurier translation states that during his time as prince of Antioch Renaud 
of Châtillon had a dispute with the Roupenid prince Thoros II ‘au sujet des forteresses que les 
Grecs avaient enlevées aux Frères (Templiers) et que Thoros avait reprises aux Grecs’.26 
However, Chevalier has examined the original Armenian text and observes that it does not 
suggest that the brothers of the Temple held these strongholds before they were captured by 
the Byzantine army.
27
 The Syriac version of Michael the Syrian’s chronicle, translated into 
French by Chabot, records that ‘ces châteaux avaient jadis été enlevés aux Francs par les 
Grecs’.28 Therefore, it is quite possible that the Amanus castles were under Antiochene, 
rather than Templar, control during the 1130s and that the Order’s march in this region was 
created much later. 
The idea that the Temple controlled a march on the northern frontier of the 
principality of Antioch in the 1130s is debateable, but there is no doubt that it obtained 
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fortresses in the Amanus Mountains during the 1150s. In c.1156 Renaud of Châtillon, prince 
of Antioch, forced Thoros II of the Roupenid principality in Cilicia to relinquish his control 
of the Amanus castles which he had taken from the Greeks. Renaud then conferred these 
strongholds upon the Templars.
29
 The Order appears to have held Baghras, Darbsak, La 
Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol by the late 1150s, although it is possible that 
one or two of them were acquired later as the sources do not specifically name the individual 
fortresses that were taken from Thoros. 
The Temple briefly lost possession of some of these castles in the early 1170s due to 
the aggressive and expansionist policies pursued by Thoros II’s successor Mleh. However, 
the Templars appear to have regained their dominant position in the Amanus region after 
Mleh’s death in 1175.30 Certainly Darbsak and Baghras were in Templar hands when Saladin 
besieged them in September 1188. The sultan captured both these fortresses with relative ease 
and put them under the command of the emir ‘Alam al-Dīn Sulaymān.31 Darbsak remained 
under Ayyubid control for decades afterwards, but a major dispute was to emerge over the 
possession of Baghras. 
In c.1191 Saladin ordered the destruction of Baghras, which suggests that he did not 
consider the castle to be particularly important. Lawrence argues that unlike Darbsak, which 
occupied a prominent position and controlled the traffic passing through the nearby mountain 
pass, Baghras had a restricted view of the surrounding area and its real value lay in helping to 
defend the city of Antioch.
32
 Saladin’s men did a considerable amount of damage to the 
fortress, but they abandoned the site before completely demolishing it after learning that the 
Roupenid prince Leon II planned to attack them. The Cilician Armenians subsequently 
secured control of Baghras and repaired the fortifications.
33
 The Templars hoped to recover 
the castle now that it was once again in Christian hands, but Leon had no intention of 
relinquishing it. As a result, the two sides quarrelled relentlessly over Baghras until the 
Armenian king granted the fortress to the Order after capturing Antioch in 1216. 
The Templars acquired castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains and along the 
coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta, but there is no evidence that they ever obtained possessions 
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on the Cilician plain or in the Taurus Mountains.
34
 The Order of the Temple wasn’t granted 
lands or fortresses in Cilicia during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries because of 
its disagreement with Leon about Baghras. The Armenian king’s refusal to return the castle to 
the Templars caused a mutual antipathy to develop between the two sides and prompted the 
latter to support Bohemond IV in the Antiochene succession dispute. At the same time, Leon 
cultivated strong links with the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights. These military orders 
received many of their lands and properties in Cilicia during the period when the Armenian 
king and the Templars were feuding over Baghras. Thus, the Order of the Temple received 
nothing when Leon was making significant donations to Latin military and religious 
institutions. The monarchy of the Armenian kingdom appears to have made fewer grants to 
the military orders after 1216, when the conflict over Baghras was finally resolved. When 
King Hethoum I and his successors did make endowments they preferred to reward the 
military orders who already had a substantial presence in the Armenian kingdom and 
therefore the Templars did not receive any major strongholds or large estates in the heart of 
Cilicia. 
The Teutonic Knights in the kingdom of Cilicia 
The origins of the Teutonic Knights lie in a field hospital that was established by 
German crusaders in 1190 to care for those who were injured while participating in the siege 
of Acre. The founders of this hospital subsequently decided to found their own military order 
and adopt the Rule of the Templars, while also modelling their care of the sick on the 
practices of the Hospitallers. These decisions were confirmed in a papal bull issued by 
Innocent III in February 1199.
35
 The Teutonic Knights found a natural ally in King Leon I, 
who was crowned in January 1198 after accepting the suzerainty of the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Henry VI.
36
 At some point in the early thirteenth century, the Order delighted Leon 
by deciding to support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. 
King Leon I rewarded the Teutonic Knights for their diplomatic support by 
confirming the donation of the castle of Amouda and several villages to the Order in April 
1212.
37
 However, the Teutonic Knights may have already held Cumbethfort and Ayun as 
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these settlements are recorded in a document issued by Pope Innocent III in 1209 which lists 
the possessions of the Order.
38
 Less than fifteen years after their establishment as a military 
order the Teutonic Knights had obtained a fortress and a number of estates in Cilicia. 
Amouda was a small and unimpressive castle in comparison with Baghras or Silifke, but it 
was an important acquisition for such a new institution and for more than two decades it 
remained the Order’s primary stronghold in the Armenian kingdom. 
The Teutonic Knights received their next major endowment in Cilicia in January 
1236, when King Hethoum I bestowed the castle of Harunia upon the Order. In addition to 
this modest fortification, they were given a considerable lordship which included numerous 
villages and estates.
39
 Riley-Smith argues that Hethoum made this grant to the Teutonic 
Knights in order to help secure the eastern frontier of the Armenian kingdom so that he could 
concentrate on defending western Cilicia from the Seljuks.
40
 It is certainly true that Harunia’s 
location close to the Amanus Gates made it a key defensive stronghold. However, whenever 
the Mamluks invaded the Armenian kingdom from this direction in the second half of the 
thirteenth century the Teutonic Knights were unable to hinder the attackers so the castle’s 
importance should not be exaggerated.
41
 
The Impact of the Military Orders on Antiochene-Cilician Relations 
The disagreement over Baghras meant that the principality of Antioch and the 
kingdom of Cilicia were engaged in a diplomatic conflict even before the death of Bohemond 
III in 1201. In December 1199 Pope Innocent III wrote to King Leon I commanding him to 
return the castle to the Order of the Temple. The letter reveals that the patriarch of Antioch, 
Prince Bohemond III, Count Bohemond of Tripoli, and the Antiochene commune had all 
been pressing the Armenian king to give Baghras to the Templars.
42
 Thus, the Order 
encouraged hostility between the Latin elite at Antioch and the Cilician Armenians by 
seeking the support of the former in their quarrel with the latter. 
The ownership of Baghras was not the only issue which caused animosity between the 
principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia in the late 1190s. It was at this point that 
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the question of who would succeed Bohemond III as prince became a serious issue. In the 
winter of 1198-1199, Count Bohemond of Tripoli expelled his father from Antioch and took 
control of the principality with the help of the Antiochene commune. In a letter to Pope 
Innocent III, Leon claimed that Bohemond of Tripoli had plotted an attack on the Armenian 
kingdom with the Templars and the Hospitallers.
43
 He also asserted that these military orders 
later made peace with him and suggested that Bohemond III was subsequently able to regain 
power at Antioch with the assistance of a Cilician Armenian army.
44
 The implication of this 
information is that the Tripolitan count seized Antioch with the backing of the Templars and 
Hospitallers, but once they withdrew their support he was unable to hold the principality. 
These military orders appear to have been particularly influential in the principality at this 
time and it seems that their change of heart in 1199 delayed the outbreak of the War of 
Antiochene Succession between Leon and Bohemond of Tripoli. 
The Tripolitan count took control of the Latin principality and was recognised as 
Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch by the Antiochene commune following his father’s death in 
1201.
45
 When King Leon I led an army into the principality in the summer of that year and 
met with Philip of Plessis, the Master of the Temple, his proposals for an agreement over the 
future of Baghras were rejected. The Armenian king stated he was willing to cede the castle 
to the Templars and that both parties should send emissaries to Innocent III in order to allow 
the pope to settle the matter.
46
 Leon also promised to aid their attempts to recapture Darbsak 
and requested that he and Raymond-Roupen were made confratres of the Order.
47
 In return 
for these concessions the Armenian king demanded that the Templars supported Raymond-
Roupen’s claim to Antioch.48 
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The Templars’ decision to rebuff Leon’s offer certainly aided Bohemond IV’s efforts 
to secure and maintain control of the principality of Antioch. Riley-Smith is probably correct 
to argue that they were not prepared to accept terms which implied that their claims to 
Baghras were doubtful and dependent on the arbitration of the pope.
49
 The issue of trust, 
however, was most likely the decisive factor which prompted Philip of Plessis to decline to 
co-operate with the Cilician Armenians. Leon had spent much of the previous decade 
refusing to relinquish Baghras despite incessant petitioning from the Templars and the 
Antiochenes, and clear instructions from the papacy.
50
 The Order probably did not believe 
that the Armenian king would actually hand over the castle. Philip did not want to pledge his 
support to Raymond-Roupen before Leon had given Baghras to the Templars. It would have 
been particularly galling for the Templars if they had helped the Cilician Armenians to expel 
Bohemond IV from Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as the new prince in 1201, only to 
find that Leon subsequently ignored a decree from Innocent III to cede the castle to the 
Order. Philip appears to have judged that the Templars stood a better chance of recovering 
Baghras with Bohemond IV as the prince of Antioch. 
The stance taken by the Order of the Temple in 1201 may have played a significant 
role in Leon’s failure to capture Antioch that year. The Templars seem to have backed 
Bohemond IV from the very beginning of the Antiochene succession dispute. They were 
clearly unwilling to aid the Armenian king’s endeavours to seize Antioch, but there is no 
evidence that they actually assisted the count of Tripoli in defending the city from the 
Cilician Armenians in 1201. Considering their alleged co-operation with him in the winter of 
1198-1199, however, this is not an impossibility. Apart from refusing to support Raymond-
Roupen’s claim and collaborate with his partisans, the Order also ignored Leon’s pleas to 
help defend the Armenian kingdom when Cilicia was invaded by the Seljuks.
51
 The Cilician 
Armenians probably withdrew from the Latin principality after three months of campaigning 
in order to defend their realm and prevent Rukn al-Dīn Süleymānshāh from conquering 
strategically important strongholds. Therefore, by rejecting Leon’s appeal to protect the 
Armenian kingdom in his absence the Templars may have forced him to prematurely end his 
campaign and prevented the Cilician Armenians from occupying Antioch in 1201. 
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The influence of the Templars on the Antiochene succession dispute in 1203 is quite 
evident. After the Cilician Armenians had succeeded in entering Antioch on a night in 
November, Leon began negotiating with Peter of Angoulême, the Latin patriarch of Antioch. 
However, before the Armenian king could secure full control of the city and have Raymond-
Roupen invested as prince, his troops were attacked by the Templars.
52
 Bohemond IV’s 
Antiochene supporters were probably also involved in the offensive on the Cilician 
Armenians, but in his correspondence with Innocent III Leon focused upon the 
aggressiveness of the Templars. Shortly afterwards, the Armenian king and his men began to 
retreat back to Cilicia when an Aleppan army advanced towards Antioch and reached the 
Orontes.
53
 The intervention of al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s forces appears to have been crucial in forcing 
Leon’s withdrawal from Antioch. However, if the Templars had not attacked the Cilician 
Armenians and secured the city’s fortifications then the latter may have captured Antioch and 
established their rule over the metropolis before the Aleppans arrived. Thus, the Order played 
a pivotal role in maintaining Bohemond IV’s grip on the Latin principality, thereby extending 
the War of Antiochene Succession. 
In later years it is more difficult to detect how the Templars aided the count of Tripoli 
in the military aspects of the Antiochene succession dispute. The Order clearly had a 
substantial force of fighting men based at Antioch in the early stages of the conflict because 
otherwise it would not have been able to make such a vital contribution in combatting the 
Cilician Armenians after the latter entered the city in November 1203. However, it is unclear 
whether this Templar force remained at Antioch and continued to help Bohemond IV’s 
garrison to defend the metropolis from the troops of King Leon I because the Templars aren’t 
mentioned in the primary source accounts of subsequent attacks on the city. 
The Order of the Temple continued to cause diplomatic problems for King Leon I 
until it recovered Baghras in 1216. Shortly after the Templars helped thwart the Armenian 
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king’s attempt to capture Antioch in November 1203, he retaliated by seizing their castles of 
La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol.
54
 This hostile act, combined with the 
persistent refusal of the Cilician Armenians to relinquish Baghras, damaged Leon’s 
relationship with the pope and his representatives. The papal legate Peter of Saint-Marcellus 
excommunicated Leon and placed an interdict upon the kingdom of Cilicia because of his 
clashes with the Templars, who maintained a good relationship with the Apostolic See. The 
Armenian king came to an agreement with the Order in September 1204 and appears to have 
agreed to return La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol.
55
 However, his initial 
decision to attack and occupy the fortresses can only have increased the Templars’ hostility 
towards him and entrenched their support for Bohemond IV. Furthermore, such behaviour 
probably discouraged Innocent III from becoming too supportive of Leon, even if the pope 
thought he had been excommunicated over a very minor incident.
56
 
Innocent III’s correspondence suggests that he was sympathetic towards Raymond-
Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. The pope knew that Bohemond III had 
publicly designated Raymond-Roupen as his heir and ordered the Antiochene barons to swear 
allegiance to the boy in 1198.
57
 Innocent would surely not have taken such an active interest 
in the Antiochene succession dispute if he was content for Bohemond IV to rule the 
principality because the count of Tripoli was already in control of the Latin state. The 
interference of the papacy suggests a desire for a change in the governance of Antioch. 
However, the ongoing row between the Cilician Armenians and the Templars over possession 
of Baghras continued to harm Innocent III’s relationship with King Leon I. In March 1209 
the pope wrote to Patriarch Albert of Jerusalem and asked him to try and persuade the 
Armenian king to give the castle to the Order. The patriarch was also to implement a new 
sentence of excommunication against Leon if the latter continued to remain intransigent over 
Baghras.
58
 Rather than obtaining the explicit support from the papacy for Raymond-Roupen 
that he sought, the Armenian king found himself facing a serious spiritual punishment from 
Innocent III for his reluctance to cede Baghras to the Templars. 
Leon was later excommunicated for coming into conflict with the Order of the 
Temple. In late 1210 or early 1211 the Cilician Armenians captured Port Bonnel from the 
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Templars, before subsequently seizing all the Order’s possessions in and around the Amanus 
Mountains apart from two castles. A Templar force then marched towards one of these 
fortresses, presumably either La Roche de Guillaume or La Roche de Roissol, in order to 
resupply and strengthen the garrison, but it was attacked by Leon’s troops. William of 
Chartres, the Master of the Temple, was seriously wounded in this skirmish.
59
 After news of 
the Armenian king’s behaviour reached Rome Innocent III wrote to several senior clergymen 
in the summer of 1211 commanding them to publicise and enforce the sentence of 
excommunication against Leon.
60
 The pope also encouraged John of Brienne, king of 
Jerusalem, to assist the Templars in responding to this aggression from the Armenian king.
61
 
According to Eracles, John of Brienne supplied the Order of the Temple with 50 
knights for the purpose of attacking the Armenian kingdom. Alongside troops from the 
kingdom of Jerusalem and the principality of Antioch, the Templars then invaded Cilicia 
before later making peace with Leon.
62
 If John did send 50 knights to participate in a conflict 
with the Cilician Armenians then this incident clearly demonstrates how Leon’s quarrel with 
the Order over possession of Baghras hampered his efforts to secure Antioch for his great-
nephew. The Armenian king could not launch another attempt to capture the city if he was 
fending off an attack from the Templars and their allies. Furthermore, Leon’s clashes with the 
Order weakened his position when trying to persuade the papacy to explicitly support 
Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. Therefore, the Armenian king 
sought reconciliation with the Templars, which persuaded Innocent III to lift the sentence of 
excommunication which had been placed upon him.
63
 
The Templars ultimately failed to stop the Cilician Armenians from capturing 
Antioch, but their opposition to King Leon I helped Bohemond IV to cling on to the city until 
1216. The involvement of the other military orders in the conflict is less tangible. In 1207 a 
charter issued in the name of Raymond-Roupen granted the town of Jabala to the Order of the 
Hospital.
64
 The settlement was under Ayyubid control so the Hospitallers did not actually 
receive the donation. Nevertheless, the symbolism of the document is still important. By 
making this agreement the Order recognised Raymond-Roupen as the prince of Antioch and 
his right to donate land and property that was either currently or formerly part of the 
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principality. It is fairly clear, therefore, that by 1207 at the latest the Hospitallers had decided 
to support Raymond-Roupen in the Antiochene succession dispute. 
There is no evidence that Hospitaller forces actually participated in Leon’s attacks on 
Templar possessions and the principality of Antioch. Instead the Order of the Hospital aided 
the Cilician Armenians indirectly. For example, in 1210 Leon bestowed the fortresses of 
Silifke, Camardias, and Norpert upon the Hospitallers.
65
 This endowment made the Order 
responsible for holding these key strongholds in western Cilicia. This meant that the 
Armenian king could potentially spend more time campaigning in northern Syria because he 
would not have to withdraw in order to defend the Armenian kingdom if castles like Silifke 
were attacked by the Seljuks. Leon seems to have been forced to cut short his offensives on 
the Latin principality in 1201 and 1208 because of incursions made into Cilicia by Rukn al-
Dīn Süleymānshāh and Kay-Khusraw I.66 He probably hoped to avoid such a scenario after 
1210 by relying on the Hospitallers to defend the western frontier of his kingdom and hinder 
any Seljuk invasion from that direction. 
When King Leon I was arranging the marriage of his daughter, Stephanie, to John of 
Brienne, king of Jerusalem, the financial assistance of the Hospitallers was very important. 
On 23 April 1214 the Order of the Hospital gave 10,000 bezants to Leon in exchange for the 
village of Vaner and its appurtenances.
67
 Furthermore, it loaned 20,000 bezants to the 
Armenian king, which was secured against the territory of Giguer.
68
 This money allowed 
Leon to pay a substantial dowry to John of Brienne, which he probably wouldn’t have 
otherwise been able to afford given that the Armenian king must have been spending a large 
amount of his tax revenues on maintaining an army in order to pursue the conquest of 
Antioch and resist the threat posed by the Seljuks. By facilitating this marriage the 
Hospitallers also helped Leon gain another ally in his quarrel with Bohemond IV.
69
 This was 
particularly important given that John had previously been asked by Innocent III to assist the 
Templars in recovering the strongholds and estates which the Cilician Armenians had taken 
from them in 1211.
70
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The Teutonic Knights also appear to have backed Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the 
principality of Antioch. In June 1209 a member of the Order was in Rome acting as an envoy 
of King Leon I at the court of Pope Innocent III.
71
 The emissary was defending the behaviour 
of the Armenian king during the Antiochene succession dispute and articulating Leon’s 
concerns. This indicates that the Teutonic Knights had developed a close relationship with the 
Cilician Armenians. Yet a few months later, in September of that year, Bohemond IV gave 
three fortified towers in Tripoli to the Order.
72
 It is possible, as Molin suggests, that this was 
an attempt by the Tripolitan count to persuade the Teutonic Knights to weaken their ties with 
the Armenian king.
73
 However, it may simply be the case that Bohemond IV was 
unconcerned by the Order’s support for Raymond-Roupen and he thought it was unlikely to 
have any meaningful effect on his struggle against the Cilician Armenians. He probably 
wanted to develop close connections with this new institution and believed that the Teutonic 
Knights could be trusted to help defend Tripoli. 
In April 1212, King Leon I confirmed in charter that he had granted the castle of 
Amouda and several villages to the Teutonic Knights. The Order was also given permission 
to buy and sell freely within the Armenian kingdom, without being subject to the taxes which 
Leon normally imposed on trade.
74
 At first glance, it is tempting to view this endowment in a 
similar manner to the donation which the Armenian king had made to the Hospitallers two 
years earlier. However, unlike Silifke and the other fortresses which the Order of the Hospital 
received in 1210, Amouda was located on the Cilician plain in the eastern half of the 
Armenian kingdom, but a long way from any frontier. Thus, Leon could not really expect the 
Teutonic Knights to inhibit a Seljuk offensive on eastern Cilicia simply because they had a 
garrison at Amouda.
75
 The Order did not aid the campaign to install Raymond-Roupen at 
Antioch by taking on a lot of responsibility for the defence and security for the Armenian 
kingdom, nor does it appear to have contributed men towards Leon’s attacks on the Latin 
principality. Therefore, the only real influence that the Teutonic Knights had on the 
Antiochene succession dispute was in the field of diplomacy, where Innocent III would have 
noted their support for Raymond-Roupen. 
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None of the military orders are mentioned by the primary sources which record the 
Cilician Armenian occupation of Antioch in 1216 which suggests that they did not play a role 
of any significance in this event. If the Templars still had a large detachment based at 
Antioch then they were unable to prevent Leon’s troops from securing control of the city 
after gaining entry during the night. The Armenian king subsequently returned Baghras to the 
Order of the Temple.
76
 He must have hoped that this act would persuade the Templars to 
abandon their opposition to Raymond-Roupen’s claim to Antioch and recognise him as the 
legitimate prince. The strategic importance of the castle to Leon greatly diminished after he 
had captured Antioch because he did not anticipate further conflict on the Antiochene-
Cilician frontier once Raymond-Roupen had been put in charge of the principality. 
Over the following three years Leon’s great-nephew continued to cultivate good 
relations with the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights. When Bohemond IV reoccupied 
Antioch in the spring of 1219 Raymond-Roupen fled to Cilicia and left the Antiochene 
citadel under the command of Ferrand de Barras, the Hospitaller castellan of Silifke. The 
count of Tripoli then besieged the citadel and Ferrand was forced to surrender.
77
 The Order of 
the Hospital was evidently trusted by Raymond-Roupen, but the Hospitaller garrison he left 
behind was unable to prevent Bohemond IV from regaining full control of Antioch. The 
Tripolitan count ruled the Latin principality for the next fourteen years, while Raymond-
Roupen unsuccessfully tried to claim the crown of the Armenian kingdom after his great-
uncle’s death. Thus, despite the strong support the Order had given to Leon’s great-nephew 
for more than a decade, it was ultimately unable to help him retain power at Antioch when 
confronted by an opposing force. 
The Hospitallers maintained a good relationship with Raymond-Roupen after his 
expulsion from Antioch and backed his attempt to win control of Cilicia. After arriving at 
Tarsus in 1220 in order to pursue his claim to the Armenian kingdom Leon’s great-nephew 
received the support of a number of Cilician barons, including the marshal Vahram.
78
 
According to the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad, Raymond-
Roupen’s partisans advanced towards Mamistra, but they were attacked by the troops of 
Constantine of Babaron between that town and Adana.
79
 Constantine’s men subsequently 
pursued them to Tarsus where Raymond-Roupen appealed to the Order of the Hospital and 
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Pelagius, the papal legate on the Fifth Crusade, for military aid. They responded by sending 
an army to Cilicia under the command of Aimery, nephew of the Hospitaller marshal Aimery 
of Layron. This force landed at Silifke, but under the incompetent leadership of Aimery it did 
not move swiftly to join Raymond-Roupen at Tarsus.
80
 During this delay Tarsus was betrayed 
to Constantine by a man named Vasil, which led to the capture and imprisonment of Leon’s 
great-nephew and his key supporters.
81
 
Raymond-Roupen’s failure to successfully claim the Cilician throne despite having 
the total backing of the Hospital demonstrates the limitations of the Order’s influence on the 
Armenian kingdom. In the early 1220s the Hospitallers still controlled a large lordship in 
western Cilicia, including several fortresses. Silifke, which had its own castellan, is likely to 
have maintained a sizeable garrison in order to protect the castle and the surrounding estates 
from Seljuk attacks. Yet these men were unable to affect the outcome of the conflict between 
Raymond-Roupen and Constantine which predominantly took place further east in the heart 
of the Armenian kingdom. Furthermore, the reinforcements from Damietta were unable to 
have the impact that Raymond-Roupen desired. Aimery, whom Chevalier suggests was 
probably a Hospitaller, headed a substantial force, but his decision to land at Silifke and 
sluggishness in advancing to Tarsus meant that his troops were unable to prevent Constantine 
from capturing the city and effectively ending the succession dispute.
82
 
The Hospitallers made little impact on the politics of the Armenian kingdom in the 
aftermath of King Philip’s deposition and imprisonment in late 1224. The coup d’état was led 
by Constantine of Babaron, with the baillie intent on installing his own son, Hethoum, upon 
the Cilician throne.
83
 After Philip’s murder his widow, Isabel, took refuge in the Hospitaller 
castle of Silifke. However, the Order decided to sell the fortress to Constantine, rather than 
defend the queen against the baillie of Cilicia.
84
 As mentioned earlier, senior figures within 
the Hospital may not have been ‘entirely unhappy’ about losing this stronghold, and the 
sources do not suggest there was much reluctance from the castellan about relinquishing 
Silifke.
85
 Nevertheless, the Hospitallers would probably not have vacated the castle unless 
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they had been pressured to do so by Constantine. It is significant that on this occasion the 
Order chose not to oppose the baillie and acquiesced to his demands. The Hospitallers may 
have calculated that Constantine and Hethoum were likely to gain full control of the 
Armenian kingdom whether Isabel married the latter or not, and it made little sense for the 
Order to antagonise the Cilician Armenian monarchy and put all its possessions in the realm 
in jeopardy.
86
 
The Teutonic Knights do not appear to have involved themselves in the Cilician 
succession dispute following the death of King Leon I in 1219. Unlike the Hospitallers, there 
is no suggestion in the sources that they gave any explicit support to Raymond-Roupen, even 
though he received the backing of the papacy.
87
 Later, the Teutonic Knights assisted 
Constantine of Babaron by holding King Philip as a prisoner in the castle of Amouda. 
Philip’s last recorded location before his death was at Amouda so it appears that he was 
poisoned while being held at the castle.
88
 Therefore, the Order was probably complicit in the 
murder of Bohemond IV’s son.89 However, there is no evidence that the Teutonic Knights 
participated in Philip’s initial overthrow. The Teutonic Order would have wanted to stay on 
good terms with Constantine of Babaron after he had deposed Philip and was prepared to 
overlook the murder of the latter in order to avoid antagonising the most powerful Armenian 
baron in Cilicia. 
The Templars had no noticeable impact on the politics of the Armenian kingdom 
between the death of King Leon I and the coronation of Hethoum I. The Order did not 
provide military aid to any of Leon’s possible successors and played no part in the deposition 
of King Philip and its aftermath. Significantly, the Templars refused to assist Bohemond IV 
when the he invaded Cilicia in 1225 following his son’s imprisonment,90 although as Riley-
Smith and Chevalier have previously noted they did allow the Antiochenes to move freely 
through the Amanus Mountains.
91
 After regaining the castle of Baghras in 1216 the Order 
was no longer in direct conflict with the Cilician Armenians and since Bohemond IV had not 
helped the Templars in the recovery of the fortress they felt no obligation to provide him with 
troops on such a campaign. The prince of Antioch’s offensive on the Armenian kingdom 
ultimately ended in failure, without the capture of any strongholds or a victory in battle 
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against Constantine’s forces, but there is no guarantee that he would have been any more 
successful with Templar support. 
There is relatively little evidence about the activities of the military orders in the 
principality of Antioch and the kingdom and Cilicia after Hethoum’s coronation in 1226. The 
political stability in both states provided fewer opportunities for these institutions to make a 
noticeable impact. However, the behaviour of the Templars in the 1230s must have strained 
the Order’s relationship with the Antiochene prince. In c.1235 Armand of Périgord, the 
Master of the Temple, agreed to launch an attack upon the Armenian kingdom with 
Bohemond V in order to avenge the deaths of several Templars who had been executed by 
Hethoum for stirring up trouble against him. An army comprising Antiochene and Templar 
troops appears to have assembled at Antioch and marched north into Cilicia, but before any 
real conflict took place Constantine sought to negotiate a peace agreement with Armand of 
Périgord. The Master of the Temple accepted the terms offered to him by Hethoum’s father 
and the Templars departed the Armenian kingdom soon afterwards.
92
 Chevalier speculates 
that Constantine may even have granted new lands to the Order in order to pacify Armand 
and his men, but other concessions such as a large monetary payment and recognition of 
Templar sovereignty over all the Temple’s possessions in the Amanus Mountains are just as 
likely.
93
 According to Eracles, Bohemond V was particularly annoyed by the sudden 
withdrawal of the Templars, but the source does not record whether or not the Antiochene 
prince hastily followed Armand in leaving the Armenian kingdom.
94
 If Bohemond did try to 
continue his campaign in Cilicia after the departure of the Templars then there is no evidence 
that he enjoyed any military success. The reconciliation between the Cilician Armenians and 
the Order of the Temple seems to have scuppered the prince’s plans to inflict serious damage 
on his northern neighbour, although the expedition may have ended in failure even with 
continued Templar assistance. 
Bohemond V may also have been unimpressed by the actions of the Templars a 
couple of years later. In 1236 or 1237 the Templar garrison of Baghras attacked a band of 
Turcomans that had settled in the Amouq valley and captured their livestock. In retaliation to 
this act of aggression, al-Mu‘azzam led an Aleppan army into the Amanus Mountains and 
laid siege to the castle of Baghras. Bohemond intervened on behalf of the Templars and 
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persuaded the Aleppans to negotiate with the Order. Eventually the two sides agreed a truce 
and the Ayyubid troops withdrew despite being on the verge of capturing the fortress.
95
 The 
Templars nearly lost their most important stronghold in northern Syria, but this did not 
discourage them from campaigning aggressively in the Amanus Mountains shortly after the 
siege of Baghras had been lifted. 
In June 1237 William of Montferrat, the Templar commander of Antioch, led an 
attack on Darbsak from the nearby castle of Chivlan Kale. William appears to have 
assembled an army of some strength, including troops sent by Guy of Jubayl, but his assault 
on Darbsak would prove to be a disaster. The garrison of the fortress fought vigorously 
against the Templar force, which was subsequently overwhelmed when an Aleppan relief 
force arrived to help the besieged. William of Montferrat was among the many men who 
were killed during the fighting, with most of the rest being captured by the Aleppans.
96
 This 
defeat was ‘one of the worst military disasters in the Order’s history’ and was considered 
significant enough by the English chronicler Matthew Paris to be recorded in his Chronica 
Majora.
97
 
The destruction of the Templar army at Darbsak may have had some impact on how 
the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia subsequently 
developed. If the sources are accurate in recording the death or capture of the vast majority of 
William of Montferrat’s men then the military presence of the Order of the Temple in 
northern Syria is likely to have been severely weakened. Therefore, the Templars would have 
not have been able to participate in any future campaign Bohemond V chose to launch 
against the Armenian kingdom because the few fighting men they had left in the region 
would have been needed to garrison their fortresses in the Amanus Mountains. Furthermore, 
the behaviour of senior figures within the Order would have discouraged the prince of 
Antioch from seeking military collaboration with the Templars because he would probably 
have doubted their reliability. Bohemond had been very annoyed when Armand of Périgord 
deserted him during the campaign in c.1235, while William of Montferrat chose to launch an 
offensive against Darbsak in 1237 just months after the Order had agreed a truce with the 
Aleppans following the intervention of the Antiochene prince. Without Templar support 
Bohemond does not appear to have had the necessary manpower to sustain a successful 
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invasion of Cilicia so these events discouraged him from attacking the Armenian kingdom 
despite his hostility towards Constantine and Hethoum. 
The military orders appear to have had almost no influence whatsoever on the 
relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom in the three decades 
before the fall of Antioch in 1268. The Templars maintained control of their castles and 
estates in the Amanus Mountains, while the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights retained a 
large landed presence in Cilicia, but there was no physical conflict between the two polities 
which meant that there was little opportunity for the orders to support one side against the 
other. If these military-religious institutions had any influence at all it must have been 
through diplomacy. In May 1249 the Templar commander of Antioch Ferrandus Spagnolus 
was present in Cyprus helping King Louis IX of France to prepare for his crusade to Egypt.
98
 
It is possible he may have encouraged or facilitated the truce which was agreed by 
representatives of King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond V under the supervision of Louis in 
June of that year.
99
 However, even if the Templars were involved in these negotiations it is 
unlikely that their intervention was crucial in bringing about peace between the principality 
of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. The insecurity caused by the Mongol incursions into 
Anatolia was probably a much more significant factor. 
Conclusion 
The Templars were significant participants in the Antiochene succession dispute and 
Bohemond IV may not have been able to retain control of the Latin principality until 1216 
without their support. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights assisted King Leon I during 
the conflict, but they did not play a crucial role in helping him to capture Antioch. As the 
thirteenth century progressed the influence of the military orders on the relationship between 
the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia appears to have steadily weakened. 
The Hospital supported Raymond-Roupen both during his time as the prince of Antioch and 
when he tried to claim the Cilician throne, but on both occasions he lost out to his rivals 
despite the Order’s help. Thus, even when the military orders did try to intervene in the 
politics of this region they were usually unsuccessful in shaping events. 
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Chapter Four: The Influence of the County of 
Tripoli on the Prince of Antioch 
In 1201 Bohemond, count of Tripoli, arrived at Antioch shortly after his father’s death 
and was subsequently recognised as the new prince by members of the Antiochene commune 
and some of the principality’s nobility.1 Apart from Raymond-Roupen’s brief tenure, the 
principality of Antioch remained under the control of the counts of Tripoli until May 1268. 
Therefore, for more than sixty years the county and the principality were united under one 
ruling dynasty. This presented a logistical challenge for the counts because Antioch was 
located more than 120 miles north of Tripoli and in the first half of the thirteenth century 
much of the land between these cities was controlled by the Ayyubids. 
In general histories of the Crusades it has often been asserted that the princes of 
Antioch primarily resided in the county of Tripoli when they controlled both states.
2
 
However, these claims have not been backed up with detailed evidence, and thus this subject 
deserves closer examination. This chapter will assess the surviving primary source material 
and consider whether Bohemond IV, Bohemond V, and Bohemond VI spent more time at 
Antioch or Tripoli. The implications of this matter also need to be considered. If the princes 
of Antioch were frequently absent from their principality then this must have affected the 
manner in which the state was governed and the way it interacted with neighbouring powers, 
particularly the kingdom of Cilicia. 
Travelling between Antioch and Tripoli 
In 1188 Saladin captured numerous fortifications and settlements south of Antioch, 
including the cities of Jabala and Latakia.
3
 This dramatically reduced the size of the 
principality and ended the Latin dominance of the coast between Tripoli and St Simeon. As a 
result any traveller journeying overland from Antioch to Tripoli had to pass through Ayyubid 
territory. The situation remained almost unchanged until 1260 when Bohemond VI seized 
Latakia and much of the surrounding area.
4
 However, the Mamluks sacked the city of 
Antioch eight years later and the principality crumbled. The testimony of Wilbrand of 
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Oldenburg suggests that Latins preferred to travel between the county and the principality by 
sea rather than by land during the thirteenth century because they feared attack from the 
Ayyubids of Jabala and Latakia.
5
 
Pryor estimates that during the twelfth century it took Egyptian fleets seven or eight 
days to navigate 350 miles along the eastern coastline of the Mediterranean from Alexandria 
to the waters between Lebanon and Cyprus. This is based on the assumption that a ship 
would travel ‘at an average continuous speed of two knots’.6 If Pryor’s projections are correct 
then in theory the 120 mile voyage from Tripoli to Saint Simeon could have been 
comfortably completed in three days during the summer months. Thus, provided the weather 
was relatively calm, the sea journey between the principality of Antioch and the county of 
Tripoli was relatively short and the ruler of these two states could potentially have made 
several trips back and forth in the same year. 
The Location of the Counts of Tripoli 1201-1268 
Charters are an important source for establishing the location of a medieval ruler 
because such documents often record where they were written. However, unfortunately only 
nineteen charters have survived which contain agreements involving the counts of Tripoli 
between 1201 and 1268. Röhricht has identified where eleven of these charters were drafted: 
seven at Tripoli, three at Acre, and just one at Antioch.
7
 The other eight charters do not 
explicitly state where they were formulated, but in some cases it may be possible to make an 
educated guess about where they originated. In addition, Bohemond IV appears on the 
witness list of three charters, and Röhricht has established that one of them was composed at 
Acre.
8
 
Bohemond IV was the donor or recipient in ten of the nineteen charters previously 
mentioned. In the first of these documents, he extended the privileges of the Genoese in the 
county of Tripoli in December 1203 while in the city of Antioch.
9
 The prince later issued 
charters while at Tripoli in December 1204 and July 1205, and he also witnessed an 
agreement which must have taken place in the county of Tripoli because it was drafted in 
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December 1204 on behalf of the Tripolitan constable.
10
 Towards the end of his life, 
Bohemond IV witnessed a charter issued by the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II at Acre in 
April 1229.
11
 The Antiochene prince was also at Acre when he made three grants to the 
Hospitallers in October 1231.
12
 
Röhricht has not been able to identify the location of the other four charters which 
contain agreements involving Bohemond IV. In 1206 and 1209 the prince made donations to 
the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights respectively. These charters concern land and 
property in the county of Tripoli, but that does not mean they were drafted there and it is 
possible that Bohemond made these arrangements whilst he was at Antioch. He later issued 
two charters in 1228 in relation to agreements made Hermann von Salza, grand master of the 
Teutonic Knights.
13
 Charter evidence demonstrates that Bohemond IV was at Acre in April 
1229 and October 1231, while Morton has established that Hermann was at the coastal city in 
October 1227 and September 1228.
14
 Therefore it is likely, although far from certain, that 
Bohemond IV met the grand master at Acre in 1228 and the charters were drawn up there. 
Only five charters issued by Bohemond V have survived. The agreements he made in 
1236, 1241 and 1243 were composed at Tripoli.
15
 Röhricht has not been able to identify the 
location of the other two charters which Bohemond V formulated in March 1233, shortly 
after his father’s death. One of these charters confirms the privileges granted to the Pisans by 
Raymond III of Tripoli, but that does not mean the Antiochene prince was at Tripoli when the 
documents were drafted. 
Bohemond VI issued just four of the surviving nineteen charters which contain 
agreements involving the counts of Tripoli between 1201 and 1268. The prince was at Tripoli 
when he granted land and property to the Hospitallers in 1255, and when he made a pact with 
the grand master of the Order of the Hospital in 1262.
16
 Bohemond may also have been at 
Tripoli when he formulated charters after negotiations with the Hospitallers in 1256 and 
1259, although these documents do not explicitly state the location in which they were 
composed. 
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The charter evidence alone does not reveal very much about the location of 
Bohemond IV, Bohemond V, and Bohemond VI. No documents concerning agreements 
involving the count of Tripoli have survived for the periods 1210-1227 and 1244-1254. Of 
the eleven charters involving the counts of Tripoli where Röhricht has been able to identify 
the location in which they were composed, only one was drafted at Antioch compared to 
seven at Tripoli. Of course, this data sample is very small and therefore its results have 
relatively little meaning, but it does support the idea that Bohemond IV and his successors 
spent more time at Tripoli than Antioch. Clearly, it is only by using the testimony of letters 
and chronicles in addition to the charter evidence that a more accurate understanding of their 
activities will emerge. 
Count Bohemond of Tripoli arrived at Antioch soon after the death of Bohemond III 
in 1201 and was swiftly installed as the new prince by the Antiochene commune and some of 
the principality’s nobility. Bohemond IV spent at least three months at Antioch in 1201 and 
probably much longer than that as he established himself as the ruler of the principality. The 
Tripolitan count had to defend Antioch from King Leon I of Cilicia, who tried to seize 
control of the principality after he learned of the death of Bohemond III. These events are 
recorded by several sources, including a papal letter sent by Leon to Pope Innocent III and 
the Old French continuations of William of Tyre.
17
 
In 1203 Leon led an army from Cilicia to Antioch and entered the city during the 
night. The Armenian king then began to discuss a peace agreement with the patriarch of 
Antioch, but his troops were attacked by the Templars.
18
 Leon and his men were then forced 
to withdraw from the city and retreat back to Cilicia when an Ayyubid army, sent by al-Zāhir 
Ghāzī of Aleppo to expel the Cilician Armenians from Antioch, reached the Orontes.19 Cahen 
asserts that the Armenians entered Antioch on 11 November 1203, but that Bohemond IV 
was not in the city at that time.
20
 It is true that the sources which describe these events do not 
mention the count of Tripoli, and thus he may not have been present. However, as previously 
mentioned, Bohemond issued a charter from Antioch in December 1203.
21
 Therefore, either 
Cahen is mistaken about Bohemond’s absence from Antioch or the Tripolitan count arrived at 
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the city shortly after the Cilician Armenian army withdrew. He may have returned to Tripoli 
at some point between his investiture at Antioch and Leon’s occupation of the city in late 
1203, but there is no evidence to confirm it. 
Bohemond IV certainly spent a considerable amount of time in the county of Tripoli 
in 1205 after becoming embroiled in a conflict with one of his barons. Renaud of Nephin 
married the heiress of the lord of Gibelcar without the permission of the count. Bohemond 
could not allow the creation of such a large lordship in his county under the command of a 
man who had shown him such little respect and so he resolved to punish Renaud. The 
Tripolitan count eventually succeeded in capturing Nephin and imprisoning Renaud after 
several months of fighting.
22
 Charter evidence confirms that Bohemond IV was at Tripoli in 
December 1204 and July 1205, while the Gestes des Chiprois indicates that he did not seize 
Nephin until 1206.
23
 It is unlikely that the count travelled to Antioch during his ongoing 
conflict with Renaud, particularly as the lord of Nephin threatened the city of Tripoli itself, 
and therefore it would appear that Bohemond remained in the county between late 1204 and 
early 1206. 
Shortly after the conclusion of this secular power struggle, an ecclesiastical dispute 
erupted at Antioch. In 1206 the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, was 
excommunicated by Peter of Saint Marcellus, a papal legate. Bohemond IV later installed the 
Greek patriarch of Antioch, Simeon II, in the cathedral of St Peter, thereby effectively 
replacing Peter of Angoulême.
24
 The Tripolitan count probably returned to Antioch in 1206 
to oversee the appointment of Simeon II, although it is possible that he conducted Antiochene 
affairs from Tripoli. 
Bohemond IV was definitely at Antioch to resist a rebellion against his rule, which 
occurred in late 1207. Peter of Angoulême tried to help a group of knights, who presumably 
supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality, to take control of the city. However, 
the rebels were crushed by Bohemond’s forces and the count had the Latin patriarch 
imprisoned.
25
 Peter of Angoulême was deprived of food and water whilst he was in prison, 
and he eventually died of thirst. There is a suggestion in the chronicle attributed to Sempad 
the Constable that Bohemond offered to release the Latin patriarch if he recognised that the 
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count of Tripoli was also the legitimate prince of Antioch, but this proposal was refused.
26
 
Thus, it would appear that Bohemond IV remained at Antioch in the early part of 1208 to 
oversee Peter’s imprisonment. It may also have been necessary for him to spend a few 
months in the city restoring order in the aftermath of the revolt. 
Bohemond IV seems to have returned to Tripoli at some point before September 1210 
because it is recorded in Eracles that after King Hugh I of Cyprus reached the age of majority 
Walter of Montbéliard appealed to Tripoli for boats to be sent to Gastria and ‘the prince, who 
loved him greatly, sent them to him’.27 This suggests that Bohemond was at Tripoli when 
Walter requested naval transport and that he personally ensured that it was dispatched to 
Cyprus. 
The next recorded appearance of the Tripolitan count is in 1214 when he led an attack 
on the Assassin castle of Khawabi. His troops subsequently defeated an Aleppan force sent 
by al-Zāhir Ghāzī to relieve the besieged Assassins in November of that year. However, 
Bohemond IV chose to lift the siege of Khawabi and withdraw after he discovered that a 
Damascene army led by al-Mu’azzam, son of al-Adil, had begun pillaging the county of 
Tripoli.
28
 The proximity of Khawabi to the county of Tripoli suggests that Bohemond 
prepared for this campaign in his southern polity, and the evidence indicates that he headed 
south into the county after abandoning the siege of the castle. 
The Tripolitan count was at Tripoli when King Leon I of Cilicia seized Antioch in 
February 1216 and invested Raymond-Roupen as prince.
29
 The Armenian king probably 
chose to launch another attempt to capture the city at this time because Bohemond was absent 
from the principality. It would certainly have been much more difficult for the Cilician 
Armenians to capture Antioch if the count had been there, particularly if he was accompanied 
by some of his Tripolitan vassals. Therefore, it is likely that Bohemond had been absent from 
his principality in the months preceding Leon’s occupation of Antioch and that prompted the 
Armenian king to act. The count may not have visited Antioch for several years prior to 1216. 
The principality of Antioch was ruled by Raymond-Roupen until 1219, when he fled 
to Cilicia. Meanwhile, further south, Bohemond IV went to Acre in late 1217 and briefly 
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participated in the Fifth Crusade before returning to Tripoli with King Hugh I of Cyprus in 
January 1218. The Tripolitan count then married Hugh’s half-sister, Melisende, but shortly 
afterwards the Cypriot king died.
30
 According to Jacques de Vitry, Bohemond was later 
forced to defend the county of Tripoli from Muslim attacks.
31
 Clearly he was not in the 
principality of Antioch between February 1216 and March 1219 while the polity was under 
the control of Raymond-Roupen. Bohemond presumably spent most of this period in the 
county of Tripoli, although his only recorded appearance there was in early 1218. 
In the spring of 1219 Bohemond IV travelled north with a small force and seized 
control of Antioch.
32
 When Raymond-Roupen realised that he had lost control of the city he 
placed Antioch’s citadel in the hands of the Hospitallers and fled north to Cilicia. The Order 
of the Hospital later surrendered the citadel to the count of Tripoli after a siege.
33
 
Bohemond’s arrival at Antioch is likely to have occurred after Raymond-Roupen issued a 
charter granting trading privileges to the Teutonic Knights in the principality in March 1219, 
but before the death of King Leon I of Cilicia in early May 1219.
34
 It is unclear how long the 
Tripolitan count remained in the principality after capturing Antioch in order to re-establish 
his grip on the state. 
Bohemond IV appears to have been present at Antioch at some point in the early 
1220s, if the testimony of several Armenian chroniclers is correct. The count’s son, Philip, 
became king of Cilicia after marrying Leon’s daughter, Isabel, in 1222, but he was deposed 
and imprisoned in late 1224 after losing the support of the Cilician Armenian nobility. It is 
recorded in the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable that 
Philip took the wealth of the Armenian kingdom to Antioch,
35
 while Kirakos and Vardan 
wrote that Philip sent the Cilician crown and other royal objects to his father.
36
 This would 
suggest that Bohemond IV was at Antioch during the early 1220s when his son was 
transferring this booty to the city from Cilicia. 
The count of Tripoli also seems to have spent time in the principality of Antioch in 
1225 and 1226. After learning of his son’s deposition and imprisonment Bohemond IV 
repeatedly sent ambassadors to the Cilician Armenians asking them to release Philip and 
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restore him to power.
37
 According to Bar Hebraeus, Constantine of Babaron, the leader of the 
baronial revolt, eventually agreed to release Philip and summoned Bohemond IV to Cilicia to 
collect his son. However, the deposed king had been poisoned and he died shortly 
afterwards.
38
 Ibn al-Athīr, on the other hand, recorded that the count of Tripoli invaded 
Cilicia in 1226 after the Cilician Armenian nobility refused to release Philip, but he later 
withdrew after an unsuccessful campaign.
39
 Either way, it is clear that Bohemond did enter 
into the Armenian kingdom during this period. It seems highly unlikely that he would have 
travelled straight to Cilicia from Tripoli without passing through his northern principality. 
Indeed, the testimony of Ibn al-Athīr supports the view that the Tripolitan count spent time at 
Antioch before invading Cilicia: ‘The prince assembled his troops to march into Armenian 
lands…nevertheless, others did obey the prince, who entered the fringes of the lands of the 
Armenians, which are narrow passes and rugged mountains’. Ibn al-Athīr does not mention 
sailing and instead suggests that Bohemond’s forces marched to Cilicia, which would 
indicate that they marched north from Antioch. 
As previously mentioned, Bohemond IV may have been at Acre in the first half of 
1228 when he was negotiating agreements with Hermann von Salza, grand master of the 
Teutonic Knights. Later in that year the count travelled to Cyprus to meet the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Frederick II. However, when Frederick asked him to swear an oath of fealty, 
Bohemond feigned illness and fled to Nephin in the county of Tripoli.
40
 He appears to have 
spent a considerable amount of time at Acre in the latter years of his life as charters confirm 
his presence there in April 1229 and October 1231.
41
 Bohemond IV’s last recorded 
appearance at Antioch is in 1226, and the surviving evidence suggests that he spent most of 
the late 1220s and early 1230s in the county of Tripoli and the kingdom of Jerusalem. 
Bohemond IV died in the first three months of 1233, although the location of his 
death is not recorded. His eldest son, Bohemond V, issued his first charters as prince of 
Antioch and count of Tripoli in March of that year, but his whereabouts are also unknown.
42
 
The evidence about Bohemond V and the two states that he governed is extremely limited, 
and it is quite difficult to locate him in the three years after his investiture as prince. His 
brother, Henry, participated in a Hospitaller attack on the fortress of Montferrand during this 
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period. According to Eracles, Bohemond did not take part in the campaign because of ‘the 
truce that he had with the sultan of Hama’, but he did give thirty knights to Henry so that his 
brother could join the Hospitallers for the offensive on Montferrand.
43
 It is unclear if the new 
prince of Antioch was in the county of Tripoli in order to help with the preparations for this 
campaign as no source records his location at this time. This attack on Montferrand took 
place in 1235 or 1236 according to the Annales de Terre Sainte and the Gestes des 
Chiprois,
44
 but historians such as Kennedy and Molin have asserted that it occurred in 1233.
45
 
Bohemond V appears to have spent some time in the principality of Antioch prior to 
1236. According to Eracles, he made preparations to invade Cilicia with the Templars, who 
wanted revenge after the Cilician Armenians captured and executed several of the Order’s 
knights. A large army assembled and advanced on the Armenian kingdom, but Constantine of 
Babaron, the father of King Hethoum I, ‘saw the army which was coming towards him…and 
he informed the master of the Temple that he wanted to reconcile with him’.46 Bohemond 
was annoyed when he learned that the Templars had made peace with the Cilician 
Armenians, but it is unclear if he continued with the campaign after they withdrew.
47
 The 
prince almost certainly prepared for the attack on Cilicia at Antioch. Bohemond was 
collaborating with the Templars who were based in the Amanus mountains, on the frontier 
between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom, so it would have made sense for 
him to gather his troops at Antioch and join forces with the Order before invading Cilicia. 
Cahen estimates that these events happened shortly after the attack on Montferrand 
(Ba‘rin),48 but the exact date is unclear. 
The first primary source which unambiguously records the location of Bohemond V 
after the death of his father is the charter which he issued at Tripoli in January 1236.
49
 
However, unfortunately apart from two other charters there is relatively little evidence about 
the whereabouts of the prince thereafter. Events in northern Syria suggest that Bohemond 
may have been at Antioch in the first half of 1237. During that period, the Templars attacked 
a band of Turcomans that had settled in the Amouq valley and seized a great deal of 
                                                          
43
 ‘…et si i fu Henris li freres dou prince, a tout .XXX. chevaliers que son frere li princes li ot baillez ; car il n’i 
poeit aler por la trive que il avoit o le sodan de Haman’. Eracles, pp. 403-404. 
44
 ATS, p. 439; GC, p. 724. 
45
 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 147; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 71. 
46
 ‘Quant Costans li peres le roi vit l’esfors qui venoit sur lui, si douta et manda au maistre dou Temple que il se 
voloit acorder a lui’. Eracles, p. 405. 
47
 Eracles, p. 406. 
48
 Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p. 652. 
49
 RRH, 1, No. 1068, pp. 278-279; TOT, No. 82, pp. 64-65. 
107 
 
livestock. The Aleppans responded to this aggression by sending a large army to besiege 
Baghras. Bohemond V intervened on behalf of the Templars and persuaded the Aleppans to 
negotiate with the military order. Eventually the two sides agreed a truce and the Ayyubid 
troops withdrew despite being on the verge of capturing the castle.
50
 It is possible that 
Bohemond simply sent envoys to the Aleppans from Tripoli, but if he was as influential in 
the negotiations as the sources suggest then it is more likely that he was in the principality of 
Antioch at the time. If the prince was in his northern territory then he would have learned of 
the Aleppan advance on Baghras much earlier and been able to react quickly in order to 
broker a peace between the two sides. 
Bohemond V was certainly at Tripoli in the autumn of 1239 when an army of 
crusaders encamped outside the city. The crusade leader Theobald, king of Navarre and count 
of Champagne, had travelled north from Acre in order to negotiate with al-Muzaffar of Hama 
after the Muslim ruler offered to cede his possessions to the Latins. These diplomatic 
discussions were ended when Theobald realised that al-Muzaffar had no intention of 
relinquishing Hama, and the crusaders subsequently returned to Acre.
51
 Jackson argues that 
these events ‘probably’ took place in late September 1239,52 and they certainly cannot have 
occurred any earlier because Theobald of Navarre arrived in the Near East that very month. 
Bohemond’s presence at Tripoli is confirmed by the Gestes des Chiprois and the Eracles and 
Rothelin continuations of William of Tyre. Indeed, the prince of Antioch is praised for his 
treatment of the crusaders by the authors of these texts.
53
 
Charters issued by Bohemond V confirm that he was at Tripoli in November 1241 and 
February 1243.
54
 The chroniclers are silent about the prince’s activities and location in the 
early 1240s so it is unclear if he visited the principality of Antioch during this period. The 
Khwarazmians devastated the county of Tripoli prior to their capture of Jerusalem in August 
1244.
55
 A number of Tripolitan barons, including the constable of Tripoli, subsequently 
participated in the battle of La Forbie, in which the Latins suffered a disastrous defeat at the 
hands of the Khwarazmians.
56
 These men presumably fought at La Forbie with Bohemond’s 
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permission, but the prince’s whereabouts are unknown. As his last recorded appearance was 
at Tripoli in 1243, it would be unsurprising if Bohemond V remained in his county 
throughout 1244 in order to defend his lands from the Khwarazmians. 
Almost nothing is known about the actions or whereabouts of Bohemond V during the 
final years of his life. The Rothelin continuation records that Robert of Nantes, patriarch of 
Jerusalem, asked for military aid from the prince of Antioch in the aftermath of the setback at 
La Forbie.
57
 The source does not document Bohemond’s response or his location. The 
principality of Antioch was attacked by a group of Turcomans in the late 1240s, but there is 
no evidence that Bohemond V was involved in Antiochene attempts to repel the raiders or 
that he was present in the polity at this time.
58
 It is also unclear if the prince of Antioch 
participated in an ill-fated raid in 1250, when a Tripolitan army was defeated by their Syrian 
neighbours.
59
 
Bohemond V died in early 1252, but the location of his death is unknown. His only 
son, Bohemond VI, had not reached the age of majority at this point and so the young heir 
travelled to Jaffa later that year in order to be knighted by King Louis IX of France.
60
 This 
ceremony enabled the teenager to inherit the principality of Antioch and the county of 
Tripoli. Bohemond VI then travelled to Antioch after telling the French king that he wanted 
to aid the people of that city.
61
 However, Jean de Joinville did not record the length of the 
prince’s stay at Antioch so it is difficult to know whether he remained there for a brief period 
or much longer. 
In 1254 Bohemond VI married Sibylle, daughter of King Hethoum I, but it is unclear 
whether the wedding took place in the kingdom of Cilicia, the principality of Antioch, or the 
county of Tripoli.
62
 However, the prince was certainly at Tripoli in March 1255 when he 
formulated an agreement with Hospitallers.
63
 According to the Venice manuscript of the 
chronicle attributed to Sempad, Bohemond journeyed to Cilicia in November 1256 in order to 
witness Hethoum’s eldest son, Leon, being knighted at Mamistra.64 Then in February 1258 
the prince accompanied his sister and his young nephew to Acre to assist their claims to the 
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Latin kingdom.
65
 King Hugh II of Cyprus was formally recognised as the heir to the kingdom 
of Jerusalem and it was agreed that Plaisance would act as the regent of the realm on behalf 
of her son.
66
 Bohemond returned to Tripoli after these negotiations had been completed and 
became embroiled in a conflict with the Tripolitan barons, who were led by Bertrand of 
Jubayl. The prince of Antioch fought these rebels near Tripoli and returned to the city after he 
was wounded in battle.
67
 He appears to have remained there until the following year, when he 
hosted King Hethoum I of Cilicia. Apparently, the Armenian king travelled to Tripoli in 1259 
to meet with his son-in-law.
68
 
Bohemond VI appears to have personally submitted to the Mongol leader Hülegü in 
1260 and recognised his suzerainty over the county of Tripoli. Letters written by Thomas 
Bérard, the master of the Temple, and Thomas Agni, papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem, 
suggest that Bohemond met with Hülegü in person and paid a large tribute to the Mongols.
69
 
Hayton recorded that Hülegü summoned the prince of Antioch to meet him after the Mongols 
had captured Aleppo.
70
  However, none of these sources mention where the two rulers met. 
One Arabic chronicler recorded that Bohemond joined the Mongols at Baalbek in 1260, but 
he made clear that the Antiochene prince was in the company of the Mongol general Kitbuqa, 
rather than the Il-Khan Hülegü.
71
 
It is recorded in the Gestes des Chiprois that Bohemond and King Hethoum I of 
Cilicia participated in the Mongol occupation of Damascus in March 1260, and that after 
entering the city the Antiochene prince had a Latin mass celebrated at the Umayyad Mosque 
and ordered his men to desecrate other mosques.
72
 Jackson has cast serious doubt over this 
account of events by arguing that they are not mentioned in any of the contemporary sources, 
and that it is ‘inconceivable’ that Arabic chroniclers would have remained silent about these 
‘outrages’.73 However, Amitai-Preiss points out that Bohemond visited Baalbek, and that if 
the prince had bothered to travel that far then he probably continued on to Damascus.
74
 The 
author of the Gestes des Chiprois may have fabricated the story of the Damascene mosques 
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being defiled, as Jackson and Amitai-Preiss suggest,
75
 but that does not mean his testimony 
that Bohemond entered Damascus in 1260 should be dismissed. An icon depicting the 
Adoration of the Magi on an iconostasis beam at St Catherine’s Monastery on Mount Sinai 
provides supporting evidence that the prince of Antioch did meet with the king of Cilicia and 
a Mongol leader at this time.
76
 Folda convincingly argues that King Hethoum I, Prince 
Bohemond VI and the Mongol general Kitbuqa are represented as the three magi in the 
Nativity scene.
77
 He proposes that the iconostasis beam on which this scene appears was 
commissioned and painted shortly after the Mongol occupation of Damascus in order to 
‘commemorate the triumphal entry’ of Hethoum, Bohemond and Kitbuqa into the city.78 If 
the iconostasis beam was created in 1260, as Folda suggests, then it provides persuasive 
evidence that Bohemond was present when the Mongols took possession of Damascus. 
The prince of Antioch also appears to have campaigned in northern Syria in 1260. 
The Antiochenes took possession of Darkush and a number of other fortresses in the Orontes 
valley, and they were also able to occupy and refortify the coastal city of Latakia.
79
 The 
testimony of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir suggests that Bohemond was personally involved in seizing 
control of these settlements.
80
 ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād recorded that it was the Mongols who 
conquered Harim and the surrounding area, before deciding to give several of these 
strongholds – including Darkush – to Bohemond.81 Therefore, these conquests must have 
been made after the Mongols arrived in Syria in December 1259, but prior to their defeat at 
the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260. 
In 1262 the Mamluks attacked the principality of Antioch, capturing the port of St 
Simeon and plundering the surrounding area.
82
 According to the Old French sources, Baibars’ 
forces besieged the city of Antioch itself, but their departure was hastened by the arrival of a 
Mongol army.
83
 The Mamluks returned to Cairo, entering the city in August 1262 with a lot 
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of booty and more than 250 captives.
84
 A charter issued by Bohemond VI confirms that the 
prince was at Tripoli in May 1262.
85
 It is difficult to know whether the Mamluk offensive on 
the principality took place before or after the charter was drafted, but it is highly unlikely that 
the prince journeyed to Antioch after concluding negotiations with the Hospitallers. There is 
no suggestion in the sources that Bohemond was in his northern principality when it came 
under attack, while the loss of St Simeon and the destruction of the ships in its harbour by the 
Mamluks would have made it extremely difficult for Bohemond to travel from Tripoli to 
Antioch after the incursion. Indeed there is no evidence that Bohemond returned to his 
principality prior to the fall of Antioch in May 1268. 
In 1263 or 1264 King Hethoum I of Cilicia journeyed to Azerbaijan in order to ask 
Hülegü to stop the Seljuks from harassing his kingdom. The Armenian king later swore an 
oath of friendship with Rukn al-Dīn and made peace with the Seljuk sultan under the 
supervision of the Mongols.
86
 Vardan recorded that both Hethoum and the prince of Antioch 
were present at the court of Hülegü in 1264.
87
 This testimony is surely credible, even though 
no other source mentions that Bohemond VI travelled to Azerbaijan to meet the Il-Khan, 
because Vardan was an eyewitness. The Antiochene prince must have spent several months 
away from his county and principality, which left them vulnerable to attack from the 
Mamluks. Vardan does not report whether Bohemond returned to Antioch or Tripoli. 
In November 1265 Bohemond VI led an army towards the city of Homs. The prince 
and his men were then confronted by Mamluk troops, who prevented the Latins from 
crossing a ford and then attacked them as they withdrew. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir made clear that 
Bohemond’s soldiers were from Tripoli.88 The chronicler’s description of this encounter 
suggests that the fighting began at a spot close to Homs and that the Mamluks subsequently 
pursued the Latins as they retreated into the county of Tripoli.
89
 The prince of Antioch 
presumably prepared for this campaign at Tripoli and remained there for at least a short time 
after its conclusion. 
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In late April 1268, shortly after capturing the castle of Beaufort, Sultan Baibars led an 
army to Tripoli and pitched his camp nearby.
90
 After a short siege, he withdrew his troops 
and headed north.
91
 The Mamluks then attacked and sacked the city of Antioch in May 
1268.
92
 A letter sent by Baibars to Bohemond VI, which is included in the chronicle of Ibn 
‘Abd al-Zāhir, suggests that the prince was at Tripoli throughout these events.93 Bohemond 
certainly cannot have been at Antioch when the Mamluks stormed the city because he would 
have been killed or taken prisoner. The prince probably spent the whole of April and May 
1268 in the county of Tripoli – initially defending his territory from the Mamluks, and then 
trying to repair the damage after they left. Although Latakia endured as a possession of the 
counts of Tripoli until 1287, and Qusair remained under Latin control until November 1275,
94
 
most of the principality’s castles and settlements were captured or destroyed by the Mamluks 
after the fall of Antioch. Thus, Tripoli was almost certainly the primary residence of 
Bohemond VI after 1268 because his main priority would have been to defend the Tripolitan 
county from Mamluk aggression. The principality of Antioch had been destroyed and he did 
not have the military strength to restore it. 
Even after all the available data has been examined, it is very difficult to discuss the 
location of the counts of Tripoli between 1201 and 1268 with any degree of certainty. The 
primary sources explicitly state or strongly suggest that Bohemond IV and his successors can 
be located in the principality of Antioch on nine separate occasions during this era, compared 
to eighteen occasions in the county of Tripoli.
95
 The counts are recorded in the principality 
just twice in the three decades before the fall of Antioch (1238-1268), but they appear in the 
county ten times during the same period in the source material. This indicates that Bohemond 
V and Bohemond VI were more active in their southern county than their northern 
principality. However, historians such as Runciman and Riley-Smith are too bold when they 
assert without qualification that Bohemond V ‘preferred’ to live in Tripoli.96 No statistician 
could confidently conclude that a person primarily resided in a certain city based on four 
recorded appearances in that location in nineteen years.
97
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The surviving evidence does support the idea that Bohemond V and Bohemond VI 
spent more time in their county than their principality, but there is not enough data to 
construct a robust argument that their main residence was at Tripoli. What is clear, however, 
is that the princes of Antioch were often absent from their principality during the thirteenth 
century. They travelled to Acre and Cilicia, Jaffa and Cyprus, as well as the county of Tripoli. 
According to Vardan, Bohemond VI even journeyed as far as Azerbaijan in order to meet 
Hülegü, the Mongol Il-Khan.
98
 This chapter will now analyse the impact which these 
absences had upon the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of 
Cilicia. 
Absenteeism, the County of Tripoli, and Antiochene-Cilician Relations 
In the first fifteen years after the death of Bohemond III in 1201, the fact that one of 
the two claimants to the principality of Antioch was also the count of Tripoli undoubtedly 
influenced the approach of the Cilician Armenians in the Antiochene succession dispute. The 
sources suggest that Bohemond IV was not present in the principality to defend it from many 
of the offensives launched by King Leon I of Cilicia. The count of Tripoli did remain at 
Antioch in the months after his father’s burial in order to establish his control over the 
principality, and it was during this period that he repulsed the Armenian king’s first attempt 
to wrest the state from his control.
99
 However, there is no evidence that Bohemond IV was 
personally involved in resisting Leon’s subsequent campaigns against his northern territory. 
For example, Kemal ad-Dīn recorded that in late 1204 or early 1205 Leon led an army 
to Antioch and ransacked the surrounding area.
100
 This caused a major famine in the city 
which the Armenian king presumably hoped would persuade the Antiochenes to surrender to 
him. However, al-Zāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo resupplied Antioch with vital provisions despite 
earlier agreeing to Leon’s demands to ignore the Antiochene succession dispute.101 It is 
highly likely that these events took place while Bohemond IV was at Tripoli. The count was 
certainly there in December 1204, when he issued a charter, and he remained in his southern 
state thereafter in order to settle his dispute with Renaud of Nephin. Kamāl al-Dīn does not 
provide a precise date for the Cilician Armenian campaign in the principality so it could have 
happened before Bohemond left Antioch for Tripoli. Nevertheless, the Aleppan chronicler’s 
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account does not mention that the Tripolitan count was caught up in the famine or hint that he 
was in any way involved. 
It is quite possible that Leon deliberately chose to attack the principality when 
Bohemond IV was elsewhere in the Latin East, particularly when the Armenian king was 
planning to capture the city of Antioch itself. As the ruler of two states the count of Tripoli 
could not fully devote himself to either, and this meant he risked losing one of them through 
internal dissent or aggression from a foreign power. This eventually happened in February 
1216 when Leon seized Antioch and invested Raymond-Roupen as prince while Bohemond 
was at Tripoli. The sources suggest that the Cilician Armenians took control of Antioch with 
relative ease and faced almost no resistance whatsoever. This would surely not have 
happened if the count had been there. 
The Cilician Armenians entered Antioch during the night after the city was betrayed 
to King Leon I.
102
 The king of Cilicia quickly secured the gates and filled the streets with 
soldiers. This swift action put the Cilician Armenians in a strong position and it would have 
been extremely difficult to expel them from the city. Nevertheless, Bohemond IV and his 
supporters had previously thwarted two attempts to seize Antioch in situations which were 
arguably just as precarious as that of 1216. In 1203 Leon and his troops were attacked by the 
Templars after occupying the city, and they were eventually forced to withdraw in response 
to Aleppan aggression. Later, in 1207, the count of Tripoli personally oversaw the crushing 
of a rebellion which threatened to wrest Antioch from his control.
103
 Although Bohemond 
may not have been involved in the former case, both these examples demonstrate that troops 
hostile to the Tripolitan count could be defeated even after they had taken large parts of the 
city. 
If Bohemond IV had been at Antioch in 1216 he would have been able to rally his 
supporters who took refuge in the citadel following the sudden arrival of the Cilician 
Armenians.
104
 He may have been able to expel Leon of Cilicia and his army from the city, 
depending on the size of their respective forces and the military tactics that both sides 
employed. It is, of course, possible that the Armenian king would have captured Antioch in 
1216 regardless of Bohemond’s location and decision-making. However, the fact that the 
count of Tripoli was absent from his principality at this moment, and had left it for extended 
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periods of time on several previous occasions, surely made it much easier for Leon to 
conquer the state and install Raymond-Roupen as the new prince. The Antiochene populace 
was probably rather war weary after fifteen years of conflict and they were evidently not 
prepared to offer serious resistance to the Cilician Armenians in order to preserve the rule of 
Bohemond IV, possibly because they did not want to risk their lives for a leader who was not 
fully committed to the principality and did not appear able to crush the relentless threat from 
Cilicia. If the Tripolitan count had spent more time at Antioch in the early thirteenth century 
he may have received greater loyalty from the city’s inhabitants. He may, therefore, have 
been able to assemble enough men to repel Leon’s army by enlisting the support of ordinary 
citizens and the Templars in addition to his own soldiers. 
The commitment of Bohemond IV to the county of Tripoli contributed towards his 
neglect and loss of the principality of Antioch. However, he may not have been able to 
recover the latter without the former. Bohemond remained a wealthy and powerful ruler in 
the Latin East during the three years in which Raymond-Roupen governed the principality. 
The county of Tripoli provided him with status, a regular source of income, and a small army. 
Thus, a group of Antiochenes decided to turn to their former sovereign after overthrowing 
Raymond-Roupen in 1219 rather than seeking to place power in the hands of the commune of 
Antioch or anointing a new prince partly because of his standing and the resources at his 
disposal. Furthermore, the Tripolitan county provided him with a base from which he could 
launch his campaign to win back the principality and enough troops to do so. Bohemond may 
not have been able to undertake such an operation if he had left the Levant or obtained a 
small landholding in the kingdom of Jerusalem. By facilitating his return to power in 
Antioch, the county of Tripoli played a key role in Antiochene-Cilician relations. The Latin 
principality and the Armenian kingdom would probably have interacted very differently in 
the decades after 1219 if Raymond-Roupen had not been deposed and replaced by Bohemond 
IV. 
There is no evidence that Bohemond V spent time in his principality in the 1240s, but 
it is highly unlikely that he was absent from the polity for the full ten years. The chroniclers 
who recorded the history of the Latin East were probably silent about the count of Tripoli’s 
activities during this period because he was not involved in any military campaigns or power 
struggles. He probably did visit Antioch during the 1240s, and may have resided there for 
long spells, but because the political situation was relatively stable none of the contemporary 
writers decided to include this information in their chronicles. 
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The principality of Antioch was not involved in a major armed conflict with the 
kingdom of Cilicia in the 1240s. On the contrary, the relationship between the two states at 
this time appears to have been characterised by almost total disengagement. Bohemond V 
was clearly hostile towards King Hethoum I and the Hethoumid dynasty but he lacked 
sufficient manpower to lead a successful campaign against the Armenian kingdom. In the 
1230s he tried to launch such an offensive, but cancelled the operation when the Templars 
withdrew their support. The count of Tripoli also attempted to undermine the Cilician 
Armenian monarchy diplomatically. When these endeavours foundered Bohemond probably 
realised that he could not inflict any serious damage upon the principality of Antioch’s 
northern neighbour and consequently decided to focus his efforts elsewhere. The fact that he 
governed two states may have been an important factor. The county of Tripoli was threatened 
by the arrival of the Khwarazmians in southern Syria and it probably required more political 
and administrative attention than the principality because it was territorially larger and 
supported a larger number of landowners. It is, therefore, quite possible that Bohemond V 
devoted most of his energy to his county in the 1240s and this contributed towards the 
detached state of Antiochene-Cilician relations at this time. 
The relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom was quite 
different during the 1260s, but the county of Tripoli continued to affect how they interacted. 
There is no suggestion in the sources that Bohemond VI returned to Antioch after the 
completion of his campaign in northern Syria in 1260. On the other hand, there is clear 
evidence that he was present in the Tripolitan county in 1262, 1265, and 1268. Bohemond’s 
seemingly prolonged absence from his principality coincided with a period when Antiochene-
Cilician relations were characterised by an entente cordiale. The prince married Sibylle, 
daughter of King Hethoum I, in 1254, and the two dynasties became firm allies thereafter. 
Mamluk aggression threatened all the Christian states in the Near East in the 1260s, 
including the kingdom of Cilicia. By the end of that decade the principality of Antioch had 
effectively been destroyed and the Armenian kingdom had been severely weakened by a 
damaging invasion. The two states would surely have had a better chance of preventing these 
catastrophes if they had assisted each other when threatened by the Mamluks. In the early 
twelfth century, the rulers of the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the county of 
Tripoli, and the kingdom of Jerusalem joined forces on a number of occasions in order to 
form a larger Latin army which was capable of offering serious resistance to their common 
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enemies.
105
 Yet collaboration of this kind was quite limited in the years immediately prior to 
the fall of Antioch. 
According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, 150 knights from the principality were sent to join 
Hethoum’s campaign in northern Syria in the winter of 1263-1264.106 This venture was 
unsuccessful, partly due to the weather, but the regular pooling of Antiochene and Cilician 
troops may have been effective in combatting the Mamluks. However, there is no record of 
any military co-operation between the two sides thereafter. 
Previously, there had been one incident where the Cilician monarchy had intervened 
to defend Antioch. Apparently, King Hethoum I ensured that a Mongol army, almost 
certainly containing an Armenian contingent, was sent to relieve the Latin principality when 
it was attacked by Baibars’ troops in 1262. This endeavour may have prolonged the life of 
Bohemond VI’s northern territory as Eracles and the Gestes des Chiprois record that the 
Mamluks were besieging Antioch when the Mongol army arrived in northern Syria.
107
 
Nevertheless, such activity was reactive rather than proactive – a risky strategy when facing 
an enemy capable of making swift and efficient conquests. 
The fact that the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were allies in the 
1260s but there is only evidence of them joining forces on one occasion during this period 
must be at least partially connected to Bohemond VI’s dedication to the county of Tripoli. If 
the sources are in anyway indicative of what actually happened then the prince spent most of 
his time in the county after 1260, and very little or no time in the principality. Those who 
governed Antioch in Bohemond’s absence may not have had the authority to commit large 
numbers of Antiochene troops into the field without his permission, and even if they did such 
campaigns required strong leadership which few men could have provided. 
There may have been a failure to regularly pool Antiochene and Cilician troops even 
if Bohemond VI had resided in the principality of Antioch for most of the 1260s. 
Furthermore, even if they had combined their armies during this period there is no guarantee 
that the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom would have had any success in 
hindering Mamluk aggression against them or preventing the fall of Antioch. On the other 
hand, medieval rulers played a vital role in defending their states from invaders, particularly 
                                                          
105
 For example, they collaborated in 1111 against Maudud of Mosul. See Asbridge, Principality of Antioch, pp. 
121-122. 
106
 IAZ, 2, pp. 505-506. 
107
 Eracles, p. 446; GC, p. 755. 
118 
 
in a volatile environment like the Levant. If Bohemond VI had been a permanent presence at 
Antioch in the years after the battle of Ayn Jalut the principality would probably have 
pursued a more active defence policy, such as he employed in the county of Tripoli,
108
 which 
may have led to collaboration with the kingdom of Cilicia. 
Conclusion 
It is, of course, difficult to know how different Antiochene-Cilician relations would 
have been if Bohemond IV and his successors had not ruled the county of Tripoli as well as 
the principality of Antioch. However, it is clear that they were often absent from their 
northern polity during the thirteenth century, and that this had an effect on the 
aforementioned relationship. Bohemond IV spent much of his time at Tripoli during the 
Antiochene succession dispute, which must have aided Leon’s attempts to capture Antioch 
and install Raymond-Roupen as the new prince. The impact of Bohemond V and Bohemond 
VI’s absences from the principality is more questionable. Yet, the history of Antiochene-
Cilician relations in the twelfth century demonstrates that engagement between the two sides 
was likely whenever an active prince controlled Antioch. Bohemond VI could have emulated 
Bohemond III – who joined forces with the Roupenid prince Thoros II in 1164 in order to 
confront Nur al-Din – by collaborating with King Hethoum I in the 1260s when both the 
Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom were threatened by the Mamluks. Instead, 
Bohemond VI appears to have spent most of this period in the county of Tripoli which made 
any serious and sustained military co-operation between the two states improbable. 
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Chapter Five: The Impact of Non-Christian Powers 
on Antiochene-Cilician Relations 
The principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia did not exist in a political 
vacuum, but rather a challenging and often hostile environment where diplomatic and 
military interaction between rival sovereign powers was critical and continual. In the early 
thirteenth century, the foreign policy of the Seljuk sultan of Rūm and the Ayyubid ruler of 
Aleppo had significant effects on the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality. Later, 
both these Christian polities were affected by the arrival of the Mongols in the Near East and 
the aggressive expansionism of the Mamluks. This chapter will consider the extent to which 
Antiochene-Cilician relations were altered and influenced by the non-Christian powers of 
Anatolia and Syria. 
Ayyubid Aleppo 
Antioch’s geographical proximity to Aleppo made the rulers of the two cities natural 
rivals throughout the history of the Latin principality. Aleppo lay just 55 miles east of 
Antioch, with several strategically important towns and fortresses, such as Harim and 
Sarmada, situated in between. Asbridge has shown how the frontier between Antioch and 
Aleppo was fiercely contested during the early twelfth century.
1
 Later, after the Antiochenes’ 
initial success at territorial expansion had stalled, the Aleppans came to dominate this region. 
Many of the conquests made in northern Syria by Zengi, atabeg of Aleppo, and his successor, 
Nūr al-Dīn, came at the expense of the Antiochenes – the principality of Antioch contracted 
as the Zengid empire expanded. 
The city of Aleppo was captured from the Zengids by Saladin in 1183, and it 
remained under the control of the Ayyubid dynasty until it was conquered by the Mongols in 
1260. Three years after annexing the city, Saladin conferred Aleppo upon one of his younger 
sons, al-Zāhir Ghāzī. The latter was just fourteen years old when he was given Aleppo, 
although his powers were initially somewhat restricted by two experienced emirs whom 
Saladin appointed to act as his guardians.
2
 The young Ayyubid ruler gradually accrued more 
authority and was eventually able to remove these men from influential positions and replace 
them with his own supporters.
3
 At the time of his father’s death in 1193, al-Zāhir Ghāzī ruled 
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over much of northern Syria, including large swaths of territory that had previously belonged 
to the principality of Antioch. For example, Harim, Zardana and most of the other castles and 
fortified towns that lay between Aleppo and Antioch were held by men loyal to him. 
Furthermore, al-Zāhir gained control of the coastline which lay between the principality of 
Antioch and the county of Tripoli when the ports of Jabala and Latakia were ceded to him by 
al-Afdal in c.1194.
4
 
Shortly after his proclamation as prince in 1201 Bohemond IV appears to have 
persuaded al-Zāhir Ghāzī that it was in both their interests to prevent the Cilician Armenians 
from seizing control of Antioch. Eddé argues that al-Zāhir had formed an alliance with 
Bohemond III in 1197, and that Aleppan support for Bohemond IV after 1201 was simply a 
continuation of this entente.
5
 In the following years, the Aleppans disrupted Leon’s 
campaigns against the Latin principality on several occasions. Al-Zāhir’s primary reason for 
intervening in the Antiochene succession dispute was almost certainly of a geo-political 
nature. He probably wanted to ensure that the principality of Antioch remained a small and 
weak polity which posed little threat to Aleppo and could potentially be conquered by an 
Ayyubid ruler at some point in the future. However, if Leon captured Antioch and appointed 
himself regent for Raymond-Roupen then the city and its environs would fall under the 
protection of the kingdom of Cilicia for at least a short period. Raymond-Roupen’s status as 
the heir of both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom also meant that the 
unification of these states was a very real possibility. Al-Zāhir must have wanted to prevent 
such an outcome as a strengthening of the ties between his Christian neighbours could have 
threatened his dominance over northern Syria. 
Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s desire to prevent King Leon I of Cilicia from seizing control of 
Antioch was one of Aleppo’s key strategic aims in the early thirteenth century. The Ayyubid 
ruler pursued this objective using a variety of tactics including sending Aleppan troops to 
confront Armenian armies which entered northern Syria and resupplying Antioch when the 
city was short of food and other vital provisions. These interventions frustrated Leon’s 
attempts to capture Antioch on several occasions, but the Aleppans did not inflict a crushing 
defeat on their opponents in battle so the Armenian king retained the military strength 
necessary to launch future assaults upon the Latin principality. It is worth examining al-Zāhir 
Ghāzī’s role in the Antiochene succession dispute in detail in order to fully appreciate the 
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true extent of Aleppo’s influence on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and 
the kingdom of Cilicia. 
Shortly after Bohemond III’s death Leon led an army to Antioch, and after 
discovering that Count Bohemond of Tripoli had already seized power and been recognised 
as the new prince by the Antiochene commune, the Armenian king laid siege to the city.
6
 It 
was at this point, according to one Old French continuator of William of Tyre, that 
Bohemond IV appealed to al-Zāhir for help and the Ayyubid ruler agreed to provide him with 
assistance. The chronicler also recorded that ‘the count could not have held Antioch’ without 
al-Zāhir’s protection.7 Cahen appears to have based his assertion that an Aleppan contingent 
was sent to the Latin principality in 1201 on this evidence.
8
 However, the co-operation 
between al-Zāhir and Bohemond described in the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles 
may be referring to later interventions by the Ayyubid ruler to prevent the Cilician Armenians 
from occupying Antioch. In his letter to Innocent III, written in October 1201, Leon did not 
mention the presence of Aleppan troops when discussing his campaign in northern Syria, 
although he explicitly stated that the Seljuk sultan Rukn al-Dīn Süleymānshāh had colluded 
with Bohemond IV and invaded the kingdom of Cilicia.
9
 This suggests that al-Zāhir may not 
have dispatched an army to protect Antioch in 1201, or that if he did the Cilician Armenians 
were far more concerned about the threat posed by the Seljuks than the force from Aleppo. 
The actions of the Ayyubid ruler were much more important in late 1203 when Leon 
came very close to subjugating Antioch. The Armenian king led an army from Cilicia into the 
Latin principality and entered the city during the night. The Templars who were stationed at 
Antioch helped Bohemond IV’s supporters to defend the citadel and resist the Cilician 
Armenians.
10
 Leon and his troops were then forced to abandon the city and retreat back to 
Cilicia when an Aleppan army, sent by al-Zāhir Ghāzī to expel them from Antioch, reached 
the Orontes.
11
 On this occasion the military assistance provided by the Ayyubid ruler may 
have been crucial in preventing the Armenian king from gaining full control of Antioch. 
When Leon later wrote to Innocent III about his attempt to capture the city in 1203 he 
asserted that the Antiochenes had united with the ‘sultan of Aleppo’.12 The fact that the 
                                                          
6
 Ernoul, pp. 321-322; Eracles, p. 313; PL, 214, Col. 1004, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-80. 
7
 Cont. WT, pp. 176-178. 
8
 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, p. 600. 
9
 PL, 214, Cols 1004-1005, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-81. 
10
 AAC, p. 160; PL, 215, Cols 689-690, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, pp. 214-215. 
11
 KD, 5, p. 41. 
12
 PL, 215, Cols 687-689, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, pp. 212-215. 
122 
 
Armenian king mentioned the Ayyubid ruler in relation to these events indicates that he 
considered the intervention of the Aleppans to be significant. 
In late 1204 and early 1205 Leon plundered Aleppan territory, including the Amouq 
valley, and began rebuilding a ruined fortress near Darbsak. He then wrote to al-Zāhir Ghāzī 
and offered to return the booty he had taken during his raiding if the Ayyubid ruler would 
agree not to interfere in his attempts to militarily resolve the Antiochene succession dispute. 
After al-Zāhir had agreed to this proposal the king of Cilicia ransacked the area around 
Antioch and laid siege to the city, seemingly with the intention of trying to starve the garrison 
into surrender. However, the Aleppans hindered the blockade by resupplying Antioch, despite 
al-Zāhir’s earlier commitment to refrain from meddling in the conflict.13 The actions of the 
Ayyubid ruler appear to have been decisive in preventing the Cilician Armenians from 
capturing Antioch on this occasion because the Antiochenes were suffering from a famine 
before his supplies reached the city. 
Leon evidently felt the Aleppans were seriously inhibiting his endeavour to conquer 
the principality of Antioch because his next military action in northern Syria was directed 
against the castle of Darbsak which had been under Ayyubid control since 1188. In 
December 1205 the Cilician Armenians attacked the people living just outside the fortress but 
withdrew after being confronted by a determined group of Aleppan soldiers. Leon’s troops 
then marched into the Amouq valley and massacred all the Turcomans they found living 
there.
14
 The Armenian king’s decision to target Darbsak and the Amouq at this point may 
have been motivated by a desire to elicit the offer of a new truce from al-Zāhir. Leon’s 
primary objective in the early thirteenth century was to secure control of the principality of 
Antioch and thus he probably hoped to pressure the Ayyubid sultan into agreeing to stop 
assisting the Antiochenes. 
Al-Zāhir Ghāzī responded to this aggression by sending Maymūn al-Qasrī to confront 
the Armenian king. Maymūn divided his army into three contingents: some troops were 
stationed at Tizin, a large detachment of soldiers was sent to bolster the garrison of Darbsak, 
and the rest of the force camped at Harim.
15
 In the weeks that followed there was regular 
skirmishing between the Aleppans of Darbsak and the Cilician Armenians who had based 
themselves at Baghras. Al-Zāhir left Aleppo in the spring of 1206 and headed to Marj Dabiq 
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with another army, which was subsequently swelled by the arrival of troops sent to help the 
Aleppans by other Ayyubid rulers. Leon then took the initiative by leading an army from 
Baghras towards Harim and attacking Maymūn’s small force which they found encamped in 
the Amouq. The Cilician Armenians ambushed the Aleppans and a rather bloody battle 
ensued. Although Kamāl al-Dīn portrays the battle as an Ayyubid victory, Ibn al-Athīr 
provides a more balanced account which suggests that both sides suffered heavy casualties 
with Leon’s troops withdrawing after capturing the Aleppan baggage train.16 Al-Zāhir led his 
large army to the Amouq as soon as he learned of the conflict but the battle had finished long 
before he reached Maymūn’s soldiers. 
According to Kamāl al-Dīn, it was at this point that Leon sent envoys to the Ayyubid 
ruler requesting a truce and promising to demolish the fortress that the Cilician Armenians 
had rebuilt near Darbsak. Al-Zāhir initially refused this offer but he later agreed to an eight 
year peace with the Armenian king after lengthy negotiations.
17
 Leon made a number of 
concessions to the Aleppans, including a commitment to leave Antioch alone. Cahen and 
Eddé, aided by the testimony of the chronicler Ibn Wasil, assert that the Armenian king 
sought peace because he feared that al-Zāhir would invade Cilicia.18 The Cilician Armenians 
had been severely weakened by the battle in the Amouq while the Ayyubid ruler had 
assembled a large force, and thus the former would have struggled to defend their kingdom 
against the latter and could easily have been militarily overwhelmed. 
King Leon I may have sought a peace deal in 1206 when Cilicia was threatened by the 
Aleppans, but he did not abide by the agreement. The Cilician Armenians made further 
attacks on the principality of Antioch long before the eight year truce had expired, although 
the primary sources indicate that their activity was restricted to raiding the plains between the 
Amanus Mountains and the Orontes River, rather than besieging the city of Antioch itself. 
This could be because Leon realised he was unlikely to capture the metropolis as long as 
Bohemond IV maintained good relations with al-Zāhir. The Armenian king had failed to 
discourage Aleppo from assisting the Latins whenever he came close to conquering Antioch. 
Therefore, the Cilician Armenians needed the political situation in northern Syria to change if 
a serious attempt to seize control of the city was to be successful. Alternatively, Leon may 
have been waiting for Raymond-Roupen to reach the age of majority so that when he next 
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tried to conquer Antioch his great-nephew could swiftly be installed as the new prince, which 
would give legitimacy to a Cilician Armenian takeover of the city. 
Cahen argues that Bohemond IV’s decision to besiege the Assassin fortress of 
Khawabi in 1214 damaged the relationship between al-Zāhir Ghāzī and the count of Tripoli.19 
Bohemond’s eldest son, Raymond, had been murdered by the Ismaili sect in the previous year 
and he responded by attacking Khawabi.
20
 The Assassins appealed to Aleppo for help and al-
Zāhir dispatched troops to relieve the garrison of the castle. The army of the Tripolitan count 
ambushed an Aleppan force in November 1214, killing many infantry and capturing thirty 
cavalrymen. Bohemond later decided to release these prisoners and retreat from Khawabi 
after al-Mu’azzam of Damascus, son of al-‘Ādil, pillaged the county of Tripoli. According to 
Kamāl al-Dīn, the count then sent envoys to al-Zāhir to express his regret that his troops had 
come into conflict with the Aleppans, but this act of diplomacy was unsuccessful.
21
 
In February 1216 King Leon I of Cilicia led an army to Antioch and entered the city 
during the night. The Armenian king swiftly secured control of the metropolis by stationing 
soldiers throughout the streets of Antioch while most Antiochenes were still asleep. 
Raymond-Roupen was hastily invested as the prince of Antioch and within a few days 
Bohemond IV’s supporters, who had sought refuge in the Antiochene citadel, surrendered.22 
Al-Zāhir Ghāzī appears to have made no attempt to prevent Leon from seizing Antioch, and 
there is no suggestion in the sources that the Ayyubid ruler sent troops to expel the Cilician 
Armenians from the city. This could be, as Cahen suggests, because Bohemond IV 
‘alienated’ al-Zāhir during his campaign to capture the castle of Khawabi, and therefore the 
latter became less vigilant in his defence of Antioch.
23
 However, it may simply be the case 
that Leon’s rapid advance towards, and occupation of, the city caught the Aleppans by 
surprise. If al-Zāhir did not learn of the movement of the Cilician Armenians until after they 
had subjugated Antioch then he could not have prevented the investiture of Raymond-
Roupen. The Ayyubid ruler may have then have realised that it would be extremely difficult 
to expel them from the Antioch once they had gained full control of the city, and thus he 
decided not to launch an immediate counter-offensive. Furthermore, Leon sought to avert 
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such conflict by sending messages of good will to al-Zāhir and liberating the Aleppan 
prisoners whom he found at Antioch. 
Al-Zāhir did agree to join ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I, the Seljuk sultan of Rūm, in an 
attack on Cilicia a few months after Raymond-Roupen had been invested as prince and while 
King Leon I was still at Antioch. However, the Ayyubid ruler was persuaded to change his 
mind by diplomatic pressure from his uncle, al-‘Ādil, who was on good terms with the 
Armenian king.
24
 Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s death later in 1216 marked the end of an era in which 
there was close co-operation between Aleppo and Antioch. Shihāb al-Dīn Tughril, atabeg of 
Aleppo and regent for al-Zāhir’s son al-‘Azīz Muhammad,25 does not appear to have showed 
any interest in helping Bohemond IV to regain control of the Latin principality, and there was 
no resurrection of the Antiochene-Aleppan alliance after the count of Tripoli recovered 
Antioch in 1219. 
In subsequent years Ayyubid Aleppo’s impact on the relationship between the 
principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia was considerably reduced, mainly because 
there was relatively little warfare between the two Christian polities after 1216. It was the 
nature of the Antiochene succession dispute which allowed al-Zāhir Ghāzī to become so 
influential in shaping how the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality interacted with 
each other. If the leaders of these states were at war with each other, then an Aleppan ruler 
could help to shape the outcome of the contest by assisting one side against the other. Al-
Zāhir played a crucial role in prolonging the Antiochene succession dispute by aiding 
Bohemond IV’s supporters. The actions of the Aleppans between 1203 and 1206 were 
particularly critical – sending a relief army to Antioch when Leon was close to capturing it, 
resupplying Antiochenes when they were suffering from a famine caused by a blockade of 
the city, confronting the Cilician Armenians in battle, and threatening to invade the Armenian 
kingdom. Without the intervention of al-Zāhir, it is likely that Leon would have managed to 
gain control of Antioch before 1216 because of the support he had from some Antiochenes, 
as demonstrated by the fact that Cilician Armenian troops were able to enter the city during 
the night in 1203 and 1216. 
There is some evidence that the Ayyubids of Aleppo directly intervened in the 
military conflict which arose between their Christian neighbours in the 1220s. Bohemond 
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IV’s son, Philip, became king of Cilicia after marrying Leon’s daughter, Isabel, in 1222, but 
he was deposed and imprisoned in late 1224 after losing the support of the nobility. Ibn al-
Athīr recorded that in 1226 the Cilician Armenian barons who had overthrown Philip 
appealed to Shihāb al-Dīn Tughril, atabeg of Aleppo, for aid when Cilicia was invaded by the 
count of Tripoli in retaliation for the treatment of his son. Tughril subsequently ‘supplied 
them with soldiers and weapons’.26 Bohemond IV later withdrew from the Armenian 
kingdom after an unsuccessful campaign in which he was unable to liberate Philip or conquer 
any settlements, but Ibn al-Athīr’s account does not suggest that the actions of the Aleppan 
atabeg were the primary cause of this failure. Eddé argues that even though Ibn al-Athīr is the 
only source for this information it is perfectly possible that Tughril chose to support the 
Cilician Armenians in order to weaken the Seljuks and the Antiochenes.
27
 
The assistance apparently given to Constantine of Babaron, who took power after 
Philip was imprisoned, and the barons of the Armenian kingdom by the leadership of Aleppo 
demonstrates the fluid nature of politics in the region. The Aleppan Ayyubids had previously 
helped to defend the principality of Antioch when it was under attack from King Leon I, but 
they came to the aid of the kingdom of Cilicia when it was invaded by Bohemond IV. This 
indicates that their central concern when dealing with their Christian neighbours was to stop 
one side from becoming too powerful at the expense of the other. The rulers of Aleppo were 
prepared to assist either the Antiochenes or the Cilician Armenians in order to achieve that 
aim. 
The surviving primary source material suggests that the Aleppan Ayyubids had 
relatively little contact with the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia after the 
1220s, and as a result their impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations was negligible. It may be 
the case that this evidence is inadequate and does not truly reflect the history of northern 
Syria at that time. However, it is more likely that the lack of combat between the Latin 
principality and the Armenian kingdom meant that there was little opportunity for Aleppo to 
have any real influence on their relationship. In 1237 Aleppan troops came into conflict with 
the Templars in the Amanus Mountains on a couple of occasions, but this does not seem to 
have affected the interaction between the two Christian polities. The conquest of Aleppo by 
the Mongols in early 1260 brought an end to a lengthy period when the rulers of that city had 
almost no impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations. 
                                                          
26
 IA, 3, p. 280. 
27
 Eddé, La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep, p. 99. 
127 
 
The Seljuk Sultanate of Rūm 
The Turks began their conquest of Anatolia in the eleventh century and by the time of 
the First Crusade much of the territory between Nicaea and Antioch was under the control of 
the Seljuk ruler Kılıç Arslān I. After the crusaders had helped the Greeks to recapture Nicaea 
in 1097, Seljuk sultans chose to base themselves at Konya. In subsequent decades, the 
Seljuks struggled to consolidate and expand their realm in the face of opposition from the 
Byzantines and the Danishmendids. The Seljuk sultanate contracted in size during a period of 
political instability after the death of Kılıç Arslān II in 1192. His chosen heir, Ghiyāth al-Dīn 
Kay-Khusraw I, was not universally accepted as the new sultan. During the 1190s Leon 
expanded the Roupenid principality by conquering towns and fortresses in western Cilicia 
which had previously been held by the Seljuks. Rukn al-Dīn Süleymānshāh emerged as the 
dominant Seljuk leader after gaining control of cities such as Kayseri, Sivas and Tokat, 
before seizing Konya from Kay-Khusraw I in 1197. 
At the time of Leon’s coronation as king of the Armenians in 1198, he controlled 
almost the whole of Cilicia. The chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable includes a list 
of the Cilician barons, and the strongholds under their command, that recognised Leon as 
their new king.
28
 If this information is correct, then the Armenian kingdom stretched as far 
west as Manavgat on the Anatolian coast. Yildiz argues that in the early thirteenth century the 
Seljuks were concerned that their frontier with Armenian Cilicia was too close to Konya 
because several fortresses in the vicinity of the Saleph river (now known as the Göksu) in 
Cilicia Trachea were garrisoned by men loyal to Leon.
29
 
When Leon led an army into the principality of Antioch in 1201 shortly after the 
count of Tripoli had been recognised as Prince Bohemond IV by the Antiochene commune he 
left his own kingdom susceptible to attack. Rukn al-Dīn Süleymānshāh apparently exploited 
this vulnerability by invading Armenian Cilicia. In a letter to Innocent III, the Armenian king 
accused Bohemond of encouraging a Seljuk offensive on his kingdom.
30
 Leon is the only 
source to report this information, but a number of chroniclers agree that Rukn al-Dīn seized 
the city of Erzurum (known as Karin to the Armenians) in eastern Anatolia after capturing 
Malatya in June 1201.
31
 Nevertheless, the Seljuk sultan could have attacked the Armenian 
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kingdom after making these conquests if his army was willing and able to make the long 
march to Cilicia. Furthermore, the Cilician Armenians would not have withdrawn from the 
principality of Antioch for frivolous reasons because Leon would have wanted to take control 
of the territory as quickly as possible and avoid a prolonged conflict against Bohemond IV. It 
is possible that the Armenian king and his troops encountered other serious difficulties while 
besieging Antioch, but there is no reason to seriously doubt Leon’s claim that the Seljuks 
invaded his kingdom. They certainly attacked Cilicia later in the thirteenth century after 
negotiating with the Antiochenes. Thus, it is highly likely that the urgent need to defend 
Cilicia and prevent Rukn al-Dīn from capturing any crucial strongholds was behind Leon’s 
decision to withdraw from the Latin principality in the summer of 1201. 
The next major Seljuk incursion into Cilicia took place in 1208 when Ghiyāth al-Dīn 
Kay-Khusraw I, who had re-established himself as the dominant Seljuk leader, captured 
Pertous, a castle near Marash, and a number of other fortresses in the region.
32
 According to 
Kamāl al-Dīn, al-Zāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo sent an army to Kay-Khusraw I to assist the Seljuks 
in this campaign.
33
 Leon contacted al-‘Ādil, the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt and southern Syria, 
and asked the Egyptian sultan to protect the Armenian kingdom from the invading forces. Al-
‘Ādil persuaded Kay-Khusraw I to negotiate with the Armenian king, and a peace deal was 
subsequently agreed between the two sides. The Seljuk sultan apparently stipulated that the 
Cilician Armenians should return Baghras to the Order of the Temple and stop launching 
aggressive military campaigns against Antioch.
34
 If Leon did promise to abide by these terms 
then it demonstrates the effectiveness of Bohemond IV in building alliances with other 
sovereign powers in the Near East. The Armenian king did not yield Baghras to the 
Templars, and he later led expeditions into the principality of Antioch. However, it is clear 
that the Seljuks were explicitly opposed to his attempts to seize control of the Latin 
principality. 
It is recorded in the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable that in 1209 the 
Cilician Armenians devastated the countryside around Antioch and tried, unsuccessfully, to 
force Bohemond IV to surrender the city to Leon and Raymond-Roupen.
35
 Considering this 
text is unreliable in the dating of events,
36
 it is possible that the Armenian king’s campaign in 
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the principality of Antioch began before the Seljuks captured Pertous. The previous Seljuk 
invasion of Cilicia, in 1201, had taken place while Leon’s troops were besieging Antioch. It 
would have been tactically advantageous for the Turks to launch an assault on Pertous while 
the Armenian king was pillaging the principality of Antioch because they would almost 
certainly not have been inhibited in their attempts to capture the castle by a large relief army. 
Of course, the dating in Sempad’s chronicle may be correct, but it is just as likely that Leon’s 
attack on the Latin principality began before the Seljuk incursion in 1208. This would explain 
why the Armenian king chose to return to Cilicia and why Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I 
required him to agree to stop attacking Antioch in their peace negotiations. 
The Seljuks launched a third major offensive on the Armenian kingdom in 1216 when 
‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I laid siege laid siege to the fortress of Gaban in eastern Cilicia.37 His 
troops were unable to swiftly capture the stronghold but they were able to defeat the Cilician 
Armenian relief force that Leon sent to confront them. The Etchmiadzin manuscript of the 
chronicle attributed to Sempad records that the Armenian king sent two of his most powerful 
barons, Constantine of Babaron and Adam of Baghras, to relieve the siege of Gaban. 
However, these men were outmanoeuvred and easily defeated by the Seljuks, who captured 
several members of the Cilician nobility, including Constantine himself.
38
  This Turkish 
victory was somewhat tempered by a successful sortie made by the garrison of Gaban, which 
destroyed many of the Seljuks’ siege weapons. Kay-Kāwūs I was frustrated by his inability to 
capture the fortress and eventually decided to withdraw from Cilicia, but he took a large 
number of prisoners with him.
39
 
The Seljuk siege of Gaban appears to have begun after Leon had captured Antioch 
and Raymond-Roupen had been installed as the new prince. Kay-Kāwūs I was presumably 
aware of the success of the Cilician Armenians in northern Syria and therefore his actions 
were almost certainly motivated by a desire to acquire new fortresses and territory in Cilicia, 
rather than any attempt to help Bohemond IV. The Armenian sources do not indicate that 
Leon swiftly returned to his kingdom to defend it from this Seljuk attack, but Ibn Bībī records 
that the Armenian king was part of the army that confronted Kay-Kāwūs I.40 If the Seljuk 
sultan had managed to enlist the military support of al-Zāhir of Aleppo then they may have 
been able to make major conquests in eastern Cilicia. In such a scenario, Kay-Kāwūs I could 
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have demanded that Antioch be returned to Bohemond IV in subsequent peace negotiations. 
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I had previously demonstrated in 1208 that he was opposed to a 
Cilician Armenian occupation of Antioch, so it is possible that ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I 
could have tried to persuade Leon to relinquish the city in 1216. However, the Aleppans 
eventually decided not to participate in an attack on the Armenian kingdom and the Seljuk 
campaign of 1216 ultimately had no real impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations. 
After the death of King Leon I in 1219 Cilicia became embroiled in a succession 
dispute of its own, with the Armenians divided as to whether Isabel or Raymond-Roupen 
should ascend the throne. This internal conflict left the Armenian kingdom susceptible to 
invasion and the new Seljuk sultan, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay-Qubād I, promptly took advantage of 
this vulnerability. In 1221 the Turks captured the coastal fortress of Kalonoros (now known 
as Alanya) and most of Isauria, thereby pushing back the western frontier of the Armenian 
kingdom.
41
 The decision of the Cilician nobility to marry Isabel to Philip, a son of Bohemond 
IV, and form an alliance with the principality of Antioch in 1222 was probably driven in part 
by concern about the threat which the Seljuks posed to their realm.
42
 They required a new 
king who could lead the Cilician Armenian army and prevent the loss of further strongholds 
to the Turks. The need to find a husband for Isabel also provided the perfect opportunity to 
ally with the Latins of Antioch and ensure they did not collaborate with the Seljuks against 
the kingdom of Cilicia. If Kay-Qubād I had not conquered Isauria in 1221 then Philip may 
not have been offered the queen’s hand in marriage because the Cilician Armenians would 
not have felt pressured into ensuring that they were on good terms with the Antiochenes. 
The security of the Armenian kingdom was strengthened by the marriage alliance 
with the principality of Antioch, but the situation did not last. After a short spell as king 
consort of Cilicia, Philip was arrested and imprisoned by a group of Cilician Armenian 
barons in late 1224. As a result, Bohemond IV began negotiating with Kay-Qubād I and 
agreed with him that the Seljuks and the Antiochenes would co-operate in attacking the 
Armenian kingdom.
43
 The Seljuks invaded Cilicia in the second half of 1225 and captured 
several fortresses before withdrawing at the onset of winter.
44
 Bohemond occupied Cilician 
Armenian troops by raiding the south of the kingdom on several occasions, but the count of 
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Tripoli ultimately failed to make any conquests or to rescue his son before Philip was 
murdered. 
In 1226 Hethoum, son of Constantine, married Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, and 
was crowned king of the Armenians at Tarsus. The deposition and murder of Philip damaged 
Antiochene-Cilician relations for a generation and both sides appear to have remained hostile 
to each other for more than twenty years. There is no record of an alliance or co-operation of 
any kind between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia during this period. 
However, there was also relatively little military conflict between them, and there is no 
evidence of Hethoum besieging Antioch or pillaging the Latin principality for long periods as 
King Leon I had done. This may, to some extent, be explained by the Armenian kingdom’s 
relationship with the Seljuks after the conquests made by the armies of Kay-Qubād I in 1225. 
In addition to securing complete control of much of the southern Anatolian coastline, 
the Seljuks were able to force the Cilician Armenians to recognise their suzerainty over 
Cilicia in the aftermath of Philip’s deposition. The Armenian kingdom had suffered serious 
territorial losses and faced the prospect of further invasions from two hostile and aggressive 
neighbours. Bohemond IV was unlikely to agree to a peace deal after his son had been 
murdered so Constantine of Babaron, who ruled Cilicia as the de facto regent in the early part 
of Hethoum’s reign, had little option but to recognise Seljuk suzerainty in order to ensure that 
Kay-Qubād I ceased his attacks upon the Armenian kingdom. The agreement lasted for 
around two decades, with King Hethoum I paying tribute to his Seljuk overlords, sending 
Cilician Armenian troops to fight in Turkish armies, and acknowledging his vassal status by 
issuing bilingual coins.
45
 
Bohemond IV had collaborated with the Seljuks after the deposition of Philip, while 
previous sultans, particularly Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I, had opposed King Leon I’s 
attempts to seize Antioch. Therefore, it is quite possible that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay-Qubād I had 
instructed Constantine and Hethoum not to invade the Latin principality. Even if the Seljuk 
sultan had not advised the Armenian king to leave Antioch alone, Hethoum may have feared 
that the Turks would take advantage of his absence from Cilicia if he spent a lengthy period 
of time campaigning in northern Syria. During the first half of Hethoum’s reign the main 
foreign policy objective was to maintain good relations with the Seljuks and ensure that the 
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Armenian kingdom did not suffer any further territorial deterioration. An attack on Antioch 
could have put this strategy at risk so the Cilician Armenians avoided any serious conflict 
with the Latin principality. 
The expansion of the Mongols into Anatolia ended the dominance of the Seljuks over 
the region, which was to have a significant impact on the kingdom of Cilicia. In 1243 a 
Mongol army defeated the troops of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw II at the battle of 
Kösedağ.46 In the aftermath of this encounter some of the Seljuk sultan’s relatives, including 
his mother, fled south and took refuge in the Armenian kingdom. The Mongols subsequently 
sent a messenger to Hethoum demanding that the Seljuk refugees be sent to them. The 
Armenian king reluctantly agreed to this request, fearing the consequences if he refused, and 
swiftly dispatched Kay-Khusraw II’s mother to the Mongol commander Bayju.47 The Seljuk 
sultan was outraged by Hethoum’s behaviour and he responded by sending troops to invade 
the Armenian kingdom in 1245. The Turks later withdrew after an unsuccessful siege of 
Tarsus, but they returned in the following year and encamped before the same city. The death 
of Kay-Khusraw II prompted the Seljuk generals to seek a truce with Hethoum, who 
promised them the fortress of Bragana in exchange for their departure from Cilicia.
48
 
The sultan’s death in the winter of 1245-1246 marked the end of Seljuk suzerainty 
over the Armenian kingdom. In the period that followed, the Seljuks were preoccupied by 
their own succession dispute involving the three young sons of Kay-Khusraw II, and 
therefore they posed no real threat to Cilicia.
49
 Hethoum took advantage of Seljuk instability 
by recovering Bragana just two years after handing over the stronghold.
50
 Meanwhile, 
representatives of the Seljuks and the Cilician Armenians had travelled to Karakorum, paying 
homage to Güyük Khan in 1248.
51
 Thus, the Turkish sultanate was no longer the superior of 
the Armenian kingdom – both were now vassal states of the Mongol khanate. Thereafter, the 
influence of the Seljuks on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the 
kingdom of Cilicia rapidly declined. 
The Mongols 
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By 1206 Chinggis Khan had united most of the nomadic tribes who lived at the 
eastern end of the Eurasian Steppe. Known to posterity as the Mongols, Chinggis and his 
followers then embarked on a path of conquest and destruction that eventually led to the 
subjugation of northern China and Transoxiana. After the death of Chinggis in 1227, the 
Mongols maintained an expansionist policy and proceeded to forge one of the largest empires 
in human history. By 1260 the Mongols ruled over territory stretching from the 
Mediterranean in the west to the Sea of Japan in the east. As the thirteenth century progressed 
their activities began to have greater and greater influence on the political situation in 
northern Syria, culminating in the capture of Aleppo. After Kitbuqa’s defeat at the battle of 
Ayn Jalut, however, it was the Mamluks rather than the Mongols who had the biggest impact 
on Antiochene-Cilician relations. 
The Mongols first appeared in the Caucasus in 1220, but it was not until the 1230s 
that that they began to systematically conquer the region. Their plundering of the Armenian 
cities of Ani and Kars brought them to the attention of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw 
II, who dispatched troops to capture and enslave those who had not been killed by the 
Mongols.
52
 In 1242 Bayju besieged Erzurum in eastern Anatolia for two months before 
retiring to the Mughan plain for the winter. The Mongols returned to Anatolia in the 
following year and were confronted by a large Seljuk force. In June 1243, Bayju won a 
decisive victory against Kay-Khusraw II at the battle of Kösedağ. The Mongols subsequently 
gained control of several important Anatolian cities, including Kayseri, Sivas, Melitene, and 
Erzincan (known to the Armenians as Erznka).
53
 
The success of the Mongols in Anatolia probably contributed towards the 
reconciliation between the Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians in the late 1240s and 
early 1250s. After Bayju’s victory over Kay-Khusraw II at Kösedağ, Hethoum I quickly 
recognised the threat which the Mongols posed to the Armenian kingdom, and thus he 
decided to submit to the leader of these menacing newcomers. In 1246 the Armenian king 
sent his brother, Sempad the Constable, to Karakorum to recognise Mongol suzerainty over 
Cilicia. However, Sempad does not appear to have returned to the Armenian kingdom until 
1250, predominantly because it took a long time to travel between the Near East and the 
steppes of Central Asia.
54
 Hethoum had taken short term diplomatic action to protect Cilicia 
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by handing over Seljuk refugees to the Mongols and agreeing a truce with Bayju, but 
Sempad’s expedition to Karakorum was critical because it confirmed Mongol vassalage over 
the Armenian kingdom. Prior to his brother’s return, the Armenian king could not have been 
completely sure of the Mongols’ intentions towards his realm, and he could not have relied 
on them for military assistance if Cilicia was attacked. Thus, Hethoum’s attempts to obtain a 
truce with the principality of Antioch may have been partially motivated by a desire to secure 
the southern frontier of Cilicia so that he could focus on the volatile situation in Anatolia. 
Shortly after King Louis IX of France had arrived at Cyprus in September 1248 he 
was approached by Cilician Armenian envoys who informed him of the hostility that existed 
between Hethoum and Bohemond V. The French king subsequently helped to improve 
Antiochene-Cilician relations by bringing representatives of the Latin principality and the 
Armenian kingdom together, and encouraging them to make peace.
55
 Louis, who was leading 
a major crusade, undoubtedly wanted to ensure that there was unity amongst the Christian 
states of the Near East so they could focus on fighting the Muslim enemy.
56
 The intervention 
of the French king was probably crucial in sealing the reconciliation between the ruling 
dynasties of Antioch and Cilicia. However, Hethoum’s eagerness for an agreement with 
Bohemond V was partly provoked by Bayju’s exploits in Anatolia. The Antiochene prince 
may also have been concerned about the Mongols and was perhaps willing to forget an 
historic grievance against the Armenian monarchy in return for the added security that a truce 
with Cilicia would bring. 
Bohemond VI succeeded his father as the prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli in 
1252, even though he had not yet reached the age of majority. The teenager had to be 
knighted by King Louis IX in order to inherit Bohemond V’s possessions.57 King Hethoum I 
used the opportunity provided by this change of leadership to strengthen ties between the 
Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. In 1254 Bohemond VI married Hethoum’s 
daughter, Sibylle, thereby cementing an alliance between the two states which would last 
until the fall of Antioch in 1268.
58
 The truce agreed by both sides in 1249 appears to have 
lasted without any difficulties and by the early 1250s the Armenian king had probably 
abandoned the idea of major territorial expansion at the expense of the Antiochene prince, 
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and vice versa. Therefore, it made strategic sense for them to unite against their common 
enemies. However, a request from the Mongols also encouraged Hethoum to ally with 
Bohemond VI. 
The king of Cilicia travelled to Karakorum in the early 1250s after being summoned 
there to submit to the leader of the Mongols. After Sempad the Constable had been made a 
vassal of Güyük Khan in 1248 he was sent back to the Armenian kingdom with a message for 
Hethoum, ordering him to visit the Mongol court personally.
59
 It was potentially very 
dangerous for the Armenian king to travel to such a distant destination because it would 
result in his absence from Cilicia for several years. The Armenian kingdom would be 
vulnerable to attack and political instability without Hethoum, who was the chief defender of 
the realm. Therefore, if the Armenian king was to undertake such a journey he needed to take 
precautions to try and prevent invasions and rebellions while he was away. 
When Sempad the Constable returned to Cilicia in 1250 the Armenian kingdom was 
one year into a truce with the principality of Antioch. Hethoum could be reasonably confident 
that the southern frontier of his realm was secure in the short term. However, if the Armenian 
king travelled to Karakorum it was possible, although perhaps unlikely, that Bohemond VI 
could take advantage of his absence and attack Cilicia. Furthermore, even if the Antiochenes 
chose not to invade the Armenian kingdom, the Ayyubids or the Seljuks could have done. 
Therefore, in order to ensure that Cilicia would be secure while he paid homage to the Great 
Khan, Hethoum chose to pursue an alliance with the prince of Antioch. Although the primary 
sources do not record who proposed the match between Bohemond VI and Sibylle, it is 
highly likely that the Armenian king offered his daughter’s hand to the Antiochene prince. 
The marriage would bind the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality together and 
guarantee peace between them. Hethoum appears to have embarked on his journey to 
Karakorum in 1253 so the union of Bohemond and Sibylle may have been agreed long before 
the wedding actually took place in 1254.
60
 The prince of Antioch had almost certainly 
promised to help defend Cilicia if it was attacked in the absence of the Armenian king. Of 
course, it is quite possible that Hethoum would have sought a marriage alliance with the 
Antiochenes even if he had not been summoned to the Mongol court. Nevertheless, the fact 
that he waited around three years after Sempad’s return before departing on this expedition 
suggests that he wanted to cement an Antiochene-Cilician alliance before he left. 
                                                          
59
 GA, pp. 313-315; Bayarsaikhan, The Mongols and the Armenians, pp. 84-85. 
60
 Bayarsaikhan, The Mongols and the Armenians, pp. 84-85. 
136 
 
Hethoum arrived back in Cilicia in 1256 after submitting to Möngke, who had 
succeeded Güyük as Great Khan, and strengthening ties between the Mongols and the 
Cilician Armenians.
61
 According to the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable, 
Bohemond VI attended a ceremony at Mamistra in November 1256 in which Hethoum’s 
eldest son, Leon, was knighted.
62
 Thereafter, the Armenian king and the prince of Antioch do 
not seem to have closely collaborated despite their alliance. In the late 1250s, however, the 
Mongols continued their western expansion, which ultimately altered the relationship 
between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom even further. 
Hülegü, the younger brother of Möngke Khan, embarked upon the conquest of 
Mesopotamia after crushing the Assassins who resided in the Alborz Mountains, south of the 
Caspian Sea, in 1256. The Mongols famously sacked the city of Baghdad in February 1258 
and killed the Abbasid Caliph, thereby sending shockwaves throughout the Islamic World.
63
 
Hülegü then sent troops to besiege Mayyafariqin before withdrawing with the rest of his army 
to Azerbaijan, where he remained for more than a year. In September 1259 the Mongol 
commander began advancing towards northern Syria, and by the end of the year he had 
captured most towns and cities in the Jazira, including Edessa and Harran.
64
 Hülegü’s army 
eventually reached Aleppo in January 1260. 
This Mongol western advancement may have been one of the main reasons why 
Hethoum decided to travel to Tripoli in 1259 to meet with Bohemond VI.
65
 Considering 
subsequent events, it is possible that the Armenian king used this meeting to urge his son-in-
law to submit to Hülegü and recognise Mongol suzerainty over the principality of Antioch 
and the county of Tripoli. Hethoum would certainly have been aware of the plundering of 
Baghdad and the sources indicate that he played an influential role in convincing his ally that 
a similar fate awaited Antioch and even Tripoli if Bohemond did not align himself with the 
Mongols, as the Cilician Armenians had done. Thomas Bérard, the master of the Temple, 
wrote a letter on 4 March 1260 in which he reported that the Antiochene prince recognised 
Mongol overlordship of the county of Tripoli after taking advice from the Armenian king.
66
 
Thus, it is clear that Hülegü’s campaigning in the Near East prompted diplomatic discussions 
between Bohemond and Hethoum. 
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The Armenian king participated in the Mongol capture of Aleppo and he is denounced 
by Arab historians for setting fire to the city’s Great Mosque.67 It has been suggested by 
Bayarsaikhan that Bohemond VI had also joined Hülegü’s army prior to the siege of 
Aleppo.
68
 Whilst such a theory is possible, there is no evidence which supports this claim. 
Several primary sources record that the Antiochene prince submitted in person to Hülegü, but 
Hayton clearly states that this took place after Aleppo had been taken by assault.
69
 If 
Bohemond did submit in person to the Il-Khan then it must have happened before Hülegü 
began his withdrawal to Azerbaijan. The Il-Khan left Syria in the spring of 1260 and reached 
Akhlat in eastern Anatolia on 7 June. Hülegü took the vast majority of his troops with him, 
but he did leave a force of around 10,000 men to complete the conquest of the Levant under 
the command of the general Kitbuqa.
70
 
Although there is no evidence that the prince of Antioch travelled to Aleppo in 1260, 
he did join the Mongols at Baalbek. The Arabic chronicler Qutb al-Dīn al-Yūnīnī claimed to 
have personally seen Bohemond VI in the town: 
I saw him myself in Baalbec in the year 658/1260. He was in attendance on 
Kitbuqa Noyon and he went up to the Baalbec citadel and residency. He had 
decided to ask for it (Baalbec) from Hülegü and offer him what would please him 
for it.
71
 
This testimony confirms that the prince of Antioch did meet with Kitbuqa before the Mongol 
general was defeated and killed at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260. It thus lends 
credence to the notion that Bohemond VI and King Hethoum I of Cilicia accompanied 
Kitbuqa when he entered Damascus, as recorded in the Gestes des Chiprois.
72
 Furthermore, 
an icon depicting Bohemond, Hethoum and Kitbuqa as the three magi provides additional 
evidence that they did enter Damascus together in 1260.
73
 Therefore, Jackson, who originally 
cast real doubt over the idea that Bohemond accompanied Kitbuqa into Damascus by 
questioning the reliability of the Gestes des Chiprois, has somewhat revised his view and 
conceded that Bohemond ‘may have ridden into Damascus with the Mongol army’, although 
he maintains that the story that the prince of Antioch ‘converted the Great Mosque into a 
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church is demonstrably apocryphal’.74 Sourdel is convinced that a Latin mass was celebrated 
at the Umayyad Mosque after the Mongols has taken Damascus because of Bohemond’s 
presence in the city, but argues that claims the mosque was converted into a church are 
excessive.
75
 
On 3 September 1260 a Mongol army led by Kitbuqa was massacred by the Mamluks 
at the battle of Ayn Jalut.
76
 Prior to this encounter, Bohemond VI had taken advantage of 
Hülegü’s presence in northern Syria by seizing Darkoush and a number of other fortresses in 
the Orontes valley. He also regained control of the coastal city of Latakia.
77
 Hethoum 
benefitted from the Mongol conquest of much of Anatolia, Mesopotamia and northern Syria. 
Hülegü ceded several towns and fortresses to him, thereby leading to a considerable territorial 
expansion of the Armenian kingdom, particularly on its eastern frontier.
78
 However, 
Bohemond and Hethoum subsequently struggled to repulse the Mamluk attacks on their states 
in the 1260s. 
The prince of Antioch and the king of Cilicia remained vassals of Hülegü after the 
battle of Ayn Jalut. Mongol overlordship encouraged these Christian rulers to maintain their 
alliance and co-operate against common enemies. When the Latin principality was attacked 
by the Mamluks in 1262 Hethoum encouraged the Mongols to send an army into northern 
Syria to prevent Baibars’ troops from capturing Antioch. The mere appearance of this 
Mongol force was apparently enough to prompt the Mamluks to withdraw without any 
serious conflict taking place.
79
 Considering that Hethoum had taken part in the Mongol 
conquest of Aleppo and that Armenians fought with Kitbuqa at Ayn Jalut, it quite likely that 
the Mongol army which marched to Antioch’s aid in 1262 contained a contingent of 
Armenian soldiers from Cilicia. However, this is the only incident recorded in the primary 
sources where the Cilician Armenians took action to help the Latin principality when it was 
attacked by the Mamluks. 
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In 1264 King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI were present at the court of the Il-
Khan in Azerbaijan.
80
 The Armenian king complained to Hülegü that the Seljuks were 
harassing his kingdom and sought Mongol assistance in helping him to negotiate a peace 
agreement with Rukn al-Dīn, a son of the deceased sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw II.81 
Apart from reaffirming his loyalty as a vassal to the Il-Khan, it is quite possible, and perhaps 
likely, that the Antiochene prince pressed his overlord to give more military support to the 
Latin principality. Hethoum requested diplomatic help from Hülegü so it is clear that other 
Mongol vassals felt able to make demands from the Il-Khan. Bohemond would not have 
spent months away from his territories travelling to and from Azerbaijan if he did not hope to 
receive something in return for his efforts. However, if the prince did ask Hülegü for military 
aid then he was to be disappointed because the Mongols did very little to defend the 
principality of Antioch or the county of Tripoli from the Mamluks. 
There was one other occasion when a force comprising Mongol and Cilician 
Armenian troops was active in the vicinity of Antioch. However, this expedition was 
aggressive rather than defensive. After returning from Azerbaijan in 1264 Hethoum raised an 
army and headed south, attacking the towns of Ma‘arrat Mesrin and Sarmin, which had been 
part of the Latin principality in the early twelfth century.
82
 The Armenian king later withdrew 
to Cilicia, but he reassembled his soldiers soon afterwards and marched towards Aintab in the 
winter of 1264-1265.
83
 After being attacked by Mamluks, the Cilician Armenians headed to 
Harim, where they were joined by 700 Mongols and 150 knights from Antioch, but they were 
forced to abandon the campaign because of the severe weather.
84
 
In the following four years the weakness of the alliance between the Antiochenes, 
Cilician Armenians and Mongols was exposed. Although they remained on good terms with 
each other, they did not collaborate in order to resist the Mamluk offensives on the kingdom 
of Cilicia or the principality of Antioch. Both these polities were targeted by the Mamluks in 
the 1260s partly because of their association with the Mongols.
85
 Furthermore, the Il-Khanate 
failed to provide either of them with the substantial military support that would have been 
necessary to repel the attacks of Baibars’ troops. Thus, although Mongol overlordship 
encouraged a co-operative relationship between King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI, it 
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also damaged the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality. The crippling of the former 
in 1266 and the destruction of the latter in 1268 can be partially blamed on the Mongol 
influence over these states. 
The Mamluks 
On 2 May 1250 the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, al-Mu‘azzam Turan-Shah, who had 
only assumed power a few months earlier, was murdered by the Mamluks of Cairo. The 
Mamluk emir Aybeg subsequently established himself as the new ruler by marrying Shajar 
al-Durr, the widow of former sultan al-Salih Ayyub. However, the first decade of Mamluk 
rule in Egypt was somewhat marred by political infighting. Aybeg had his main rival, Aktay, 
assassinated and exiled a large number of Bahri Mamluks who posed a serious threat to his 
leadership. Yet the Mamluk sultan was himself killed on 10 April 1257. One of Aybeg’s 
chief administrators, Qutuz, later took power and he was the man who led the Mamluks into 
battle against Kitbuqa’s Mongol army at Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260.86 
The decisive victory of the Mamluks at Ayn Jalut provided them with a clear 
opportunity to conquer the Levant. Kitbuqa lay dead on the battlefield and his army was 
destroyed.
87
 Hülegü’s decision to withdraw to Azerbaijan with the vast majority of his troops 
meant that the recent Mongol conquests in Syria were particularly vulnerable after Kitbuqa’s 
defeat. Within a matter of weeks important cities such as Aleppo and Damascus had fallen 
under Mamluk control.
88
 Then another change occurred in the Mamluk leadership as Qutuz 
was murdered by Baibars on 24 October 1260 while returning to Cairo.
89
 Baibars was 
subsequently recognised as the new sultan by all the Mamluk emirs that had been travelling 
with Qutuz.
90
 He later entered Cairo and firmly established himself in power.
91
 Baibars 
proved to be a strong and effective leader who spent much of his seventeen year reign 
vigorously attacking his enemies in the Near East. 
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Prince Bohemond VI and King Hethoum I remained allies throughout the 1260s, but 
the extent of their collaboration against the Mamluk threat was fairly limited in the years after 
the battle of Ayn Jalut. To some extent this can be explained by Bohemond’s long absences 
from the principality of Antioch and his focus on defending the county of Tripoli.
92
 
Furthermore, it may be the case that at this point the Latin principality supported a relatively 
small number of troops, and therefore the Antiochene prince, or those who governed the state 
in his absence, may have been unwilling to commit them to battle and risk leaving Antioch 
defenceless. 
The first serious Mamluk attack against the territories of Bohemond and Hethoum 
was the invasion of the principality of Antioch in 1262. After arriving at Damascus in the 
autumn of 1261 Baibars dispatched a military force to northern Syria in order to assert his 
authority in the region and oversee the appointment of a new governor at Aleppo. One of the 
sultan’s most trusted emirs, Sunqur al-Rumi, later invaded the principality of Antioch, 
capturing the port of St Simeon and destroying its harbour, after being put in charge of the 
Mamluk troops who had secured control of Aleppo.
93
 According to the authors of Eracles 
and the Gestes des Chiprois, the Mamluks then decided to besiege Antioch, but withdrew 
when a Mongol army arrived to relieve the city.
94
 Sunqur entered Cairo on 17 August 1262, 
where he was rewarded by Baibars for the plunder that he had taken during his raid of the 
Latin principality.
95
 
In 1264 Hethoum boldly invaded territory held by the Mamluks in northern Syria on 
at least two occasions. He led an attack on the towns of Ma‘arrat Mesrin and Sarmin before 
withdrawing after the king himself was nearly killed.
96
 The Cilician Armenians marched 
towards Aintab later that year, which prompted Baibars to order troops from Hamah and 
Homs to confront them and conduct counter-raids.
97
 After being attacked by Mamluks, 
Hethoum asked the Mongols and the Antiochenes for reinforcements rather than deciding to 
abandon his campaign. Both his allies sent token forces which joined the Cilician Armenians 
at Harim, but any plans they may have had to besiege the castle were thwarted by heavy rain 
and snow.
98
 Hethoum’s army eventually withdrew and returned to Cilicia, but the Mamluks 
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chose not to pursue the Armenian king. Instead they plundered the principality of Antioch 
and departed with many prisoners.
99
 
It is clear that Mamluk advances into northern Syria in 1262 and 1264 prompted some 
co-operation between the Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians, although Prince 
Bohemond VI does not appear to have been personally involved. By the middle of the 1260s, 
however, Hethoum appears to have recognised that his incursions into the region between 
Antioch and Aleppo had proved unsuccessful and that the Mamluks posed a major threat to 
his kingdom. At some point after retreating from Harim, the Armenian king sent envoys to 
Cairo to negotiate a peace with Baibars, but they were rebuffed by the Mamluk sultan.
100
 
Diplomatic discussions were resumed at Damascus in 1266 after the Mamluks had captured 
the Templar castle of Safed, but the two sides were ultimately unable to reach agreement. 
Two Armenian chroniclers recorded that Baibars demanded that Hethoum cede several 
fortresses to him in return for peace.
101
 Amitai-Preiss persuasively argues that the sultan had 
already decided to invade Cilicia when the Armenian king’s envoys arrived at Damascus so 
he requested terms that he knew Hethoum would not agree to.
102
 
In August 1266 Baibars ordered al-Mansur of Hamah to launch a major offensive on 
the Armenian kingdom.
103
 Under the leadership of al-Mansur, the Mamluks marched north 
and after travelling through the Amanus mountains they confronted a Cilician Armenian 
force near Marri. Hethoum had learned in advance that Mamluk troops were marching 
towards Cilicia and therefore he travelled to meet a Mongol commander in Anatolia to seek 
military assistance.
104
 The king entrusted his sons, Leon and Thoros, with the defence of the 
realm, but their army was no match for al-Mansur’s force. The Mamluks won a decisive 
victory, although very little fighting took place because most of the Cilician Armenian 
soldiers panicked and fled the battlefield. The troops of al-Mansur captured Leon and killed 
Thoros before advancing into the heart of the Armenian kingdom.
105
 They plundered the area 
around Til Hamdoun and captured the castle of Amouda on their way to Sis. Al-Mansur 
secured the conquest of that city, which was looted by his men for several days, before 
sending contingents of Mamluks to other parts of Cilicia in order to devastate the entire 
                                                          
99
 IAZ, 2, p. 511. 
100
 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, p. 116. 
101
 Smbat, p. 116; VG, p. 223. 
102
 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, p. 116. 
103
 IAZ, 2, pp. 608-609. 
104
 BH, 1, pp. 445-446; GA, p. 357; Smbat, p. 117. 
105
 BH, 1, p. 446; GA, p. 357; IAZ, 2, p. 609; Smbat, pp. 117-118. 
143 
 
kingdom.
106
 By the time they had returned to Syria in September 1266 Hethoum’s realm was 
severely weakened, both economically and militarily. 
The Mamluk invasion of Cilicia demonstrates that although the Latin principality and 
the Armenian kingdom were formally allied to each other, this diplomatic agreement rarely 
translated into military collaboration. The army of al-Mansur almost certainly marched 
through the former on their way to attack the latter so the Antiochenes must have been aware 
of the movement of the Mamluks, and yet they did not offer any assistance to their Cilician 
Armenian allies.
107
 It is unlikely that Antioch could have raised a large enough force to 
change the outcome of the battle near Marri, even if it had sent troops to join Thoros and 
Leon. Nevertheless, it is significant that those governing the principality in the absence of 
Bohemond VI did not seek to help the Armenian kingdom militarily. The two states had been 
in an alliance for more than a decade and both were threatened by the Mamluks, but this did 
not prompt the Antiochenes to try and defend Cilicia. 
When Baibars personally led an attack on Antioch two years later, the Cilician 
Armenians did not rush to the aid of the Latin principality. In May 1268 the Mamluks 
defeated a small force outside Antioch and captured the constable, Simon Mansel. They then 
surrounded the city and ordered Simon to persuade the other leaders of the principality to 
surrender.
108
 After trying to negotiate a peaceful takeover for several days, Baibars became 
frustrated with the delay and ordered his troops to attack. The Mamluks easily scaled the 
walls of Antioch near the citadel and set about massacring the city’s inhabitants.109 On the 
following day, the Antiochenes who had sought refuge in the citadel surrendered and were 
taken prisoner.
110
 After almost 170 years under Latin control the city of Antioch fell to the 
Mamluks and the surrounding principality quickly disintegrated. 
There are several reasons which help explain why King Hethoum I does not appear to 
have tried to prevent the Mamluks from sacking Antioch in 1268. First, the kingdom of 
Cilicia had been badly weakened by al-Mansur’s offensive two years earlier. Many Cilician 
Armenian soldiers had been killed in that campaign and Hethoum could not be confident that 
the remainder would achieve any success on the battlefield against the Mamluks considering 
the flight of his kingdom’s army when confronted by al-Mansur near Marri. If he had lost 
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large numbers of men trying to defend the principality of Antioch, then Cilicia would have 
been extremely vulnerable to permanent Mamluk conquest. More importantly, when Baibars 
attacked Antioch the Armenian king was still negotiating the release of his son, Leon, who 
had been captured by the Mamluks in 1266.
111
 Hethoum would have been extremely reluctant 
to antagonise Baibars before Leon was freed because the sultan could have executed his son 
in retaliation. Given the weak state of his fighting forces and the fact that the Mamluks were 
holding his son captive, it is hardly surprising that the Armenian king did not risk sending 
troops to Antioch’s aid when the Latin principality had not provided the Cilician Armenians 
with any military assistance two years before. However, it is possible that the real explanation 
for Hethoum’s failure to act in 1268 was simply a question of time. In early May 1268 
Baibars and his army were raiding the county of Tripoli, but they then swiftly headed north 
and began besieging Antioch just days later. It would have been very difficult for the 
Armenian king to raise an army and hurry south to help the Antiochenes, unless he was 
extremely well prepared for a Mamluk attack. Baibars gave Hethoum very little opportunity 
to assist the Latin principality in its hour of need, although for the reasons set out above he 
would not have done so even if he could. 
Analysis of the Political Environment in Southern Anatolia and Northern 
Syria 
Before making a final comment on how the four non-Christian powers mentioned 
above affected the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of 
Cilicia, it is worth analysing the geopolitical environment in which they operated and putting 
it in historical context. The ideas of Köhler are particularly interesting when trying to make 
sense of the alliances that were made in this region during the thirteenth century. His 
monograph, which focuses predominantly on the twelfth century, concludes that the Latin 
Christian states were fully integrated into the ‘political landscape’ of the Near East. 
Furthermore, he argues that the influence of ‘confrontationist ideologies’, such as crusading 
or jihad, ‘on the organisation of relationships between Syrian powers of differing religions is 
generally quite slight’.112 
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Köhler demonstrates that the polities of northern Syria in the early twelfth century 
cannot simply be divided between Christian and Muslim. Even at a time when the 
principality of Antioch was expanding in size in the 1100s and 1110s, it still allied with 
Aleppo when both sides considered such an arrangement to be in their interests. Tancred, 
who ruled Antioch from the winter of 1104-1105 until his death in 1112, collaborated with 
the Aleppan lord Ridwan against Count Baldwin II of Edessa and Jawali of Mosul in 1108.
113
 
This is one of a number of cases where Latin Christian rulers made serious alliances with 
their Turkish Muslim counterparts and even fought alongside them. 
Köhler uses the example of Tancred to illustrate that co-operation between Latins and 
Turks went beyond the occasional joint venture on the battlefield in the early twelfth century. 
Tancred employed Turkish troops in his service, and he may even have rewarded some of 
them with landed estates as opposed to simply paying them with money.
114
 Furthermore, 
when Ibn Tekish was forced to leave Mesopotamia by his cousin, Muhammad, the Seljuk 
sultan of Baghdad, he was able to obtain refuge at Antioch after being rebuffed by the rulers 
of Homs and Hamah. Ibn Tekish subsequently served under Tancred until the latter’s 
death.
115
 What emerges from the evidence is a picture or ‘religious indifference’ amongst the 
princes and emirs of northern Syria, who were primarily focused on preserving and extending 
their own power.
116
 
It is important to make clear that although Latins and Turks often interacted with each 
other collaboratively, they also clashed on a regular basis. Tancred of Antioch and Ridwan of 
Aleppo fought for control of towns on the frontier between their territories, such as al-Atharib 
and Zardana, and met on the battlefield near Artah in 1106. Köhler asserts that these military 
activities were ‘in no way different’ from the conflicts that took place between the Turkish 
lords of Antioch and Aleppo before the First Crusade.
117
 He implies that in many respects 
Ridwan treated Tancred as though he were just an ordinary Turkish rival in northern Syria, 
which explains not only why they formed an alliance in 1108 but also why Ridwan refused to 
support the Seljuk army which advanced towards the Orontes in 1111, under the command of 
Mawdud of Mosul. Despite the rivalry that existed between Antioch and Aleppo in the early 
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twelfth century, their rulers were prepared to co-operate with each other when they felt 
threatened by external forces.
118
 
One key component of Köhler’s hypothesis on diplomacy in twelfth century Syria is 
his observation that ‘the threat to the autonomy of the individual rulers from the advance of 
external powers always led to the conclusion of defensive alliances irrespective of ethnic and 
religious boundaries’.119 He labels this idea the ‘no place doctrine’ and explains how it led to 
the alliance of Christian and Muslim polities when both felt threatened by a ‘superior power’. 
Possibly the best example of this is the agreement made between King Fulk of Jerusalem and 
Mu‘in al-Din Unur of Damascus in the early 1140s. Both men wanted to prevent the 
aggressive Zengi, atabeg of Aleppo and Mosul, from occupying Damascus because they 
feared he would subsequently pose a substantial threat to the rest of southern Syria and 
Palestine.
120
 
Some of Köhler’s arguments about northern Syria in the early twelfth century can also 
be applied to the same region one hundred years later, although there are a number of key 
differences. It is quite clear that religion had very little influence upon the relationships 
between the various polities of southern Anatolia and northern Syria in the thirteenth century. 
Bohemond IV allied with the Aleppan Ayyubids and the Seljuk Turks on several occasions. 
These agreements were made because both sides recognised that it was politically 
advantageous to collaborate with each other, despite their religious differences. The alliances 
were temporary and based upon self-interest rather than any notions of kinship or affinity. 
During the Antiochene succession dispute both the Ayyubids of Aleppo and the 
Seljuks of Rūm tried to prevent King Leon I from capturing Antioch. This was not because 
they were concerned about the plight of Bohemond IV or thought that he had a stronger claim 
to the Latin principality than Raymond-Roupen. They simply recognised that the Cilician 
Armenians would be greatly strengthened by the acquisition of the city and its environs. If 
Leon had gained full control of Antioch in 1201 or soon afterwards then he would have acted 
as the regent for Raymond-Roupen, who would have been far too young to govern himself. 
Therefore, from the perspective of other powers in the region, the Armenian kingdom would 
effectively have been extended south of Cilicia into northern Syria, even if the principality 
remained a separate state in theory. Such an outcome would clearly have been 
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disadvantageous to the Ayyubids of Aleppo because a small and weak neighbouring state 
would have become part of a larger, expansionist polity. 
One contrast between northern Syria in the early twelfth century and the same region 
one hundred years later is that there seems to have been far less conflict on the frontier 
between the principalities of Antioch and Aleppo in the early thirteenth century. The Latin 
principality suffered major territorial losses in 1188 and most of the towns and fortresses 
located between the two cities subsequently remained under Ayyubid control until 1260. 
Bohemond IV and his successors appear to have made very little effort to try and reconquer 
these settlements until the arrival of the Mongols in northern Syria. The course of the 
Antiochene succession dispute suggests that it was a struggle for the Latin princes simply to 
retain control of Antioch and that any attempt at territorial expansion would have been 
thwarted by the militarily superior Aleppan Ayyubids. Furthermore, in the thirteenth century 
the princes of Antioch were also the counts of Tripoli and therefore they were often absent 
from the Latin principality. 
Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s accord with Bohemond IV during the Antiochene succession dispute 
has some parallels with the alliance between Unur of Damascus and Fulk of Jerusalem in the 
1140s. Fulk wanted to prevent Zengi from securing control of Damascus because he 
recognised the danger that the atabeg of Mosul posed to his kingdom. Similarly, al-Zāhir 
must have been concerned about the consequences for Aleppo if King Leon I captured 
Antioch. After succeeding his brother as the lord of the Roupenid principality in Cilicia in 
1187, Leon had conquered a large number of town and fortresses, and obtained a crown from 
the Holy Roman Emperor. The Armenian king may or may not have been able to seriously 
threaten the city of Aleppo itself, but if he possessed Antioch then it is likely that this 
ambitious ruler would have tried to extend his control over the rest of northern Syria. Al-
Zāhir Ghāzī’s decision to support Bohemond IV and hinder Leon’s efforts to seize Antioch 
was probably because he judged that the latter would be a more aggressive neighbour. 
Bohemond IV’s agreement with the Seljuks was slightly different to his alliance with 
the Aleppan Ayyubids. The sultans of Rūm did not try to actively defend Antioch from the 
Cilician Armenians in the way that al-Zāhir did. Instead they invaded Cilicia in 1201, 1208 
and 1216 while Leon was campaigning in northern Syria. Their primary goal was 
undoubtedly to capture fortresses and plunder the realm in the absence of the Armenian king. 
The Seljuks benefitted from this arrangement by seizing booty and conquering new territory, 
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but they were also aware that it helped Bohemond IV because it forced Leon to turn his 
attentions away from Antioch in order to defend his own kingdom. 
The treaty made between the Seljuks and the Cilician Armenians in 1208 
demonstrates that the former were concerned about the plight of the Latin principality. 
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I stipulated that Leon should stop attacking Antioch because he 
felt that it was in the Seljuk interest for the city to remain under the control of Bohemond IV. 
The Armenian king was one of Kay-Khusraw I’s main rivals, and therefore the sultan appears 
to have concluded that he was opposed to any avoidable increase in Leon’s power. The 
territorial expansion of the Armenian kingdom into northern Syria would not have had any 
direct impact on the sultanate of Rūm, but it would have strengthened the Cilician 
Armenians. The Seljuks, however, wanted their neighbours to be as weak as possible so they 
could pursue the conquest of Cilicia and gain control of the southern coastline of Anatolia. 
The decision of the Ayyubids of Aleppo and the Seljuks of Rūm to oppose Leon’s 
attempts to seize Antioch was essentially motivated by a desire to preserve the status quo. For 
different reasons, both these powers concluded that it was not in their interests to allow the 
Cilician Armenians to gain control of one of the largest and wealthiest cities in the Levant. 
They wanted to ensure that the principality of Antioch remained under the control of 
Bohemond IV, but neither al-Zāhir Ghāzī nor any of the Seljuk sultans were close allies of 
the Tripolitan count. Therefore, an Aleppan army fought against Bohemond’s troops in 1214 
after the latter laid siege to the Assassin castle of Khawabi, despite the fact that both al-Zāhir 
and the count of Tripoli had been co-operating to prevent Leon from capturing Antioch. The 
alliances made by Bohemond IV with the Seljuks and the Aleppans were simply marriages of 
convenience that did not last beyond the conclusion of the Antiochene succession dispute. 
These arrangements were slightly different from the alliances based on the ‘no place 
doctrine’ because the Cilician Armenians did not threaten the existence of the Ayyubid 
principality of Aleppo or the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm. The rulers of both states simply wanted 
to prevent the Armenian kingdom from becoming even more powerful. 
There is more evidence of these rival powers making alliances with each other in the 
1220s when the kingdom of Cilicia came under attack. After the arrest and imprisonment of 
Philip, king consort of Cilicia, by a group of Cilician Armenian barons in late 1224, the 
Seljuks and the Antiochenes collaborated by simultaneously invading the Armenian 
kingdom. Shihāb al-Dīn Tughril, atabeg of Aleppo, subsequently aided the Cilician 
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Armenians who had overthrown Philip by sending them supplies and Aleppan troops. The 
willingness of Tughril to oppose the Seljuks and the Antiochenes, who had both previously 
allied with the Aleppans, provides clear evidence that diplomacy in this region was quite 
fluid and that states which had previously co-operated could easily turn against each other if 
their interests diverged. These events also demonstrate that Christian and Muslim rulers were 
prepared to unite against men of their own faith when it suited them. In that sense there are 
clear parallels between the alliances made in 1225-1226 and those formed in 1108 when 
Tancred of Antioch collaborated with Ridwan of Aleppo against Baldwin II of Edessa and 
Jawali of Mosul.
121
 
In the 1230s and 1240s the politics and diplomacy of the region appear to have been 
quite different, although this could be explained by the paucity of evidence in the primary 
sources. Both the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia enjoyed a period of 
internal stability, with no revolts or succession disputes. This made them less vulnerable to 
invasion from one of their neighbours. Furthermore, in order to obtain peace and prevent 
further territorial losses Constantine and King Hethoum I were forced to accept Seljuk 
suzerainty over the Armenian kingdom, which lasted until c.1245. This meant that Seljuk 
incursions into Cilicia became very rare and for several years the relationship between the 
sultans of Rūm and the Armenian king was relatively peaceful. Overall, there seems to have 
been considerably less conflict between the Aleppans, Antiochenes, Seljuks, and Cilician 
Armenians in the second quarter of the thirteenth century in comparison to the first quarter. 
Thus, there was no need for them to make short term alliances with each other in order to 
protect the polity that was under attack. 
The response of King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI to the arrival of the 
Mongols in the Near East was quite different to how Latin rulers had reacted to the advance 
of external powers into Syria in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Rather than allying 
with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw II against Bayju’s army in the early 1240s, Hethoum 
decided to submit to the Mongols and accept their suzerainty over his kingdom. The 
Armenian king evidently judged that resistance to the Mongols would be futile and therefore 
it was better to recognise their superiority and hope they would allow him to rule over Cilicia 
if he remained a loyal vassal. Bohemond VI later followed in the steps of his father-in-law by 
submitting to Hülegü and acknowledging Mongol suzerainty over the principality of Antioch 
and the county of Tripoli. There is no evidence which suggests the Antiochenes considered 
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allying with the Ayyubids of Aleppo to try and resist the Mongols. This approach was almost 
the antithesis of the ‘no place doctrine’ which operated in the Levant for much of the twelfth 
century. 
Köhler neglects the geopolitics of northern Syria and southern Anatolia in the early 
thirteenth century because he fails to consider just how intertwined the principality of 
Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were during this period. He asserts that there were no 
‘proper’ alliances between Christian and Muslim rulers prior to 1240 in thirteenth century 
Syria, apart from the accord between Bohemond IV and al-Zāhir of Aleppo during the 
Antiochene succession dispute.
122
 However, the count of Tripoli was also on good terms with 
several Seljuk sultans who wanted to prevent King Leon I from capturing Antioch. 
Furthermore, the Antiochenes collaborated with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay-Qubād I after the 
deposition of King Philip of Cilicia in the 1220s. Whenever Bohemond IV found himself in 
conflict with the Cilician Armenians he sought to co-operate with the Seljuks or the 
Aleppans. If consideration is given to the whole of the Near East, rather than artificially 
focusing on Syria, it becomes clear that several alliances were made between the prince of 
Antioch and his neighbouring Muslim counterparts in the first three decades of the thirteenth 
century. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the non-Christian powers of northern Syria and southern Anatolia had a 
significant impact on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of 
Cilicia during the thirteenth century. This is most evident during the Antiochene succession 
dispute – it is highly unlikely that Bohemond IV’s supporters would have been able to retain 
control of Antioch until 1216 without the intervention of the Seljuks and the Aleppans. If 
King Leon I had not been hindered by al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s troops or distracted by Seljuk 
invasions of the Armenian kingdom then he would probably have conquered the Latin 
principality within a few years of Bohemond III’s death in 1201. Indeed, the Cilician 
Armenians seem to have been very close to subjugating Antioch in 1203, but they were 
thwarted by the advance of an Aleppan army. It is significant that Raymond-Roupen had 
reached the age of majority, and was therefore able to govern himself, by the time Leon 
captured Antioch because the relationship between the principality and the kingdom of 
Cilicia could have been very different if they were both governed by the Armenian king. 
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The influence of non-Christian powers on Antiochene-Cilician relations was not 
always so evident. For more than two decades after the coronation of King Hethoum I in 
1226, the two states remained hostile towards each other, but the sources suggest there was 
little or no conflict between them. The imposition of Seljuk suzerainty on the Armenian 
kingdom may have discouraged Hethoum from attacking the Latin principality, but clearly 
other factors were important, including the fact that the princes of Antioch also ruled the 
county of Tripoli and appear to have spent much of their time in their southern territory. 
The arrival of the Mongols in the Near East played a crucial role in the forging of 
amicable ties between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. The reconciliation 
and truce agreed by King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond V in the late 1240s may have 
been prompted in part by Bayju’s campaigns in Anatolia. The subsequent summoning of 
Hethoum to Karakorum to pay homage to the Great Khan was almost certainly pivotal in 
persuading the Armenian king to seek a marriage alliance with Bohemond VI, in order to try 
and ensure that Cilicia would be safe in his absence. 
The Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom remained in an alliance until the 
fall of Antioch in 1268. This was encouraged by the fact that after 1260 both polities were 
vassal states of the Mongols and both were threatened by the Mamluks. However, their 
military collaboration was somewhat limited despite the immense threat posed by Baibars’ 
forces. Throughout the thirteenth century the non-Christian powers of Anatolia and Syria 
undoubtedly helped to shape the conflicts and alliances between the Antiochenes and the 
Cilician Armenians, but the 1260s demonstrates the limits of their influence. The Mamluks 
campaigns of 1266 and 1268 devastated the kingdom of Cilicia and destroyed the principality 
of Antioch. On neither occasion did the two states combine their armed forces and attempt to 
resist the invaders. Non-Christian powers could encourage them to ally, but neither polity 
was prepared to risk a crushing defeat in order to try and help the other. 
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Chapter Six: The Influence of Ethnicity and 
Religion on Antiochene-Cilician Relations 
When the First Crusaders arrived in the Near East at the end of the eleventh century 
they found a land populated not just by Muslims, but also a multitude of different Christian 
denominations. The Latins who established the principality of Antioch quickly became 
accustomed to living alongside an ethnically diverse range of peoples with their own distinct 
religious practices. This chapter will examine the way in which Latins and Armenians 
interacted during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in order to ascertain the extent to which 
their ethnic and religious differences impacted upon Antiochene-Cilician relations. This will 
be done by contemplating whether the Latins and Armenians of northern Syria integrated 
with each other, analysing the levels of intermarriage between Latins and Armenians, and 
considering why King Leon I of Cilicia faced so much opposition when he tried to take 
control of Antioch. The role of the papacy in the Antiochene succession dispute and the 
implications of the union of the Latin and Armenian Churches will also be assessed. 
Latins and Armenians in the Near East 
Historians of the Latin East have long been interested in the relationship between the 
Latin Christians and the indigenous people of Syria and Palestine. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, scholars such as Grousset and Madelin argued that newcomers and 
natives successfully integrated to form ‘une nation franco-syrienne’.1 This integrationist 
model, which posited that people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds blended 
together to form a cosmopolitan society, was rejected by Smail and Prawer in the second half 
of the twentieth century. Smail thought that 
The basic feature of the Latin states was the imposition of a numerically small 
military aristocracy over the mass of the native population. This ruling class 
exploited the subject peoples economically by means of social arrangements 
which they found in existence, and which were akin to those they had known in 
Europe. Otherwise they made little difference to the daily life of the Syrians.
2
 
Prawer argued that society in the Latin East was characterised by ‘apartheid’ between the 
Latin Christians and the indigenous people of Syria and Palestine.
3
 He also emphasised that 
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‘native Christians were treated no better than Moslems, Jews or Samaritans’.4 This 
segregationist model has recently been challenged by the work of several historians, who 
argue that the Latins of the Near East did integrate with the local Christians. Ellenblum uses 
archaeological and textual evidence to demonstrate that Latins lived alongside Melkite 
Christians in many rural areas in the kingdom of Jerusalem, with both groups sharing 
churches for worship.
5
 This scholarship completely disproves Prawer’s argument that ‘almost 
the entire Frankish population was concentrated in the cities’ and undermines the 
segregationist model.
6
 Ellenblum claims that his findings represent a synthesis between the 
two earlier models – Latins did integrate with the indigenous Christians, although their 
relations should not be idealised, but they remained largely separate from the Muslims of 
Syria and Palestine.
7
 
Ellenblum’s view has been supported by Kedar and Murray, who both highlight 
examples of positive interaction between Latins and local Christians in the Near East. Kedar 
concludes his article examining relations between them by asserting that the Latins ‘were 
rulers who felt relatively at ease among their Oriental Christian subjects and maintained 
manifold relations with them’.8 Murray proposes a new hierarchical model for the 
relationship between the Latins and the indigenous peoples of the Near East – Muslims were 
at the bottom of the hierarchy since they were mostly excluded from the towns and cities of 
the Latin East, Jews and Samaritans were above them as they were subject to fewer 
restrictions, while the native Christians were the most privileged as they lived alongside the 
Latins in both rural and urban areas.
9
 He also differentiates between the Oriental Christians 
by arguing that the Arabic- or Syriac-speaking Melkites held lowly administrative posts in 
the Latin states,
10
 Greek-speaking Melkites held ‘important administrative and military 
positions’,11 while Armenians possessed fiefs and fought alongside Latins on the battlefield.12 
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MacEvitt argues that twelfth century relations between Latins and indigenous 
Christians, including Armenians, were characterised by ‘rough tolerance’.13 While there was 
violence between the two sides, it was not of a sectarian nature – ‘an attack on one group or 
individual was never interpreted as an attack on an entire community or class’, and the Latins 
never ‘systematically’ attacked the Armenians.14 However, MacEvitt suggests that the era of 
‘rough tolerance’ came to an end in the late twelfth century because its most important 
characteristics – permeable boundaries between religious communities, and silence about the 
theological differences which divided them – gradually disappeared.15 
It is certainly true that from the late twelfth century onwards Latin texts are better at 
identifying subgroups within the indigenous Christians of the Near East. However, Jotischky 
argues that it was the Melkites rather than the Armenians that were singled out for criticism 
by writers such as Jacques de Vitry.
16
 Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that Latins 
and Armenians should become more intolerant of each other simply because the former 
developed a greater understanding of the religious beliefs and practices of the latter. The 
Armenian Church was theoretically in communion with the Latin Church throughout the first 
half of the thirteenth century, even though the papacy probably knew that Armenian clerics 
were ignoring its requests to align their religious practices and customs with their Latin 
counterparts.
17
 In 1239 Pope Gregory IX explicitly recognised the rites and customs of the 
Armenian Church which did not contravene the canon law of the Latin Church in order to 
maintain the union of the Churches.
18
 The papacy was unconcerned by the ethnicity of the 
Armenians and was even prepared to overlook their religious differences when necessary. 
It is important to note that the Latins who settled in the Near East did identify the 
Armenians as an ethnic group that was distinct from the other peoples of the region. Bartlett 
has convincingly argued that medieval perceptions of ethnicity were based on descent, 
language, law and customs. Furthermore, some political leaders recognised that a nation or 
ethnic group with its own language should have its own laws and customs, although not 
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necessarily its own state.
19
 Bartlett’s theory that language was a key identifier of ethnicity 
concurs with Murray’s research on the Latin East. The latter has found that Latin chroniclers 
tended to divide the Oriental Christians into three groups: Syrians (Suriani or Syri), Greeks 
(Graeci) and Armenians (Armeni). These distinctions were based on language, with the term 
‘Syrian’ applying to Arabic- or Syriac-speaking Melkites, Jacobites and Maronites. In this 
case, people from different Christian denominations were considered to be one race. The 
Armenians were identified as an ethnic group on the basis of their language and while most 
Armenian-speakers also belonged to the Armenian Church, a minority of them were of the 
Greek Orthodox faith.
20
 
The Armenians were one of the most populous ethnic groups living in northern Syria 
during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and their presence can be detected in 
many cities across this region, including Antioch and Latakia.
21
 Therefore, the Latins who 
settled in the principality of Antioch governed and lived alongside a substantial number of 
Armenians. The Antiochenes came into conflict with the Cilician Armenians on numerous 
occasions in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but their relationship with the 
Armenian communities of northern Syria appears to have remained relatively peaceful and 
tolerant. There is no evidence that Armenians living in the principality of Antioch were 
persecuted or treated any differently by secular Latins after the polity was decimated by 
Saladin in 1188. In an account of his tour of the Near East in 1211-1212, Wilbrand of 
Oldenburg recorded that ‘Franks and Syrians, Greeks and Jews, Armenians and Saracens’ 
inhabited Antioch when he passed through the city.
22
 He also wrote that ‘the Franks are lords 
of all of them, and all of them observe their own laws’,23 which demonstrates a tolerant 
attitude towards non-Latins by the princes of Antioch and their vassals. Wilbrand’s testimony 
is supported by the fact that there are no references to Armenians or other Oriental Christians 
in the Assises of Antioch, and the legal treatise appears to apply only to the Latin inhabitants 
of the principality of Antioch. 
The testimony of one primary source implies that the Latin population of Antioch had 
a negative view of the Armenians. According to the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of 
Eracles, the Antiochenes did not seriously begin to resist the Roupenid endeavour to annex 
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their city in c.1193 until after a sommelier decried that Antioch was being ‘handed over to so 
vile a people as the Armenians’.24 In this instance the word ‘vile’ probably implies ‘low born’ 
and is criticising the social status of the Armenians. However, Murray and MacEvitt have 
demonstrated that Armenian knights held fiefs in the Latin East and that Latin nobles and 
even kings took Armenian wives.
25
 This would surely not have happened if the prevailing 
view amongst the Latins of the Near East was that the Armenians were a low born race. The 
Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles were produced in Acre in the 1240s so the author 
of this tale may not be accurately reflecting the views of the Antiochenes fifty years earlier.
26
 
Intermarriage between Latins and Armenians 
A number of prominent Latins who settled in the Near East after the First Crusade 
entered into marriages with local Christian women. In fact, Baldwin of Boulogne, the first 
count of Edessa, married the daughter of an Armenian lord as early as 1098. Baldwin of 
Bourcq, Joscelin of Courtenay and Galeran of Le Puiset also took Armenian wives during 
their time in the county of Edessa. These men evidently had no qualms about marrying non-
European women from a different Christian denomination when they thought that such a 
union would enhance their own career.
27
 The marriages helped them to win the support of the 
Armenians who resided in northern Syria and Mesopotamia while raising cash through dowry 
payments. 
The early princes of Antioch did not marry local women from the Near East, but that 
was because they were less dependent on the support of the Armenians than the Latins of the 
county of Edessa. Bohemond of Taranto married Constance of France, daughter of King 
Philip I, after returning to the West and he also arranged Tancred’s marriage to Constance’s 
sister, Cecilia. These matches raised both men’s standing so it is hardly surprising that they 
seized the opportunity to form close ties with the French monarchy. Roger of Salerno and 
Bohemond II thought it more politically advantageous to marry relatives of Baldwin of 
Bourcq, one of the most powerful men in the Latin East, than the sisters or daughters of 
Armenian lords. However, that does not mean the princes of Antioch had any principled 
objection to marrying local Christians. 
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The testimony of a contemporary chronicler suggests that marriage to local women 
helped those who settled in the Near East to integrate into their new surroundings. Fulcher of 
Chartres, a clergyman who served as the chaplain of Baldwin of Boulogne and wrote about 
the establishment of the Latin states in the Levant, described how ‘some have taken wives not 
only of their own people, but Syrians and Armenians or even Saracens who have obtained the 
grace of baptism’.28 MacEvitt argues that many Latins ‘of a lower rank’ who inhabited the 
county of Edessa and the principality of Antioch are ‘likely’ to have married ‘local Christian 
wives’, but admits that there is ‘little evidence’ of such unions aside from Fulcher’s 
account.
29
 Ellenblum and Murray support this view.
30
 
Prior to the creation of the Armenian kingdom, several members of the Roupenid 
dynasty had intermarried with their Latin neighbours. Indeed, Rüdt-Collenberg’s data 
indicates that during the twelfth century the Roupenids were more likely to marry Latins than 
other Armenians.
31
 For example, Joscelin of Courtenay married Thoros I’s sister at some 
point before 1113, while Roupen III wedded the sister of Humphrey of Toron in 1181. The 
Roupenids evidently believed that it was in their interests to form strong links with powerful 
landowners in the Latin East. Furthermore, the number of marriages that appear to have taken 
place suggests that both sides were either unconcerned by their ethnic and religious 
differences, or not concerned enough by these factors to stop arranging politically 
advantageous matches. 
Male members of the ruling dynasty of Antioch took Armenian wives on four 
occasions, with two of these matches being made before the creation of the kingdom of 
Cilicia in 1198. Bohemond III wedded his third wife, Sybil, in c.1181,
32
 and charters confirm 
that they remained married until at least 1199.
33
 Sybil is described as an Armenian by 
William of Tyre, but little else is known about her heritage. This union caused many 
problems for Bohemond – he was excommunicated, the principality was put under interdict, 
and many Antiochene nobles turned against him after he began plundering churches and 
monasteries
34
 – but his critics were not concerned by Sybil’s Armenian heritage.35 The match 
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was condemned by the Latin Church because the prince had shunned his previous wife and 
remarried without first seeking an annulment.
36
 After a delegation from the kingdom of 
Jerusalem had brokered a truce between Bohemond and the patriarch of Antioch, the prince 
exiled several of his prominent vassals, including his constable and chamberlain. However, 
these men headed north and gained service in Roupenid Cilicia.
37
 This behaviour suggests 
that in the 1180s the Antiochene elite viewed the neighbouring Armenian lords and princes as 
legitimate Christian rulers whom they were happy to serve under. 
Leon, who succeeded his brother, Roupen III, as prince of Roupenid Cilicia in 1187, 
married Sybil’s niece in 1189.38 According to the chronicle attributed to Sempad the 
Constable, Leon hoped that by forming familial ties with Bohemond III he would discourage 
Antiochene aggression towards his lordship.
39
 However, this match did not dissuade the 
Roupenid prince from imprisoning and torturing the prince of Antioch in the 1190s. Leon’s 
marriage to Sybil’s niece indicates that he considered Armenian Cilicia’s relationship with 
the Latin principality to be particularly important, but the violent manner in which he 
apparently disposed of his first wife in 1205 demonstrates just how weak her position became 
after the death of Bohemond III.
40
 
The second known marriage between an Armenian woman and a man from the ruling 
dynasty of Antioch occurred in c.1195 when Raymond, the eldest son of Bohemond III, 
married Leon’s niece, Alice.41 The wedding took place around two years after the first 
Roupenid attack on Antioch was thwarted. Such a union would surely not have taken place if 
a large number of Antiochenes were as actively hostile towards Armenians as the Lyon and 
Florence manuscripts of Eracles suggest. Bohemond III may or may not have been pressured 
into assenting to this match in order to secure his own freedom – he was in captivity when the 
agreement was made – but he was evidently not totally opposed to a marriage between his 
son and the daughter of an Armenian prince. Despite Raymond’s early death in c.1197, the 
marriage did produce a son, Raymond-Roupen, whose birth appears to have been greeted by 
both Bohemond and Leon.
42
 Even if the Antiochene prince had initial doubts about the 
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wisdom of such a match, they did not prevent him from naming Raymond-Roupen as his heir 
in 1198.
43
 
Raymond’s premature death and the birth of Raymond-Roupen were two of the main 
causes of the Antiochene succession dispute, but it was not a conflict based on ethnic or 
religious differences and it did not discourage marriage between Latins and Armenians. In 
1210 Leon married Sybil, the half-sister of King Hugh I of Cyprus. The Armenian king also 
arranged the marriage of Raymond-Roupen and Hugh’s sister, Helvis.44 These matches 
clearly demonstrate that Leon’s marital strategy was based largely on political considerations. 
He evidently hoped to get the diplomatic support of the Cypriot monarchy in the Antiochene 
succession dispute, although there is no suggestion that he expected or received any military 
assistance in the conflict. 
The king of Cilicia further enhanced his links with Latin monarchs in 1214 when his 
daughter Stephanie, the only child of his first marriage, married John of Brienne, king of 
Jerusalem. Leon later arranged to marry his other daughter, Isabel, to the son of King Andrew 
II of Hungary, although the proposed match never came to fruition. Hodgson argues that 
these matches ‘underlined the newfound importance and heightened reputation of the 
Armenian kingdom of Cilicia’ amongst Latin rulers following Leon’s coronation and the 
union of the Latin and Armenian Churches.
45
 The marriage strategy pursued by the Armenian 
king isolated Bohemond IV diplomatically and ensured that Raymond-Roupen’s investiture 
as the prince of Antioch in 1216 was not opposed by other Latin rulers in the Near East. 
The Antiochene succession dispute in effect prevented any marriages between the 
ruling dynasty of Armenian Cilicia and the family of Bohemond IV, but after 1219 there were 
new opportunities for the two sides to intermarry. When the conflict that erupted after Leon’s 
death had been quelled, the Cilician nobility and the catholicos of the Armenian Church 
decided that the young queen, Isabel, needed to be married to an adult husband who was 
capable of governing their realm. In 1222 she wedded Philip, son of Prince Bohemond IV.
46
 
Although Constantine of Babaron hoped to pair Isabel with one of his sons,
47
 most of the 
nobility of Cilicia appear to have decided that a marriage alliance with the principality of 
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Antioch was in the best interests of the Armenian kingdom.
48
 The marital union between 
Philip and Isabel was violently ended by the former’s deposition, imprisonment and murder 
just a few years after their wedding.
49
 Philip was deposed by a group of Cilician Armenian 
barons, but it is highly unlikely that they were concerned by the ethnic background of the 
men he appointed to key positions within the kingdom following his coronation. 
Philip’s short reign in Cilicia and his subsequent demise cast a long shadow over 
Antiochene-Cilician relations. The next marriage between the ruling dynasties of the two 
states took place more than three decades after Philip and Isabel’s wedding. In 1254 
Bohemond VI of Antioch married Sybil, daughter of King Hethoum I of Cilicia.
50
 Crucially, 
the match was arranged after the death of Bohemond V, who maintained a policy of hostility 
towards the Armenian kingdom throughout his tenure as prince. Bohemond VI was born long 
after the murder of his uncle and therefore he probably did not have a deep resentment of 
King Hethoum and his family, who had been instrumental in Philip’s deposition and death. 
The prince recognised that a marriage alliance with the kingdom of Cilicia was in Antiochene 
interests and agreed to wed Sybil. 
The pairing of Sybil and Bohemond VI ultimately proved to be the most successful of 
the marriages between the ruling dynasties of Cilicia and Antioch. Medieval rulers would not 
hesitate to put aside their wife and seek a new bride if they thought the match was no longer 
in their interests. Bohemond’s union with Sybil helped to sustain a prolonged alliance 
between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom, but crucially the prince chose not 
to annul the marriage after the loss of Antioch in 1268. The fact that the couple remained in 
holy matrimony until Bohemond VI’s death in 1275 suggests that either the prince had 
genuine affection for his wife or he wanted to maintain an alliance with her family even 
though he did not have a principality in northern Syria to defend. Their son, Bohemond VII, 
inherited the county of Tripoli, although Sybil briefly ruled the polity on his behalf until he 
reached the age of majority. 
King Hethoum I appears to have favoured non-Armenian Christians when selecting 
husbands for his daughters because Sybil was not the only Hethoumid woman to marry a 
prominent figure in the Latin East. Euphemia was paired with Julian of Sidon while Maria 
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was married to Guy of Ibelin. These unions demonstrate that Cilician Armenians continued to 
value strong links with Latin Christians – a trend that dates back to the early twelfth century. 
After the destruction of the principality of Antioch, Hethoum’s successors arranged marriages 
with the Lusignan dynasty in order to maintain good relations with the kingdom of Cyprus. 
The number of recorded marriages between Latins and Armenians is sufficient to 
demonstrate that neither people were seriously concerned by the ethnic or religious 
differences between them. The main consideration of Near Eastern rulers when arranging a 
marital union was the political advantage that it would secure. The ruling dynasties of 
Armenian Cilicia and Antioch intermarried on three significant occasions in c.1195, 1222, 
and 1254. Furthermore, if the city of Antioch had not fallen in 1268 it is likely that more 
matches between these families would have been arranged because a strong alliance would 
have benefitted both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom as they attempted to 
resist Mamluk aggression. 
Antiochene Opposition to King Leon I 
The amount of intermarriage and the level of co-operation between Latins and 
Armenians in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries proves that these peoples did not view each 
other with an aggressive intolerance. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
princes of Antioch treated their Armenian subjects any worse than the other Christian 
denominations that lived in the Latin principality. Other than the presumably fictional tale of 
the sommelier in the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles,
51
 there is little reason to 
think that the resistance to the Roupenid endeavour to take control of Antioch in c.1193 was 
prompted by anti-Armenian prejudice. This episode was the first of several attempts made by 
Leon II of the Roupenid principality – who subsequently became King Leon I of Cilicia – to 
seize the city of Antioch. 
In many respects the fact that Leon and his troops were Armenian was irrelevant. Any 
invader seeking to capture Antioch would have faced hostility from some of the city’s 
inhabitants. Bohemond III’s supporters tried to prevent the Roupenid army from occupying 
the metropolis because they hoped to maintain the principality’s existence and keep their 
leader in power. These men would have resisted any force that attempted to seize control of 
the city regardless of the ethnicity or religion of the attackers. Other Antiochenes probably 
fought against Leon’s troops because they wanted to preserve the Latin governance of 
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Antioch and feared the change that a new regime would bring. The commune of Antioch, 
which was established in c.1193 in order to prevent the Roupenids from capturing the city,
52
 
probably contained non-Latin members,
53
 and therefore it is possible that some Greek 
Orthodox and other indigenous Christians may have joined the Latins who opposed Leon’s 
army. 
Count Bohemond of Tripoli took possession of Antioch after the death of Bohemond 
III in 1201, even though his father had previously designated Raymond-Roupen as the heir to 
the Latin principality. The Tripolitan count was recognised as Prince Bohemond IV by the 
commune of Antioch, which suggests he had the support of many Antiochenes. Raymond-
Roupen was only an infant when Bohemond III died, but his claim to the principality was 
backed by his great-uncle, King Leon I of Cilicia. The fear of political upheaval helps to 
explain why Bohemond IV was able to retain control of Antioch until 1216. Raymond-
Roupen was a child during the early stages of the conflict and therefore he would not have 
been able to govern himself. Leon sought to seize the principality and rule as regent for his 
great-nephew, but this prospect was no more appealing to many Antiochenes than his 
attempted conquest in c.1193. 
The suggestion by Boase that ‘anti-Armenian feeling’ played an important part in the 
Antiochene succession dispute appears to be based upon the assumption that this conflict was 
essentially a struggle for control of Antioch between Latins and Armenians.
54
 However, there 
is plenty of evidence that the supporters of Bohemond IV and Raymond-Roupen cannot be 
divided along ethnic or religious lines. Some Antiochenes supported Raymond-Roupen’s 
claim to the principality of Antioch from the beginning of the succession dispute, including a 
number of barons who honoured the oath they had sworn in 1198 recognising him as the heir 
of Bohemond III.
55
 Sempad the Constable recorded that six Antiochene knights left the 
principality in 1201 and entered the service of King Leon I.
56
 These men presumably fled 
from Antioch shortly after Bohemond IV was recognised as the new prince by the 
Antiochene commune. They were willing to actively support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the 
principality by serving under an Armenian king. 
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Two charters issued by Raymond-Roupen in 1215, a year before he was invested as 
the prince of Antioch, confirm that at least ten other Antiochenes also pledged their 
allegiance to him during the succession dispute.
57
 While one or two of them may have had 
some Armenian blood in their veins they clearly came from Latin Christian families with 
European origins as names like Thomas, Walter, and William testify. The witnesses of these 
charters made a political decision to recognise Bohemond III’s grandson, rather than his 
second son, as the legitimate prince. They were evidently unconcerned by the ethnic and 
religious differences between themselves and the Armenian people because they were willing 
to fight alongside King Leon I of Cilicia in order to install Raymond-Roupen in power at 
Antioch. Some of these men may have been amongst the barons who pledged their allegiance 
to the boy in 1198 and their actions may have been influenced by the oath they made, but in 
all probability they chose to support Raymond-Roupen primarily because they thought it 
would be better for their own careers if he inherited the principality rather than Bohemond 
IV. 
It seems highly unlikely that anti-Armenian prejudice was prevalent amongst the 
Latin elite at Antioch considering the number of Antiochenes who sided with Raymond-
Roupen in the succession dispute. Those who pledged their allegiance to Bohemond IV did 
so for political reasons rather than because they did not like the Armenians as a people. Many 
of Antioch’s inhabitants, both Latin and non-Latin, were firmly opposed to Raymond-
Roupen’s claim to the principality, even after he had reached the age of majority and there 
was no need for Leon to govern as his regent. Three of Raymond-Roupen’s four grandparents 
were actually Latins so his opponents in Antioch are unlikely to have been particularly 
concerned by his ethnic background.
58
 If Bohemond III’s eldest grandson had been raised at 
Antioch under the guidance of his Latin relatives then he would probably have faced 
considerably less opposition from Antiochenes. However, because Raymond-Roupen grew 
up in the kingdom of Cilicia under Leon’s supervision, many feared that if he ever gained 
power at Antioch he would marginalise those who held positions of power under Bohemond 
III and Bohemond IV, and favour those who were loyal to himself and his great-uncle. They 
would have felt similar concerns about any outsider who wanted to take control of the 
principality. Furthermore, Raymond-Roupen’s status as the heir to the kingdom of Cilicia 
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during the Antiochene succession dispute can only have increased anxieties that his 
succession at Antioch would lead to major upheaval.
59
 
Several historians have described the Antiochene opponents of King Leon I and 
Raymond-Roupen as the ‘anti-Armenian faction’ within the principality of Antioch.60 
However, the Latins who resisted Leon’s efforts to capture Antioch in c.1193 and during the 
Antiochene succession dispute were anti-Roupenid rather than anti-Armenian. They had lived 
alongside the sizeable Armenian population of northern Syria since the foundation of the 
principality, and there is no evidence that these Armenians were systematically persecuted by 
the Antiochenes. Nevertheless, the Latins did not want to be governed by a Cilician 
Armenian dynasty which might threaten their hegemony at Antioch. The anti-Roupenid 
stance amongst large sections of the Antiochene elite is perfectly understandable because a 
new ruler, who had been raised in a foreign court, would probably want to put his own 
supporters in positions of power within the principality at the expense of members of the 
existing regime. For example, after his coronation as king of Jerusalem in 1131, Fulk of 
Anjou bestowed castellanships and offices of the crown upon his Angevin supporters, thereby 
threatening the power of the established noble families. Mayer argues convincingly that Hugh 
of Jaffa’s rebellion against Fulk in 1134 was, in part, a reaction against this policy.61 The 
Antiochene opponents of Leon and Raymond-Roupen were not particularly concerned by the 
ethnic and religious differences between themselves and the Armenian people – they were 
worried that their powers and privileges would be threatened. 
The Role of the Papacy in the Antiochene Succession Dispute 
The papacy learned of the succession dispute in the principality of Antioch around 
two years before Bohemond III’s death. King Leon I of Cilicia wrote to Pope Innocent III in 
1199 and informed the pontiff that the Antiochene prince had designated his newly born 
grandson, Raymond-Roupen, as his successor. The Armenian king also mentioned that in the 
winter of 1198-1199 Count Bohemond of Tripoli expelled his father from Antioch and was 
proclaimed the legitimate heir to the principality by his supporters.
62
 Bohemond III 
subsequently resumed his position at Antioch a few months later, but Innocent probably 
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realised that conflict was likely to break out after the elderly prince’s death unless diplomatic 
steps were taken to resolve the issue of who should inherit the Latin principality. 
The pope immediately responded to Leon’s letter by writing that he would dispatch 
papal legates to the Near East with a mandate to examine the matter and judge who had the 
stronger claim to succeed Bohemond III.
63
 However, when the Armenian king wrote to 
Innocent III in October 1201 he stated that he was looking forward to the arrival of the 
legates so that a judgement could be made. Furthermore, he requested that the archbishop of 
Mainz, who had crowned Leon king of the Armenians in 1198, was made one of the judges in 
the Antiochene succession dispute.
64
 Clearly the papacy had been slow in appointing legates 
to settle the quarrel because the process of consulting with the rival claimants and their 
representatives had not begun, even though Innocent had been made aware of the situation 
two years earlier. 
The pope’s sluggishness meant that Bohemond III had died and conflict had erupted 
over control of the principality of Antioch long before papal legates began trying to settle the 
succession dispute. It would have been difficult to persuade Bohemond of Tripoli to renounce 
his claim to the territory in favour of Raymond-Roupen or convince Leon that the Tripolitan 
count was the rightful heir to Antioch in the period before the prince’s death. However, the 
papacy had a greater chance of influencing the succession during that time. Once war had 
broken out between the Armenian king and Bohemond of Tripoli a military solution to the 
quarrel was far more likely than a diplomatic one. 
In the autumn of 1202 the first of two papal legates tasked with trying to resolve the 
Antiochene succession dispute arrived in the Holy Land. Soffredus of Santa Prassede entered 
Tripoli on 11 November, but Bohemond IV was absent from the city and did not appear until 
February 1203. Even after his arrival the Tripolitan count refused to discuss the fate of the 
principality with the legate on the grounds that he had been excommunicated by the 
patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem. Bohemond IV was predictably reluctant to recognise the 
right of the papacy to judge who had the better claim to the principality because Antioch was 
already under his control. After weeks of unsuccessfully trying to engage with the count, 
Soffredus departed for Acre.
65
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The papal legate, accompanied by King Aimery of Jerusalem, the masters of the 
Temple and the Hospital, and an assortment of barons, sailed to the principality of Antioch 
later in 1203. This delegation met with Leon in northern Syria after he agreed to temporarily 
suspend hostilities in order to discuss the succession dispute. The Armenian king recognised 
the right of Soffredus and the barons to judge who was the legitimate heir of Bohemond III. 
Leon attempted to persuade them to support Raymond-Roupen’s claim by promising twenty 
thousand men for the service of Christianity if justice was obtained for his great-nephew. As 
these negotiations were taking place during the Fourth Crusade it would appear that Leon was 
offering military support for that enterprise. However, the barons rejected the Armenian 
king’s offer and when Soffredus departed for Acre later that year little progress had been 
made.
66
 
In November 1203 a Cilician Armenian army entered Antioch during the night and 
came very close to capturing the city. Leon’s men were then attacked by the Templars and 
forced to retreat back to Cilicia when an Aleppan force advanced towards Antioch and 
reached the Orontes. This offensive is clear evidence that the papacy had failed in its early 
attempts to prevent military conflict between the two sides competing for control of the 
principality. Soffredus had tried to agree a peace and persuade both Leon and Bohemond IV 
to accept his judgement over who was the legitimate prince of Antioch. However, the 
Tripolitan count’s refusal to co-operate frustrated the Armenian king and convinced him that 
he was far more likely to obtain the principality on Raymond-Roupen’s behalf by force than 
waiting for the papacy to find a diplomatic solution. 
Shortly after Leon’s troops had retreated back to the Armenian kingdom from Antioch 
another papal legate arrived in the Near East. Peter of Saint Marcellus journeyed to Cilicia 
and entered into discussions over the role of the catholicos following the union between the 
Latin and Armenian Churches. After these matters were concluded Peter turned his attention 
to the Antiochene succession dispute. Leon’s attempts to obtain the principality by military 
means had failed so he once again began to engage in the legal process in the hope that Peter 
would declare Raymond-Roupen to be the prince de jure. However, the Armenian king 
realised this was highly unlikely after holding discussions with the papal legate, the patriarch 
of Antioch, and the Templars and the Hospitallers at the Black Mountain in the Amanus 
Mountains.
67
 Leon became convinced that Peter was opposed to Raymond-Roupen’s claim to 
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the principality of Antioch and wrote a letter to Innocent III accusing the legate of conspiring 
with the Tripolitan count against him. The Armenian king labelled Peter an ‘adversary’ and 
demanded that he was not allowed to pass judgement on the succession dispute.
68
 
The negotiations between Peter of Saint Marcellus and King Leon I became 
increasingly strained during the first half of 1204. The legate actually placed the kingdom of 
Cilicia under interdict after Leon refused to relinquish control of the castles that he had seized 
from the Templars in retaliation for their attack on his troops at Antioch in November 1203.
69
 
When it became clear that the two men could not reach agreement Peter travelled to Acre and 
a council was convened by Soffredus to try and reach a compromise. The Armenian king sent 
an ambassador to Acre in September 1204, while the bishop of Tripoli also joined the 
conference on behalf of Bohemond IV. The Templars and the Cilician Armenians were 
reconciled, but no accord was made between Bohemond and Leon.
70
 Peter and Soffredus 
departed the Holy Land soon afterwards without giving explicit papal support to either side.
71
 
Around two years after Soffredus of Santa Prassede had first arrived in the Near East 
both he and fellow legate Peter of Saint Marcellus left the Near East having comprehensively 
failed to settle the Antiochene succession dispute. They were unable to bring peace between 
the supporters of Bohemond IV and Raymond-Roupen or even persuade the Tripolitan count 
to seriously negotiate. Crucially, the legates did not make a judgement on the case and openly 
state who they thought was the legitimate heir of Bohemond III. As he already controlled the 
principality of Antioch Bohemond IV was understandably wary of acknowledging that his 
claim to the polity was in doubt by debating the succession with Leon or the papal legates. If 
he had agreed to abide by the judgement of Soffredus and Peter on the matter then he risked 
losing his principality as they may have backed Raymond-Roupen. It was always highly 
unlikely that the legates would have been able to induce the Tripolitan count to give up 
Antioch, but they may have been able to influence the outcome of the conflict between Leon 
and Bohemond IV by supporting one of the claimants to the principality. Instead Soffredus 
and Peter left the situation unresolved which probably strengthened the count of Tripoli’s 
belief that he could ignore the papacy’s attempts to intervene in the succession dispute. 
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In March 1205 Pope Innocent III wrote to the abbots of Lucedio and Mount Tabor 
about the quarrel between Leon and Bohemond. He noted that Soffredus and Peter had been 
unable to find a solution to the controversy, despite working tirelessly. The pontiff ordered 
the abbots to travel to the Near East in order to convene a meeting between the Tripolitan 
count and the Armenian king, and to encourage them to reach an agreement over the future of 
the principality of Antioch. Innocent was clearly frustrated that the dispute was dragging on 
and that the two sides were fighting each other instead of the Muslims in the region. 
Therefore, he authorised the abbots to use spiritual sanctions against either side if they 
refused to co-operate and forbid other Christian groups in the Holy Land, such as the 
Hospitallers, from supporting the contumacious party. In fact, the pope suggested that if 
Bohemond or Leon tried to hinder the legal process then their opponent should be given 
military assistance. 
The abbots of Lucedio and Mount Tabor were clearly no more successful in finding a 
solution to the Antiochene succession dispute than Soffredus and Peter had been since the 
Armenian king and the Tripolitan count continued to battle for control of the principality for 
another decade. Indeed it is unclear whether the three month arbitration suggested by 
Innocent ever took place since no letter recording the activities of the abbots has survived. 
Nevertheless, the pope maintained an interest in the quarrel and encouraged Patriarch Albert 
of Jerusalem to try and end the conflict between Leon and Bohemond. The Tripolitan count 
continued to make life difficult for those trying to legally settle the dispute. He even claimed 
that he held the principality of Antioch as a vassal of the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, 
and therefore he was only required to obey the judgement of the emperor.
72
 The Armenian 
king also irritated the pope and his legate by repeatedly clashing with the Templars in the 
Amanus Mountains.
73
 The behaviour of both sides discouraged the papacy from backing 
Raymond-Roupen or Bohemond IV and so the conflict rumbled on until Leon achieved a 
military breakthrough. 
The Armenian king wrote to Innocent III in 1216 after securing control of Antioch 
and installing Raymond-Roupen as prince. The fact that Leon sent such a letter reflects his 
knowledge that the pope would want to be informed of any developments in the quarrel over 
the principality. By this point it was probably clear to all that the papacy was merely a 
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spectator and had almost no influence on the conflict between Bohemond IV and King Leon 
I. Throughout the Antiochene succession dispute, Innocent refused to explicitly support 
Raymond-Roupen or the count of Tripoli. This meant that Bohemond’s possession of the 
principality was never seriously threatened in the diplomatic arena. The Armenian king did 
agree to abide by the judgement of the papacy and suspended hostilities on several occasions 
when asked by Innocent’s legates. However, he became frustrated by the inability of the 
Apostolic See to offer a verdict on who it deemed to be the legitimate prince and so he 
continued to lead military campaigns into the principality until he was finally able to capture 
Antioch. 
The Union between the Latin Church and the Armenian Church 
The Armenian Church had been politically separate from Roman Christianity since its 
establishment in the early fourth century, and this division was subsequently reinforced by 
the theological disputes of the fifth century which culminated in the council of Chalcedon in 
451.
74
 The national character of their Church allowed the Armenians to use a vernacular 
liturgy, and they adopted distinctive positions on matters such as the celebration of Mass and 
the wording of the Trisagion. These differences made the Armenians heretical in the eyes of 
the Latin Church and they were condemned by Pope Gregory VII in 1080. There had been 
‘little direct contact between the Armenian Church and the West’ prior to the second half of 
the eleventh century,
75
 but the permanent settlement of Latins in the Near East after the First 
Crusade provided the opportunity for increased understanding and engagement on both sides. 
The origins of the union between the Armenian Church and the Latin Church are to be 
found in 1184 when Catholicos Gregory IV wrote to Pope Lucius III. Unfortunately his letter 
has not survived so the exact nature of the message is unclear. Hamilton argues that the 
papacy believed the Armenian Church was acknowledging the primacy of Rome and that the 
two institutions were subsequently in complete communion. However, the Armenians simply 
intended to form ‘closer links with a sister-Church’ and retain their own religious customs.76 
It was not until 1198 that that a full union between the Churches was recognised by both 
sides. Before this unity was established between the Latins and the Armenians, the 
Byzantines had pursued a policy of reunion between the Armenian and Greek Orthodox 
Churches. Emperor Manuel I Comnenus was especially keen on a reunion and sent envoys to 
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the Armenian catholicos in 1171 in order to try and resolve the doctrinal differences between 
them. However, these negotiations proved fruitless and Manuel’s death in 1180 provided the 
opportunity for the papacy to forge closer links with the Armenian Church.
77
 
The catalyst for the strengthening of the accord was Leon’s desire to make the 
transition from Roupenid prince to Armenian king. In order to obtain a royal crown he 
needed the approval of an emperor. Therefore, in the 1190s Leon contacted Holy Roman 
Emperor Henry VI and Pope Celestine III, who had crowned Henry and given the emperor 
his authority. The pontiff refused to sanction Leon’s coronation unless the Armenians agreed 
to adopt the practices of the Latin Church. The Roupenid prince persuaded twelve Armenian 
bishops to swear to comply with the terms of the papacy by implying that they would not 
have to abandon their religious customs despite pledging otherwise.
78
 Leon was subsequently 
invested as the king of Cilicia on 6 January 1198 and the Armenian Church remained in 
communion with the Latin Church throughout the first half of the thirteenth century. 
The most significant effect of the decision of the Armenian Church to ally itself with 
the Latin Church on Antiochene-Cilician relations was Leon’s coronation in 1198. Before 
that date he was simply the ruler of the expanding Roupenid principality, while after it he was 
recognised as the king of the Armenians, and Cilicia became a kingdom. The elevation in 
status raised the profile of both Leon himself and the state that he ruled. Subsequently, the 
ruler of Armenian Cilicia was treated as the equal, and even the superior, of the prince of 
Antioch by his Latin contemporaries. 
The union between the Latin and Armenian Churches had little direct impact on the 
relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. Although a 
number of traditional customs used by the Armenian Church were viewed as heretical by the 
papacy, this did not mean that prior to 1198 the Latins of northern Syria sought to persecute 
Armenians on a religious basis. During his long tenure as prince of Antioch Bohemond III 
both allied with and fought against the Roupenid princes of Cilicia. These actions were 
undertaken in order to secure the maximum political advantage for the prince and were not 
influenced by the religion of the Armenians. After 1198 the situation remained fundamentally 
unchanged. Unity between the Churches did not lead to unity between the Latin principality 
and the Armenian kingdom. 
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The Antiochene succession dispute demonstrates beyond doubt that the religious 
differences between different rulers had relatively little impact upon the politics of southern 
Anatolia and northern Syria. Little more than three years after the formation of a union 
between the Latin and Armenian Churches a major conflict erupted between Bohemond IV 
and King Leon I. The Tripolitan count was even prepared to form alliances with al-Zāhir 
Ghāzī of Aleppo and several Seljuk sultans in order to retain control of Antioch. The fact that 
Leon and Bohemond were both Christians and their respective Churches were in communion 
did not stop the latter from persuading Muslim leaders to attack Cilicia and the troops of the 
Armenian king. 
The union of the Latin and Armenian Churches clearly had little or no effect on the 
attitude of King Leon I towards Bohemond IV or vice versa. However, it did influence the 
behaviour of the papacy during the Antiochene succession dispute. Innocent III wanted to 
maintain unity between the two Christian denominations and therefore he was keen to avoid 
unnecessarily upsetting the Cilician Armenians in order to avoid an ecclesiastical split. This 
attitude was one reason why the pope refused to acknowledge Bohemond IV as the legitimate 
prince of Antioch, even though the Tripolitan count had been recognised as such by the 
Antiochene commune and others within the polity. Innocent did not want to dismiss 
Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality because that would anger Leon and thereby 
potentially threaten the union of the Churches. 
The papacy valued Christian unity, but that did not mean that the pope was afraid to 
admonish the Armenian king when he disapproved of the latter’s behaviour. Innocent 
criticised Leon on several occasions for seizing Templar possessions and refusing to return 
Baghras to the Order. Furthermore, in 1211 the pope confirmed the excommunication of the 
Armenian king after learning that the Cilician Armenians had attacked a Templar force in the 
Amanus Mountains.
79
 Such strong action could easily have led to the dissolution of the union 
between the Churches. Indeed, Leon responded provocatively to these papal sanctions by 
lending his support to the Greek patriarch of Antioch and expelling Latin clergymen from 
Cilicia.
80
 However, the Armenian king subsequently realised the importance of maintain 
good relations with the Latin Church and reconciled with the Templars. Innocent then agreed 
to lift Leon’s excommunication in 1213, but he remained neutral in the Antiochene 
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succession dispute.
81
 These events suggest that Innocent was prepared to put ecclesiastical 
unity at risk when he thought the Armenian king was acting intolerably. 
Pope Honorius III was even less willing to rebuke the Cilician Armenians than his 
predecessor because of his desire to preserve the union of the Churches. When Philip, a son 
of Bohemond IV who became king of Cilicia after marrying Queen Isabel in c.1222, was 
deposed by a group of Armenian nobles Honorius actually hindered attempts to help him. Ibn 
al-Athīr recorded that the pope initially ordered Bohemond not to invade Cilicia in order to 
rescue his son because the Armenians shared their faith. It was only later that the pontiff gave 
permission for the Tripolitan count to attack if the Armenian nobles continued to refuse to 
release Philip.
82
 Hamilton observes that Honorius ‘showed no attachment’ to Bohemond’s 
son and suggests that the pope did not support him because of the bad relationship between 
the Tripolitan count and the Latin Church.
83
 However, the papacy’s approach in this matter 
was probably determined more by a desire to remain on good terms with the Cilician 
Armenians than apathy towards Philip’s plight. Honorius wanted the Latin Church to remain 
in communion with the Armenian Church and he may have been worried that this would be 
put at risk if he supported an invasion of Cilicia by Bohemond IV. However, the continuous 
refusal of the Cilician Armenian barons to release Philip appears to have eventually 
persuaded the pontiff to give his consent to the Tripolitan count’s planned assault. 
The importance placed upon the union of the Churches by the papacy is clearly 
demonstrated by the actions of Pope Gregory IX in the late 1230s. In April 1237 Gregory 
wrote to the archbishop of Nazareth and asking him to investigate whether the marriage of 
King Hethoum I and Queen Isabel of Cilicia should be annulled on the grounds of 
consanguinity. The pontiff suggested that he had been inundated with requests from the 
prince of Antioch to dissolve their union.
84
 Perhaps the annulment of his own marriage to 
Alice, dowager queen of Cyprus, inspired Bohemond V to argue that the match between the 
royal couple of Cilicia was invalid. 
In June 1238 Gregory IX ordered that the catholicos of Cilicia and all Armenians that 
lived in the diocese of Antioch should obey the Latin patriarch of Antioch.
85
 Hamilton 
suggests that while it was Patriarch Albert who persuaded the pope that the Armenian Church 
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should be subject to his authority, Bohemond V was the mastermind behind these 
ecclesiastical manoeuvrings.
86
 Gregory’s decision to inform the Armenians that they should 
recognise the supremacy of the Latin patriarch should be seen in the context of his policy of 
trying to get the indigenous Christians of the Near East to adopt Latin doctrine and customs.
87
 
In 1237, Philip, the prior of the Dominican province of Terra Sancta, wrote to the pope and 
informed him that the Syriac Orthodox patriarch of Antioch, Ignatius II, had visited 
Jerusalem in that year. The Dominican prior reports that Ignatius had promised obedience to 
the Apostolic See and confirmed this in a written declaration. According to Philip, the 
Jacobite patriarch even decided to wear the Dominican habit.
88
 Gregory may have hoped that 
the Armenian catholicos would follow Ignatius in accepting the primacy of the Latin Church. 
Hethoum fiercely protested both against the threat of annulment to the royal marriage 
and the decision that the Cilician Armenians should recognise the supremacy of the Latin 
patriarch of Antioch. Gregory IX was aware that the Armenians would simply break their 
union with Rome if he interfered in their affairs too strongly and therefore on this occasion he 
backed down in the face of determined opposition. Less than nine months after deciding to 
reduce the autonomy of the Armenian Church, Gregory instead awarded it new privileges, 
including the decree that no-one should be allowed to preach in the Armenian kingdom 
without a mandate from the pope, the catholicos or another  senior Cilician prelate.
89
 The 
pontiff also acknowledged that the marriage of Hethoum and Isabel was legitimate.
90
 After a 
few years of uncertainty, Bohemond V’s strategy of undermining the Hethoumid dynasty 
through his correspondence with the Holy See was now obsolete. 
The fragile union between the Latin and Armenian Churches appears to have 
disintegrated in the second half of the thirteenth century. Hamilton argues that the Cilician 
Armenians abandoned their accord with Rome in 1261, although there is no evidence that the 
union was formally abandoned.
91
 It was at this time that Catholicos Constantine I sent an 
Armenian theologian named Mekhitar to meet Thomas of Lentini, papal legate and bishop of 
Bethlehem. During this encounter Mekhitar attacked papal primacy and asserted that the 
                                                          
86
 Hamilton, ‘Armenian Church’, p. 79. 
87
 A. Jotischky, ‘The Mendicants as missionaries and travellers in the Near East in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries’, in R. Allen (ed.), Eastward Bound: Travel and Travellers, 1050-1550 (Manchester, 2004), pp. 97-98. 
88
 MP, 3, pp. 396-399; Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th Centuries, trans. 
M. Barber and K. Bate (Farnham, 2010), pp. 133-135; Hamilton, Latin Church, pp. 349-350. 
89
 Reg. Gre. IX, 2, No. 4734, pp. 1223-1224. 
90
 Reg. Gre. IX, 2, No. 4732, p. 1223. 
91
 Hamilton, ‘Armenian Church’, pp. 81-83. 
174 
 
Armenian Church had the authority to pass judgement on the Latin Church.
92
 These opinions 
were commonplace amongst the Armenian clergy, but had not been expressed to their Latin 
counterparts so boldly before. 
The breakdown in ecclesiastical unity occurred during a period when there was a 
strong alliance between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. Hamilton 
convincingly argues that the Cilician Armenians maintained formal ties with Rome primarily 
for ‘political and diplomatic reasons’.93 Therefore, King Hethoum I allowed Armenian 
theologians to be more open in their criticism of the Latin Church once he had established a 
good relationship with Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch and acknowledged Mongol 
suzerainty over his kingdom because this made the union of the Churches considerably less 
valuable to the Armenian kingdom. The accord with Rome did lead to some theological 
realignment within the Armenian Church, however. In 1243 a synod in Sis decided to adopt 
the Latin practice of giving extreme unction to the sick.
94
 Nevertheless, many Armenian 
clergymen were opposed to some beliefs and practices of the Latin Church, particularly the 
notion of papal primacy, and therefore there was little to hold the union together when the 
kings of Cilicia did not need it for political purposes. Unsurprisingly therefore, it was the 
diplomatic interests of the Armenian kingdom which prompted attempts to re-establish 
ecclesiastical unity in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.
95
 
Was the Kingdom of Cilicia treated as though it were part of the Latin East 
in the Thirteenth Century? 
As all historians of the crusades know four Latin states were formed in the Near East 
either during or immediately after the First Crusade. The county of Edessa lasted for less than 
fifty years before it was overrun and destroyed by the Zengids, but the principality of 
Antioch, kingdom of Jerusalem and county of Tripoli survived into the late thirteenth 
century. Cyprus was conquered by King Richard I of England in 1191 while he was 
participating in the Third Crusade and the island actually remained under Latin control for far 
longer than the three mainland states in the Levant. Thus, during the period analysed by this 
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thesis there were four crusader states in the Near East – four polities that were formed as a 
direct result of crusading activity and were subsequently ruled by Latin Christians. 
The kingdom of Cilicia was founded and governed by Armenians, but it maintained 
links with the Latin West and East throughout the thirteenth century. When Leon II of the 
Roupenid principality sought a crown for himself in the 1190s he sent an embassy to Pope 
Celestine III and Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI. His coronation on 6 January 1198 in the 
presence of the papal legate Conrad of Mainz symbolised the incorporation of the Cilician 
Armenians into the Latin sphere. The Armenian king recognised a Western emperor as his 
suzerain, while the Armenian Church entered into a formal union with the Latin Church. 
These ties with political and religious leaders in western Europe distinguished them from the 
other Christian peoples of the Near East. 
The attitude shown by the papacy towards the kings of Cilicia is particularly striking. 
Innocent III maintained a position of neutrality throughout the Antiochene succession dispute 
and refused to explicitly support the claims of Bohemond IV or Raymond-Roupen, despite 
the fact that during the early stages of the quarrel the latter was far too young to govern 
himself. If Bohemond III’s eldest grandson had inherited the principality in 1201 or soon 
after he would have required a regent and, as the boy’s guardian, King Leon I of Cilicia 
would have secured this position for himself. The pope was almost certainly aware of Leon’s 
intentions to rule the principality of Antioch on Raymond-Roupen’s behalf, yet he still 
declined to back Bohemond IV. To some extent this reflects the Tripolitan count’s difficult 
relationship with the Church, but it also demonstrates the esteem with which the Armenian 
king was held by the papacy. Leon was Armenian both ethnically and religiously, yet 
Innocent III and Soffredus of Santa Prassede were not opposed to the prospect of him 
governing Antioch instead of Bohemond IV. The union of the Latin and Armenian Churches 
meant that the counts of Tripoli, who claimed and ruled the principality of Antioch, could not 
rely on the support of the papacy when involved in a military conflict or diplomatic quarrel 
with the kings of Cilicia. 
It was not only during Innocent III’s pontificate that the papacy took an interest in the 
affairs of the Cilician Armenians. Honorius III backed Raymond-Roupen’s claim to be the 
legitimate heir of Leon, both before and after the king’s death in 1219.96 The fact that the 
pope cared who ruled the Armenian kingdom suggests that the realm was viewed as an 
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important part of Christendom by the Apostolic See. The papacy maintained this attitude 
even when the union between the Latin and Armenian Churches was disintegrating in the 
1260s. After the devastating Mamluk invasion of Cilicia in 1264 Pope Clement IV wrote to 
rulers in the Latin East urging them to help the Cilician Armenians.
97
 
In many respects the Latins who lived in the Near East behaved as if the kingdom of 
Cilicia was another Latin Christian state. The Cilician Armenians did fight against Latins 
when their political interests diverged. For example, Bohemond IV clashed with King Leon I 
during the Antiochene succession dispute, and the former also invaded Cilicia in the 1220s. 
However, the Latins of this region also fought amongst themselves and therefore such 
conflict does not mean that the Cilician Armenians were treated differently. Indeed, Holy 
Roman Emperor Frederick II and his supporters battled against the Ibelins for control of the 
kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus in the late 1220s and early 1230s.
98
 
The presence of the military orders in the Armenian kingdom clearly distinguishes it 
from other non-Latin territories. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights gradually 
acquired extensive landholdings in Cilicia and were granted several castles by the Armenian 
king.
99
 Their willingness to accept military strongholds in southern Anatolia suggests that 
they viewed the Armenian kingdom as a Christian realm that should be defended from 
Muslim powers in the region. Furthermore, these military orders did not simply accept 
donations in Cilicia – they tried to involve themselves in Cilician Armenian affairs. Both the 
Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality 
of Antioch, and the former also backed his attempt to take the Cilician throne after the death 
of King Leon I in 1219. 
The Templars had a difficult relationship with the Cilician Armenians until 1216 and 
clashed with Leon both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena, but their appeals to the 
papacy over these quarrels is instructive. The fact that the Order expected Innocent III to 
assist them by ordering the Armenian king to relinquish Baghras and return any Templar 
possessions that he had seized during the Antiochene succession dispute demonstrates that 
they considered the kingdom of Cilicia to be subject to the authority of the pope. 
Furthermore, this tactic was successful for the Temple because on two separate occasions 
Leon negotiated with the Order and reached an agreement with it after receiving 
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condemnation and spiritual sanctions from Innocent III or the papal legate Peter of Saint 
Marcellus.
100
 
The level of intermarriage between the Latin and Cilician Armenian elite undoubtedly 
demonstrates that neither side was seriously concerned by the ethnic and religious differences 
between them. It also suggests that Latin nobles and kings saw considerable advantages in 
forging familial links with the kingdom of Cilicia. For example, Perry argues that John of 
Brienne chose to marry Stephanie, the eldest daughter of King Leon I, in order to obtain a 
sizeable dowry and to form an alliance with the Armenian king. In 1214 John was searching 
for powerful new allies and considered Leon to be a formidable ruler.
101
 At this point the 
Armenian king was in conflict with Bohemond IV, count of Tripoli and de facto prince of 
Antioch, but the king of Jerusalem still pursued the match with Stephanie. John clearly saw 
nothing wrong in seeking to collaborate with a monarch who was fighting against another 
Latin ruler in the Near East. This indicates that he considered the kingdom of Cilicia to be 
part of Christendom and Leon to be a legitimate ally who could further the interests of the 
kingdom of Jerusalem. 
The fact that Latin knights chose to serve under King Leon I and probably fought for 
him against the supporters of Bohemond IV strongly suggests that most Latins living in the 
Near East did not have a negative view of the Armenians. Furthermore, it could indicate that 
Latin knights saw little distinction between the kingdoms of Cilicia, Jerusalem and Cyprus. 
They were prepared to swear allegiance to any Christian monarch that would properly reward 
them for their military service. The willingness of some of these men to fight for an 
Armenian king at a time when he was in conflict with a Latin count implies that they viewed 
the Antiochene succession dispute as a struggle between two Christian rulers, rather than 
between a Latin and non-Latin. Knights who had recently arrived in the Near East from 
Europe also saw the conflict in this way. Some crusaders, such as John of Nesle, decided to 
fight for King Leon I and supported his attempts to capture Antioch.
102
 
The politics of the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were deeply 
intertwined for much of the thirteenth century. It is hard to imagine the former developing 
such strong ties to another non-Latin state. Bohemond IV did ally with al-Zāhir Ghāzī of 
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Aleppo and several different Seljuk sultans when it was in his interests to do so. However, the 
links between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom went far beyond short-term 
collaboration for political expediency. Intermarriage between the ruling dynasties of these 
two states meant that it was possible for Raymond-Roupen to be recognised as the heir to 
both states and for the prince of Antioch’s son (Philip) to become the king of Cilicia. The 
strategy of King Louis IX of France to improve the relationship between the Latin 
principality and the Armenian kingdom indicates that he considered the latter to be part of 
Christendom. The French king probably recognised that an alliance was in the interests of 
both states and would further the Christian cause in the Near East. 
The kingdom of Cilicia was not a crusader state in the sense that it was not a polity 
formed as a direct result of crusading activity. However, in many respects it was treated as 
though it were part of the Latin East in the thirteenth century. The papacy arguably showed 
just as much interest in the fate of the Armenian kingdom as it did in the affairs of the 
principality of Antioch or the county of Tripoli. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights 
possessed numerous estates and fortresses in Cilicia, just as they did in other Latin states, 
partly because they considered it to be Christian territory which should be defended from the 
Muslims. Furthermore, the Latins who resided in the Near East engaged with the Armenian 
kingdom in ways which they simply did not with other non-Latin powers in the Levant. 
Conclusion 
Overall the ethnic and religious differences between Latins and Armenians had very 
little influence on Antiochene-Cilician relations. When it was politically expedient the ruling 
dynasties of the two states intermarried and made alliances. On the other hand, the fact that 
the Latins of Antioch and Armenians of Cilicia were both Christian does not mean that they 
were always co-operative and friendly neighbours. They fought against each other when their 
political interests diverged. In the thirteenth century Near East men of the same faith would 
fight each other and those of differing religions were prepared to collaborate. Indeed, there 
are many examples of the Latins of the Levant fighting amongst themselves or making 
alliances with Muslim leaders. 
The Antiochene elite were willing to marry Armenians, but not Muslims, so their 
shared faith did have some effect on their behaviour. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that 
anti-Armenian feelings were widespread amongst the Latin population of Antioch. On the 
contrary, the Cilician Armenians were probably perceived as their Christian brethren by most 
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Antiochenes. The opposition to Roupenid attempts to annex the Latin principality in the 
1190s and to Raymond-Roupen during the Antiochene succession dispute was for political 
reasons rather than concerns about the ethnic or religious background of the aggressors. 
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Conclusion 
The relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia was 
fundamentally important for both of them in the period 1188-1268, but particularly for the 
former. In the early twelfth century, the Antiochenes had sought to maintain possession of the 
Cilician plain and incorporate the region into their principality. Slowly but surely more and 
more of the fortresses and settlements in Cilicia fell under Armenian control. The expanding 
Roupenid principality became a significant neighbour of the principality of Antioch, with 
their rulers making alliances and coming into conflict at different points in time. The situation 
was transformed, however, by the territorial losses that Saladin inflicted upon the Latin 
principality in 1188. Thereafter it was a smaller and weaker state that could no longer easily 
assert its superiority over Armenian Cilicia. 
All three of the Latin states in the Levant were seriously weakened by Saladin’s 
forces in 1187-1188. The kingdom of Jerusalem, however, was able to partially recover 
within five years because of the Third Crusade. As a result, by 1192 all the cities along the 
coastline between Tyre and Jaffa were back in Latin hands. The principality of Antioch did 
not benefit from the arrival of crusaders in the Near East during this period. Without external 
help, Bohemond III was unable to reconquer any of the towns and castles he had lost to 
Saladin in 1188. The Antiochene prince may have secured the recovery of Arzghan, but it 
was bestowed upon him by Saladin when he visited the sultan at Beirut in 1192. At the dawn 
of the thirteenth century the Latin principality remained a small rump around Antioch and 
was barely larger than it had been in the autumn of 1188. This was probably largely due to 
the shortage of manpower available to Bohemond III, which meant that he was unable to 
successfully overcome the Ayyubid forces in northern Syria. 
The growing power and aggression of Leon II of the Roupenid principality also 
damaged the prospects of an Antiochene recovery in the 1190s. He captured Bohemond III in 
1193 and imprisoned the prince of Antioch for several months. Bohemond was eventually 
released, but he returned to his principality diminished in authority and possibly in poor 
physical health after being tortured while in captivity. The Antiochene prince was not in a 
position to revive the principality’s fortunes in the late 1190s and the marriage alliance he 
forged with Leon during this period would lead to a conflict which prevented its potential 
reconstruction in the first two decades of the thirteenth century. 
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King Leon I played a crucial role in the succession dispute which engulfed the 
principality of Antioch between 1201 and 1216. Many Latins supported Raymond-Roupen’s 
claim to the territory, but the threat to Bohemond IV’s rule at Antioch would have been 
seriously diminished without the intervention of the Armenian king. The near constant 
pressure exerted on the Latin principality by the Cilician Armenians during those fifteen 
years ensured that Bohemond struggled simply to preserve his grip on Antioch. He was 
prevented from trying to recover some of the fortresses conquered by Saladin. The conflict 
between the de facto prince of Antioch and the king of Cilicia made any expansion of the 
Latin principality almost impossible in the early thirteenth century. Thus Antiochene-Cilician 
relations in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were a significant factor in the 
failure to rebuild the principality of Antioch in the period immediately after 1188. 
This relationship was also amongst the underlying causes of the Latin principality’s 
deterioration and destruction during the 1260s. King Hethoum I of Cilicia recognised Mongol 
suzerainty over his realm in the 1240s and personally submitted to Möngke Khan in the 
1250s. The Armenian king encouraged Bohemond VI to emulate him when the Mongols 
advanced on Syria. By aligning himself with the Mongols in 1260 the prince placed both of 
his states in grave danger, although the consequences of this decision would not have been 
apparent at the time. 
After defeating the Mongols at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260, the 
Mamluks set about extinguishing the Mongol presence in Syria and attacking their principal 
allies in the Near East: King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI. In the following decade 
they invaded the kingdom of Cilicia, the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch. 
The latter was the first to fall because of its size and Bohemond VI’s decision to spend most 
of his time away from Antioch in the 1260s. The Mamluks devastated Cilicia in 1266, but the 
Armenian kingdom was able to recover because Hethoum was devoted to preserving his 
realm, and because the Mamluk army subsequently chose to completely withdraw from the 
region, rather than garrisoning the settlements and strongholds they had sacked. In contrast, 
Sultan Baibars captured and permanently occupied several fortresses in the vicinity of 
Antioch after seizing and destroying the city in 1268. Thus, there was not a strong base from 
which to reconstruct the principality. Furthermore, Bohemond VI was in the county of Tripoli 
when the Mamluks attacked Antioch and he does not appear to have returned to northern 
Syria after the fall of the city. The prince was focused on defending his southern polity rather 
than trying to rebuild his northern principality. 
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Antiochene-Cilician relations undoubtedly played a key role in the downfall of the 
Latin principality. King Leon I’s actions, both before and after his coronation in 1198, made 
it extremely difficult for Bohemond III and Bohemond IV to try and recover the territory 
conquered by Saladin. In 1260 Bohemond VI did regain control of the coastal city of Latakia 
and a handful of fortresses in the Orontes valley. Nevertheless, when the Mamluks sacked the 
city of Antioch in 1268 the principality was small and weak because it had not properly 
recovered from Saladin’s invasion seventy years earlier. The Mamluks attacked the Latin 
principality on several occasions in the 1260s largely because Bohemond VI and the 
Antiochene elite had submitted to the Mongols – a move which was encouraged and 
facilitated by King Hethoum I. The prince of Antioch’s relationship with the king of Cilicia 
may not have been the principal reason for the principality’s destruction in 1268, but it was a 
key factor which should not be ignored. 
Several different elements shaped Antiochene-Cilician relations between 1188 and 
1268. In the 1190s and the first two decades of  the thirteenth century, the commune of 
Antioch was an influential body which supported Bohemond IV’s claim to the Latin 
principality. If this institution had sided with Raymond-Roupen after Bohemond III’s death 
then the Tripolitan count would have struggled and probably failed to gain control of Antioch 
in 1201. The Antiochene succession dispute would not have evolved into a prolonged conflict 
if Bohemond IV had been unable to take power at that point. Raymond-Roupen’s investiture 
as prince in 1201 would have prevented conflict between some Antiochenes and the Cilician 
Armenians, and could have led to a much closer relationship between the Latin principality 
and the Armenian kingdom. The commune’s decision to back Bohemond IV as the prince of 
Antioch had major implications for the future of their state and Antiochene-Cilicians 
relations. 
The actions of some Antiochene nobles during the succession dispute show a different 
side to the relationship. Several Latins chose to serve under the king of Cilicia while he was 
at war with the de facto prince of Antioch because they supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim 
to the principality. Thus, conflict between the rulers of the two states did not prevent 
members of their elite from developing close ties. The Antiochene nobles who backed 
Raymond-Roupen helped to ensure a relatively smooth transition of power following his 
investiture as prince, and some of them also facilitated the Cilician Armenian capture of 
Antioch in 1216 by opening the gates of the city during the night. However, contemporary 
narrative histories hardly mention the Antiochene nobility after the conclusion of the 
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succession dispute in 1219 in so it is difficult to fully assess their influence upon the 
principality. 
In the early thirteenth century, the Cilician nobility had a significant impact on the 
future of their kingdom and its relationship with the principality of Antioch. They persuaded 
King Leon I to designate his daughter Isabel as his heir in 1216, thereby disinheriting 
Raymond-Roupen, who had been in line to succeed his great-uncle as king of Cilicia. This 
probably angered the young prince and may help to explain why there appears to have been 
very little co-operation between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom during his 
brief tenure at Antioch. The barons of Cilicia were particularly influential between Leon’s 
death in 1219 and the accession of King Hethoum I in 1226. They forged an alliance with the 
principality of Antioch by marrying Isabel to Bohemond IV’s son, Philip. Constantine the 
constable then led a baronial revolt against their new king just a few years after his 
coronation and succeeded in overthrowing Philip. The restoration of a strong and 
authoritative monarchy in Cilicia under Hethoum appears to have reduced the influence of 
the Armenian kingdom’s nobility, but he would have been aware that his own position could 
come under threat if he upset too many of his barons. By ousting Philip from power the 
Cilician nobility damaged their realm’s relationship with the principality of Antioch for two 
decades as Bohemond IV and Bohemond V were reluctant to ally or co-operate with the 
Armenian kingdom, even if there was little conflict between the two states after 1226. 
The military orders also exercised a limited influence on Antiochene-Cilician 
relations in the early thirteenth century. The Templars were uniquely positioned by 
possessing a number of castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains. Their presence on the 
frontier between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom benefitted Bohemond IV 
during the Antiochene succession dispute, but was less significant for his successors. The 
Order of the Temple aided the count of Tripoli during the conflict primarily by helping him to 
defend the city of Antioch, but also by resisting Leon’s forces in the Amanus. Thus, the 
Templars helped to extend the Antiochene succession dispute, although they could not 
prevent the eventual triumph of the Cilician Armenians and the investiture of Raymond-
Roupen. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights supported Leon and his great-nephew in 
the quarrel, but there is no evidence that they contributed much in the military aspects of it. 
Both of these orders struggled to translate their extensive possessions in Cilicia into real 
influence in the political affairs of the Armenian kingdom, particularly after King Hethoum I 
took power. The Templars were pivotal in averting a resumption of hostilities between the 
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two states in the 1230s when they belatedly withdrew their support for Bohemond V’s 
planned invasion of Cilicia, but in the final three decades of the Latin principality’s existence 
none of the military orders appear to have had much impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations. 
The fact that the prince of Antioch was also the count of Tripoli for all but three years 
between 1201 and 1268 almost certainly had some effect on Latin principality’s relationship 
with the Armenian kingdom, but it is difficult to fully appreciate the implications of its 
impact without resorting to speculation on how things might have been different. Bohemond 
IV and his successors were often away from Antioch in order to oversee the governance of 
the county of Tripoli. These absences probably made it easier for the Cilician Armenians to 
capture Antioch in 1216 and install Raymond-Roupen as prince, although this may still have 
happened even if Bohemond IV had remained in the principality throughout the whole 
conflict. If Bohemond V spent most of his time in the county of Tripoli then it would help to 
explain the apparent lack of engagement between the Latin principality and the Armenian 
kingdom, either in terms of violence or co-operation, during the 1230s and most of the 1240s. 
Furthermore, Bohemond VI’s absence from his northern territory for most, if not all, of the 
1260s is probably one of the reasons why there was relatively little collaboration between the 
Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians against the Mamluks. 
The behaviour of non-Christian powers in southern Anatolia and northern Syria had a 
significant influence on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom 
of Cilicia throughout the whole period 1188-1268. The interventions of the Aleppans and the 
Seljuks prolonged the Antiochene succession dispute. After the conclusion of that conflict, 
Seljuk attacks on Cilicia encouraged the Armenian kingdom to make a marriage alliance with 
the Latin principality in the 1220s. That there was no collaboration or warfare between the 
two states in the 1230s and 1240s to some extent reflects the general state of peace in 
northern Syria and southern Anatolia prior to the arrival of the Mongols. The alliance 
between King Hethoum I and Bohemond VI during the 1250s and 1260s was entered into 
largely because of the uncertainty created by the Mongol advance into the Near East, and it 
was maintained partly in order to try and resist the Mamluks. Sultan Baibars and his army 
also effectively destroyed the principality of Antioch, which left the kingdom of Cilicia as the 
only Christian state in the northern Levant. 
The ethnic differences between the Latins of Antioch the Armenians of Cilicia do not 
appear to have affected Antiochene-Cilician relations. Their common religious identity, on 
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the other hand, did influence their relationship in a variety of ways. Pope Innocent III 
remained officially neutral during the Antiochene succession dispute, while the Hospitallers 
and Teutonic Knights supported Raymond-Roupen. In reality, this meant that two military 
orders chose to give their backing to King Leon I, considering Raymond-Roupen was a child 
for most of the conflict. They would almost certainly not have adopted this position if the 
Armenian king was not a Christian. The shared religion of Latins and Armenians also 
allowed the ruling dynasties of Antioch and Cilicia to intermarry. No Antiochene prince 
would ever have married a Muslim so faith was clearly an important influence on the 
relationship, even though the two sides practiced different forms of Christianity. 
Nevertheless, warfare did occur between the Antiochenes and Cilician Armenians, just as 
there was occasionally conflict between Latins in the Near East. Clearly, a shared faith did 
not lead to a consistently friendly and co-operative relationship between the Latin principality 
and the Armenian kingdom. 
The relationship between the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch after 
1187 is an interesting subject which merits further study. Sharing a ruler for more than sixty 
years must have had an impact on both states. However, the Latin principality’s most 
important relationship with a polity governed by a different ruler was undoubtedly with the 
kingdom of Cilicia. It encompassed several wars, marriages and alliances. There appears to 
have been a lull in the interaction between the two states during the 1230s and 1240s, 
although this may simply reflect the paucity of the primary source material. However, it is 
clear that the Armenian kingdom severely hindered any prospect of rebuilding the 
principality of Antioch in the four decades after it was devastated by Saladin in 1188. All 
attempts to unify the two states during this period ended in violence. A long-term alliance 
between them was finally established in the 1250s, but this ultimately led to the Latin 
principality’s destruction as Bohemond VI antagonised the Mamluks by replicating his 
father-in-law’s decision to align with the Mongols. The significance of the relationship 
between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia should not be underestimated 
as it had a major impact on both. These polities did not exist in isolation, however, and their 
relations were shaped particularly by the geopolitics of the region in which they existed. The 
Armenian kingdom survived for another century after the fall of Antioch in 1268, and it 
continued to interact with the Latin states of the eastern Mediterranean. However, the absence 
of a Christian principality on its southern frontier ensured that its foreign policy during this 
period was very different to what it had been before. 
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Appendix A: List of Princely Charter Witnesses, 1188-1268 
Name Date of Charters Witnessed 
Acharie, seneschal of Antioch 1215, 1216 
Aimery, bishop of Tripoli 1199 
Aimery de Lairon 1219 
Aimery Saleman 1228, 1241, 1243 
Amalric of the Cross 1216, 1219 
Americus de Rodanos 1216 
Anfredus of Margat 1216, 1219 
Angel Peter 1255 
Aubrey de Ranquerole 1228 
Baldwin de Maimendon 1215, 1216 
Baldwin of the Mount of Olives 1256 
Bartholomew de Jaune 1215 
Bartholomew Saxius 1203 
Bartholomew Tirel (1), marshal of Antioch 1190 
Bartholomew Tirel (2), marshal of Antioch 1262 
Bertrand of Jubayl (de Biblio) 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206 
Bertrand Porcelet 1228, 1236 
Bertrand de Taisio 1203 
Bohemond Arra 1262 
Bohemond, lord of Batroun 1228, 1231, 1233, 1241 
Bonacors 1228 
Eschivard, brother of Acharie the seneschal 1215, 1216 
Gerard de Ham, constable of Tripoli 1203, 1204, 1205, 1209 
Gervase of Sarmenya, seneschal of Antioch 1189, 1190, 1193, 1194, 1199 
Guace de Ranis 1236 
Guy, lord of Jubayl (de Biblio) 1203, 1209, 1233 
Helyas the Monk 1205 
Henry, brother of Bohemond V 1233, 1236, 1256, 1262 
Henry of Camardias 1241, 1255, 1256 
Henry, lord of Jubayl (de Gibelet) 1262 
Hugh de Curbulio, dux of Antioch 1190, 1193, 1200, 1205 
Hugh Dalmas 1228 
Hugh Fermin 1233, 1236 
Hugh de Flauncurt, marshal of Antioch 1193, 1194, 1200 
Hugh of Jubayl (de Biblio) 1203 
Hugh de Logiis 1190 
Homodei 1203 
James de Marasio 1200 
John of Angerville, baillie of Antioch 1262 
John Arra 1233, 1236 
John, brother of Oliver the Chamberlain 1190 
John de Farabel, lord of Puy 1236, 1241, 1243, 1255, 1256 
John of Flanders, dux of Antioch 1216 
John de Flauncurt 1255, 1256 
John de Hazart 1262 
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John of Jubayl (de Gibelet) 1241 
John Lombard 1262 
John, lord of Maraclea 1233 
John, marshal of Tripoli 1241, 1243, 1255, 1256 
John Pascalis; Saxus de Tripoli 1189, 1199 
John Peter 1255, 1256, 1262 
John de Rancheroles 1203, 1205 
John de Salquino 1193, 1200 
John Saxius 1203 
Julian Jalnus 1193, 1194, 1216 
Mansel de Busarra 1203, 1204, 1205 
Mansel de Gibel 1228 
Meillor, lord of Maraclea 1255, 1256, 1262 
Milo de Colovardino 1189, 1193, 1199 
Nicholas Farmac 1243 
Nicholas Jalnus, dux of Antioch 1194, 1200 
Nicholas Lualn 1210 
Oddo de Maire 1190, 1200 
Oliver, chamberlain of Antioch 1190 
Otto of Tiberias 1210, 1215, 1216 
Pascal de Gibeau 1241 
Pascal de Seona 1193, 1200 
Paganus, butler of Antioch 1210 
Peter de la Gibroille 1255, 1262 
Peter de Hazart (1) 1190, 1193, 1194 
Peter de Hazart (2), seneschal of Antioch 1262 
Peter de Logiis 1190 
Peter de Ravandell 1189, 1199, 1200 
Peter de Scandalione 1228, 1236 
Philip Tirel 1194 
Plebanus, lord of Batroun 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1209 
Pontius of Lombardy 1215, 1216 
Ralph of the Mountains, constable of Antioch 1190 
Ralph de Riveria, castellan of Antioch 1190, 1193, 1200 
Raymond Arra 1228, 1255 
Raymond of Jubayl (de Biblio) 1203, 1204, 1205, 1209 
Raymond of Maraclea 1228 
Raymond de Scandalione 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1209 
Renaud Faisant 1228 
Richard of Angerville 1193, 1194, 1200 
Richier d’Erminat 1190, 1193, 1194, 1200 
Robert Mansel, constable of Antioch 1207, 1210, 1216, 1219 
Robert Tali 1210 
Roger of the Mountains, constable of Antioch 1194, 1200, 1216 
Roger de Seona 1194 
Saisius 1203 
Simon Burgevin, chamberlain of Antioch 1193, 1194, 1215, 1216 
Simon Mansel, constable of Antioch 1262 
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Socherus de Cozires 1216 
Stephen Alexander 1203 
Thomas Arra 1241, 1255, 1256 
Thomas de Ham, constable of Tripoli 1233, 1236, 1241, 1243 
Thomas Maslebrun 1215, 1216 
Thomas, marshal of Antioch 1200, 1215, 1216, 1231 
Thomas Saxius 1203 
William, lord of Batroun 1255, 1256, 1262 
William de Flechia, dux of Antioch 1219 
William de Hazart 1215, 1216, 1219 
William of the Island 1200, 1210, 1215, 1216, 1228 
William of Jubayl (de Biblio) 1203, 1204, 1205, 1209 
Walter of Laitor 1215 
William de Moinetre 1236 
William of Saint Paul, dux of Antioch 1190 
William, viscount of Tripoli 1236, 1241 
 
N.B. Where charters simply list the names of witnesses, all names have been included. Where 
charters categorise the witnesses into different groups, only those described as the vassals of 
the prince or the barons of Antioch have been included. Charter witnesses categorised 
differently (e.g. as brothers of the Hospital) have been excluded. 
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Appendix B: Charters of the Princes of Antioch, 1188-1268 
Date and 
Location 
Summary of Agreement References 
April 
1189 
Tyre 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, grants 
freedom from murder and theft, but not 
treason, to the Genoese. 
RRH, 1, No. 680, pp. 181-182. 
7th March 
1190 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, gives the 
church of Saint Theodore and a street in 
Antioch to the Hospitallers. 
CDSMOG, No. 210, p. 251; 
CGOH, 1, No. 906, pp. 574-575; 
RRH, 1, No. 689, p. 183. 
1st September 
1190 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, grants free 
trade in the cities of Antioch, Latakia and 
Jabala to the Genoese. 
LIRG, 1, Col. 364, No. 379; 
RRH, 1, No. 695, p. 185. 
September 
1193 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, confirms 
that 500 eels will be given to the 
Hospitallers every year. 
CDSMOG, No. 80, p. 86; 
CGOH, 1, No. 948, p. 600; 
RRH, 1, No. 714, p. 191. 
September 
1194 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, confirms 
the donation of old uncultivated land to the 
Hospitallers by Godfrey the knight. 
CGOH, 1, No. 966, p. 613; 
RRH, 1, No. 719, p. 192. 
April 
1199 
Tyre 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, 
strengthens the privileges which the 
Genoese enjoy in the cities of Antioch, 
Latakia, and Jabala. 
LIRG, 1, Cols 432-433, No. 424; 
RRH, 1, No. 753, p. 200. 
20th March 
1200 
Antioch 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, confirms 
the requests of the Pisans. 
DCT, No. 50, pp. 80-81; 
RRH, 1, No. 769, p. 205. 
June 
1200 
Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, grants free 
trade in the entire principality of Antioch to 
the Teutonic Knights. 
RRH, 1, No. 772, p. 206. 
December 
1203 
Antioch 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, grants various privileges in the 
county of Tripoli to the Genoese. 
RRH, 1, No. 792, pp. 210-211. 
December 
1204 
Tripoli 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, grants an annual payment of 
1,000 bezants and houses which the count of 
Tripoli previously held in Latakia to Guy for 
his marriage to Bohemond’s sister Alice. 
CDSMOG, No. 98, p. 103; 
RRH, 1, No. 799, p. 213. 
July 
1205 
Tripoli 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms the rights and privileges 
which the Genoese hold in the county of 
Tripoli and the principality of Antioch. 
LIRG, 1, Cols 522-523, No. 477; 
RRH, 1, No. 807, pp. 215-216. 
1206 Geoffrey le Rat, master of the Hospital, 
confirms that he has received the land in 
front of Befania from Bohemond IV, but 
agrees to return it if the heir to the land, 
William Porcelet, refuses to consent to the 
grant when he reaches the age of majority. 
CDSMOG, No. 175, pp. 217-218; 
CGOH, 2, No. 1231, p. 56; 
RRH, 1, No. 816, p. 218. 
17th March / 
22nd May 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, gives 
the city of Jabala to the Hospitallers. 
CCRR, No. 11, pp. 130-131; 
CDSMOG, No. 91, pp. 95-96; 
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1207 CGOH, 2, No. 1262, pp. 70-71; 
RRH, 1, No. 820, p. 220. 
4th September 
1209 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, grants land and three towers 
below the fortress of Tripoli to the Teutonic 
Knights. 
RRH, 1, No. 839, p. 224; 
TOT, No. 44, pp. 35-36. 
September 
1210 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, gives 
the city of Jabala and the castle of Bikisrail 
to the Hospitallers. 
CCRR, No. 12, pp. 132-133; 
CDSMOG, No. 95, pp. 99-100; 
CGOH, 2, No. 1355, pp. 122-123; 
RRH, 1, No. 845, p. 226. 
31st March / 
1st April 
1215 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, 
confirms all the privileges which he and his 
predecessors have granted to the 
Hospitallers in the principality of Antioch. 
CCRR, No. 13, pp. 133-134; 
CDSMOG, No. 101, pp. 106-107; 
CGOH, 2, No. 1441, p. 175; 
RRH, 1, No. 877, pp. 236-237. 
31st March / 
1st April 
1215 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, 
confirms that he has granted Jabala and 
Bikisrail to the Hospitallers. 
CCRR, No. 14, pp. 135-136; 
CDSMOG, No. 102, p. 107; 
CGOH, 2, No. 1442, p. 176; 
RRH, 1, No. 878, p. 237. 
February 
1216 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, grants 
security and an independent court in the 
principality of Antioch to the Genoese. 
CCRR, No. 15, pp. 136-137; 
LIRG, 1, Cols 577-578, No. 516; 
RRH, 1, No. 885, p. 238. 
7th April 
1216 
Antioch 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, 
confirms the privileges of the Pisans in the 
principality of Antioch. 
CCRR, No. 16, pp. 138-139; 
DCT, No. 58, pp. 90-91; 
RRH, 1, No. 886, pp. 238-239. 
1st September 
1216 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, 
confirms that the brothers of the Order of 
Saint Lazarus will receive 1,000 eels from 
the city of Antioch in the month of 
September. 
AOL, 2, No. 32, pp. 149-150; 
RRH, 1, No. 888, p. 239. 
March 
1219 
Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, grants 
free trade in the entire principality of 
Antioch to the Teutonic Knights. 
RRH, 1, No. 921, p. 245; 
TOT, No. 51, pp. 41-42. 
January 
1228 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, grants a mill near Antioch, with 
an adjacent vineyard and other 
appurtenances, to the Teutonic Knights. 
RRH, 1, No. 979, p. 257; 
TOT, No. 61, p. 50. 
June 
1228 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, gives the Teutonic Knights an 
annual payment of 1,000 bezants, to be 
received from the Chaine and Fonde of 
Acre. 
RRH, 1, No. 989, p. 261; 
TOT, No. 64, p. 53. 
27th October 
1231 
Acre 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms the gift and sale of 
uncultivated land at Cellorie to the 
Hospitallers by John Nicephore, his liege 
man. 
CGOH, 2, No. 2003, pp. 429-430; 
RRH, 1, No. 1031, p. 269. 
27th October 
1231 
Acre 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, gives an annuity of 873 bezants 
to the Hospitallers from his revenues at 
Antioch. 
CGOH, 2, No. 2001, p. 428; 
RRH, 1, No. 1032, pp. 269-270. 
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27th October 
1231 
Acre 
Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, grants an annual payment of 316 
bezants to the Hospitallers from his revenues 
at Tripoli. 
CGOH, 2, No. 2002, pp. 428-429; 
RRH, 1, No. 1033, p. 270. 
March 
1233 
Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms the privileges of the 
Pisans in the city of Tripoli. 
DCT, No. 68, p. 99; 
RRH, 1, No. 1041, p. 272. 
March 
1233 
Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms the privileges of the 
Pisans in the principality of Antioch and the 
county of Tripoli. 
DCT, No. 69, pp. 99-100; 
RRH, 1, No. 1042, p. 272. 
January 
1236 
Tripoli 
Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms Bertrand Porcelet’s sale 
of the village of Arabiam to the Teutonic 
Knights. 
RRH, 1, No. 1068, pp. 278-279; 
TOT, No. 82, pp. 64-65. 
18th November 
1241 
Tripoli 
Albert, patriarch of Antioch and papal 
legate, confirms an agreement between 
Bohemond V and the Hospitallers. The 
Hospitallers renounce all their rights to 
Maraclea and Cameli, and in return they will 
receive an annual payment of 1,300 bezants 
from Bohemond. 
CDSMOG, No. 118, pp. 129-133; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2280, pp. 594-596; 
RRH, 1, No. 1102, pp. 286-287. 
February 
1243 
Tripoli 
Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, grants various privileges in the 
principality of Antioch and the county of 
Tripoli to the citizens of Montpellier. 
RRH, 1, No. 1110, p. 288. 
March 
1255 
Tripoli 
Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, gives the Hospitallers a canal so 
they can water their garden called Gloriette, 
which is situated by the gate of their house 
in Tripoli, and one tenth of the fish caught in 
the canal. 
CDSMOG, No. 126, pp. 147-148; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2801, pp. 807-808; 
RRH, 1, No. 1229, pp. 323-324. 
April 
1256 
Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms that he has made peace 
with the Hospitallers and he renounces all 
complaints made against them by himself 
and his predecessors. 
CDSMOG, No. 129, pp. 153-154; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2807, pp. 812-813; 
RRH, 1, No. 1248, p. 328. 
21st April 
1259 
Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, confirms firstly, that he has made 
peace with the Hospitallers; secondly, that 
he will return lands and villages taken from 
the Hospitallers; thirdly, that he will give the 
Hospitallers 2,000 eels every year; fourthly, 
that arbitrators will be appointed to decide 
the rights of the Hospital at Antioch; and 
fifthly, that the Hospitallers are free to buy 
and sell in the principality of Antioch and 
the county of Tripoli. 
CGOH, 2, No. 2917, p. 868; 
RRH, 1, No. 1284, p. 335. 
1st May 
1262 
Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count 
of Tripoli, and Hugh Revel, master of the 
CDSMOG, No. 221, pp. 262-263; 
CGOH, 3, No. 3020, pp. 27-28; 
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Tripoli Hospital, confirm that they accept the 
verdict of the three arbiters appointed to 
resolve the quarrel between them. 
RRH, 1, No. 1317, p. 344. 
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Appendix C: List of Cilician Nobles present at Leon’s Coronation, 
1198 
Name Lordship(s) 
Adam Baghras (Bakras) 
Hostius (Otto of Tiberias) Čker/Giguer 
Arewgoyn Hamus (Çardak) 
Sempad Servantikar (Savranda) 
Leon Harunia (Haruniye) 
Siruhi Simanagla 
Henry Anē 
Aplgharip the constable Kutaf 
Baldwin Ǝnkuzut 
Stephen T‘ornika 
Leon and Gregory Pertous 
Ashot Kanč‘/Gantchi (Fındıklı) 
Aplgharip Fornos (Fırnıs) 
Tancred Gaban (Geben) 
Constantine Čanči 
Geoffrey Shoghakan 
Simon Mazotxač‘ 
Robert (of Margat) T‘il Hamdoun (Toprak) 
Thoros T‘lsap 
Vasil the marshal Vaner 
George Partzerpert (Tamrut) 
Constantine Kopitar (Meydan) 
Azharos Mōlovon (Milvan) 
Sempad Kuklak (Gülek) 
Hethoum Lampron (Namrun) 
Shahinshah Loulon 
Bakuran Babaron (Çandır) 
Vasak Askuras 
Hethoum Manash 
Michael Berdak 
Tigran Bragana 
Oshin Siwil 
Simon Korykos (Kızkalesi) 
Constantine Silifke and Punar 
Romanos Sinit and Kovas 
Nicephorus Vēt and Vērəsk (Fariske) 
Christopher Lavzat and Timitupolis 
Halkam Manion (Mennan), Lamos (Esentepe), 
Žermanik (Ermenek) and Anamur 
Henry the sebastos Norpert and Camardias 
Baldwin Antchouzeda (Endişegüney) and Kupa 
Kyr Isaac Maghva and Sik (Softa) and Palapol 
Michael Manavgat and Alara 
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Constantine and Nicephorus Lakrawēn 
Kyr Vard Kalonoras (Alanya) and Ayžutap (Aydap), 
Saint Sophie and Nallawn 
 
N.B. This list is taken from Dédéyan’s French translation of the Venice manuscript of the 
chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable (Smbat, pp. 75-80), although in many cases I 
have used different spellings. The Etchmiadzin version of the chronicle contains a shorter list 
(SC, pp. 636-638), which omits some of the nobles mentioned here but includes others that 
are missing from the Venice manuscript (Simon of Amouda, Joscelin of Sinida, Roman of 
Adaros). Where the ruins of medieval castles or settlements have been identified, their 
modern Turkish name is given in brackets if it is different to the name I have used. 
Throughout my thesis I have used the Turkish name ‘Silifke’ rather than the ancient Greek 
name ‘Seleucia’ so there is no need to use brackets in this case. 
 
195 
 
Appendix D: The Location of the Counts of Tripoli, 1201-1268 
Date Count Location Sources 
1201 
 
Bohemond IV Antioch ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 259; 
Eracles, p. 313; Ernoul, p. 321; 
GC, p. 663. 
December 1203 
 
Bohemond IV Antioch RRH, 1, No. 792, pp. 210-211. 
December 1204 
 
Bohemond IV Tripoli CDSMOG, No. 98, p. 103; 
RRH, 1, No. 799, p. 213. 
July 1205 
 
Bohemond IV Tripoli LIRG, Cols 522-523, No. 477; 
RRH, 1, No. 807, pp. 215-216. 
1207/1208 
 
Bohemond IV Antioch ATS, p. 436; Eracles, pp. 313-314; 
GC, p. 664; HII, p. 481; 
PL, 215, Col. 1322, No. 214; 
Reg. Inn. III, 10, No. 214, p. 383; 
Smbat, pp. 84-85. 
September 1210 
 
Bohemond IV Tripoli Eracles, p. 316. 
1214 
 
Bohemond IV Tripoli 
(implied) 
KD, 5, pp. 48-49. 
February 1216 
 
Bohemond IV Tripoli Eracles, p. 318. 
January 1218 
 
Bohemond IV Tripoli Eracles, p. 325; 
Jacques de Vitry, Lettres de 
Jacques de Vitry, ed. R.B.C. 
Huygens (Leiden, 1960), p. 99. 
1219 
 
Bohemond IV Antioch ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 318; 
GC, p. 665; HII, p. 484; 
OP, p. 235. 
c.1222 
 
Bohemond IV Antioch Smbat, p. 96; KG, p. 428; 
VA, p. 213. 
1226 
 
Bohemond IV Antioch 
(implied) 
BH, 1, p. 381; 
IA, 3, pp. 279-280. 
1228 
 
Bohemond IV Cyprus 
followed by 
Nephin 
GC, p. 682. 
April 1229 
 
Bohemond IV Acre RRH, 1, No. 1003, pp. 263-264; 
TOT, No. 66, p. 54. 
October 1231 Bohemond IV Acre CGOH, 2, No. 2003, pp. 429-430; 
RRH, 1, No. 1031, p. 269; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2001, p. 428;        
RRH, 1, No. 1032, pp. 269-270; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2002, pp. 428-429; 
RRH, 1, No. 1033, p. 270. 
c.1234 
 
Bohemond V Antioch 
(implied) 
Eracles, pp. 405-406. 
January 1236 
 
Bohemond V Tripoli RRH, 1, No. 1068, pp. 278-279; 
TOT, No. 82, pp. 64-65. 
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September 1239 
 
Bohemond V Tripoli Eracles, pp. 415-416; 
GC, pp. 726-727; 
Rothelin, pp. 551-552. 
November 1241 
 
Bohemond V Tripoli CDSMOG, No. 118, pp. 129-133; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2280, pp. 594-596; 
RRH, 1, No. 1102, pp. 286-287. 
February 1243 
 
Bohemond V Tripoli RRH, 1, No. 1110, p. 288. 
1252 
 
Bohemond VI Jaffa ATS, p. 445; Eracles, p. 440; 
JJ, pp. 258-259. 
1252 Bohemond VI Antioch JJ, pp. 258-261. 
 
March 1255 
 
Bohemond VI Tripoli CDSMOG, No. 126, pp. 147-148; 
CGOH, 2, No. 2801, pp. 807-808; 
RRH, 1, No. 1229, pp. 323-324. 
November 1256 
 
Bohemond VI Mamistra Smbat, p. 100. 
1258 
 
Bohemond VI Acre and 
Tripoli 
ATS, pp. 447-448; Eracles, p. 443; 
GC, pp. 743-745. 
1258 Bohemond VI Tripoli GC, pp. 748-749. 
 
1259 
 
Bohemond VI Tripoli Smbat, p. 103. 
March 1260 
 
Bohemond VI Damascus GC, p. 751. 
1260 Bohemond VI Antioch 
(implied) and 
Latakia 
DSN, p. 45; IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647; 
IF, p. 50. 
May 1262 
 
Bohemond VI Tripoli CDSMOG, No. 221, pp. 262-263; 
CGOH, 3, No. 3020, pp. 27-28; 
RRH, 1, No. 1317, p. 344. 
1264 
 
Bohemond VI Azerbaijan VA, p. 220. 
November 1265 
 
Bohemond VI Tripoli 
(implied) 
IAZ, 2, p. 576. 
April and May 1268 
 
Bohemond VI Tripoli IAZ, 2, pp. 647, 658-663. 
 
197 
 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
Abū Shāma, ‘Le Livre des Deux Jardins : Histoire des Deux Règnes, Celui de Nour ed-Din et 
Celui de Salah ed-Din’, RHC Ori V, pp. 1-206. 
Acta Innocentii PP. III (1198-1216), ed. P.T. Haluščynskyj (Vatican City, 1944). 
‘Annales de Terre Sainte’, ed. R. Röhricht and G. Raynaud, AOL, 2 (1884), documents, pp. 
427-461. 
 ‘Annales monasterii Burtonensis’, in H.R. Luard (ed.), Annales Monastici, RS 36, 5 vols 
(London, 1864-1869), 1, pp. 183-500. 
Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 Pertinens, trans. A. Abouna, introduction, notes 
and index J.-M. Fiey, vol. 2 (Leuven, 1974). 
Assises d'Antioche, ed. and trans. L.M. Alishan (Venice, 1876). 
Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, trans. D.S. Richards 
(Aldershot, 2002). 
Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of Gregory Abû’l Faraj…commonly known as Bar 
Hebraeus, ed. and trans. E.A. Wallis Budge, 2 vols (Oxford, 1932). 
Caffaro, Genoa and the Twelfth-Century Crusades, trans. M. Hall and J. Phillips (Farnham, 
2013). 
Cartulaire Général de l’Ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem: 1100-1310, ed. J. 
Delaville Le Roulx, 4 vols (Paris, 1894-1906). 
Chartes de Terre Sainte provenant de l’abbaye de Josaphat, ed. H.F. Delaborde (Paris, 
1880). 
‘Chronicon Magni Presbiteri’, ed. W. Wattenbach, MGH SS 17 (Hanover, 1861), pp. 476-
523. 
La Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871). 
Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova, ed. C. Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, 3 vols 
(Rome, 1936-1942). 
Codice diplomatico del sacro militare ordine Gerosolimitano oggi di Malta, ed. S. Pauli, vol. 
1 (Lucca, 1733). 
La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr 1184-1197, ed. M.R. Morgan (Paris, 1982). 
198 
 
‘Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin’, RHC 
Occ II, pp. 483-639. 
Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall 
of Acre, 1187-1291, ed. and trans. J. Bird, E. Peters and J.M. Powell (Philadelphia, PA, 
2013). 
The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor 
Frederick and Related Texts, trans. G.A. Loud (Farnham, 2010). 
Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of the History of 
William of Tyre with part of the Eracles or Acre text, trans. J. Shirley (Aldershot, 1999). 
Documenti sulle relazioni delle citta Toscane coll’Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi, ed. G. 
Müller (Florence, 1879). 
‘L’Estoire de Eracles Empereur et la Conqueste de la Terre d’Outremer’, RHC Occ II, pp. 1-
481. 
Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913). 
Fulcher of Chartres, A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, trans. F.R. Ryan, introduction, 
notes and index H.S. Fink (Knoxville, 1969). 
‘Les Gestes des Chiprois’, RHC Arm II, pp. 651-872. 
Gregory of Akner, ‘History of the Nation of the Archers (The Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc’, 
ed. and trans. R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye, Havard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 12 (1949), pp. 
269-399. 
Hayton, ‘La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d’Orient’, RHC Arm II, pp. 111-253. 
Hethoum II, ‘Table Chronologique de Héthoum, Comte de Gorigos’, RHC Arm I, pp. 469-
490. 
‘Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris’, ed. A. Chroust, MGH SRG NS 5 (Berlin, 
1928), pp. 1-115. 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, A critical edition of an unknown Arabic source for the life of al-Malik al-
Zāhir Baibars, ed. and trans. A.A. al-Khowayter, 3 vols (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
S.O.A.S., University of London, 1960). 
Ibn al-Athīr, The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kāmil fī’l-
ta’rīkh, trans. D.S. Richards, 3 vols (Aldershot, 2005-2008). 
Ibn Bībī, Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bībī, trans. H.W. Duda (Copenhagen, 1959). 
Ibn al-Furāt, Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa’l-
Mulūk, ed. and trans. U. Lyons and M.C. Lyons, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1971). 
199 
 
‘Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin, trans. H. Massé 
(Paris, 1972). 
‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, Description de la Syrie du Nord, trans. A.-M. Eddé-Terrasse 
(Damascus, 1984). 
Jacques de Vitry, Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960). 
Jean de Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, ed. and trans. J. Monfrin (Paris, 1995). 
Kamāl al-Dīn, ‘L’Histoire d’Alep de Kamal-ad-Dîn’, trans. E. Blochet, ROL, 3 (1895), pp. 
509-565; 4 (1896), pp. 145-225; 5 (1897), pp. 37-107; 6 (1898), pp. 1-49. 
Kirakos of Ganjak, ‘Extrait de l’Histoire d’Arménie de Guiragos de Kantzag’, RHC Arm I, 
pp. 411-430. 
Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th Centuries, trans. M. 
Barber and K. Bate (Farnham, 2010). 
‘Lettre des Chrétiens de Terre-Sainte à Charles d’Anjou’, ed. H.F. Delaborde, ROL, 2, pp. 
206-215. 
Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis, ed. E. Ricotti, Historiae Patriae Monumenta, 2 vols 
(Turin, 1854-1857). 
Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. H.R. Luard, RS 57, 7 vols (London, 1872-1884). 
Mekhitar of Dashir, ‘Relation de la Conférence Tenue Entre le Docteur Mekhithar de 
Daschir, Envoyé du Catholicos Constantine I, et le Légat du Pape’, RHC Arm I, pp. 689-698. 
Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michel le Syrien, patriarche jacobite d’Antioche, ed. and 
trans. J.-B. Chabot, 4 vols (Paris, 1899-1910). 
Michael the Syrian, ‘Extrait de la Chronique de Michel le Syrien’, RHC Arm I, pp. 309-409. 
Oliver of Paderborn, ‘Historia Damiatina’, in H. Hoogeweg (ed.), Die Schriften des Kölner 
Domscholasters, Späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal-Bischofs von S. Sabina: 
Oliverus (Tübingen, 1894), pp. 159-280. 
Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols (Paris, 1844-1864). 
Pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the Holy Land, 1187-1291, trans. D. Pringle (Farnham, 2012). 
Regesta Honorii Papae III, ed. P. Pressutti, 2 vols (Rome, 1888-1895). 
Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, ed. R. Röhricht, 2 vols (Innsbruck, 1893-1904). 
Die Register Innocenz’ III, ed. O. Hageneder et al., 12 vols (Cologne, Graz, Rome, Vienna, 
1964-2012). 
Les Registres d’Alexandre IV, ed. C. Bourel de la Roncière, 3 vols (Paris, 1895-1953). 
200 
 
Les Registres de Grégoire IX, ed. L. Auvray, 3 vols (Paris, 1896-1910). 
Les Registres d’Innocent IV, ed. É. Berger, 4 vols (Paris, 1884-1921). 
Samuel of Ani, ‘Extrait de la Chronographie de Samuel d’Ani’, RHC Arm I, pp. 445-468. 
Sempad the Constable, La Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat, trans. G. Dédéyan 
(Paris, 1980). 
Sempad the Constable, ‘Chronique du Royaume de la Petite Arménie, par le Connétable 
Sempad’, RHC Arm I, pp. 605-680. 
The Seventh Crusade 1244-1254: Sources and Documents, trans. P. Jackson (Aldershot, 
2007). 
Spicilegium sive Collectio Veterum Aliquot Scriptorum qui in Galliae Bibliothecis 
Delituerant, ed. L. d’Achery, new edn by S. Baluze and L.F.J. de la Barre, 3 vols (Paris, 
1723). 
Tabulae Ordinis Theutonici, ed. E. Strehlke (Berlin, 1869). 
The Templar of Tyre: Part III of the Deeds of the Cypriots, trans. P. Crawford (Aldershot, 
2003). 
Le Trésor des Chartes d’Arménie ou Cartulaire de la Chancellerie Royale des Roupéniens, 
ed. V. Langlois (Venice, 1863). 
Urkunden Zur Älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, ed. G.L.F. Tafel 
and G.M. Thomas, 3 vols (Vienna, 1856-1857). 
Vahram of Edessa, ‘Chronique Rimée des Rois de la Petite Arménie, par le Docteur Vahram 
d’Édesse’, RHC Arm I, pp. 491-535. 
Vardan the Great, ‘The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelc’i’, trans. R.W. Thomson, 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 43 (1989), pp. 125-226. 
Walter the Chancellor, ‘Bella Antiochena’, RHC Occ V, pp. 75-132. 
Walter the Chancellor’s The Antiochene Wars, trans. T.S. Asbridge and S.B. Edgington 
(Aldershot, 1999). 
Wilbrand of Oldenburg, ‘Wilbrand of Oldenburg’s Journey to Syria, Lesser Armenia, 
Cyprus, and the Holy Land (1211-1212): A New Edition’, ed. D. Pringle, Crusades, 11 
(2012), pp. 109-137. 
William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, CCCM 63, 2 vols (Turnhout, 1986). 
 
201 
 
Secondary Sources 
Amitai, R., ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Armenian-Mongol-Mamluk Relations (1260-1292)’, in C. 
Mutafian (ed.), La Méditerranée des Arméniens: XIIe-XVe siècle (Paris, 2014), pp. 191-206. 
Amitai-Preiss, R., Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Īlkhānid War, 1260-1281 
(Cambridge, 1995). 
Asbridge, T.S., ‘The significance and causes of the battle of the Field of Blood’, Journal of 
Medieval History, 23 (1997), pp. 301-316. 
Asbridge, T.S., The Creation of the Principality of Antioch 1098-1130 (Woodbridge, 2000). 
Asbridge, T.S., ‘Alice of Antioch: a case study of female power in the twelfth century’, in 
P.W. Edbury and J. Phillips (eds), The Experience of Crusading: Volume Two: Defining the 
Crusader Kingdom (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 29-47. 
Bartlett, R., ‘Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity’, Journal of Medieval 
and Early Modern Studies, 31 (2001), pp. 39-56. 
Bayarsaikhan, D., The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335) (Leiden, 2010). 
Boas, A.J., Archaeology of the Military Orders: A Survey of the Urban Centres, Rural 
Settlement and Castles of the Military Orders in the Latin East c.1120-1291 (London, 2006). 
Boase, T.S.R., ‘The History of the Kingdom’, in T.S.R. Boase (ed.), The Cilician Kingdom of 
Armenia (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 1-33. 
Burgtorf, J., ‘The Military Orders in the Crusader Principality of Antioch’, in K.N. Ciggaar 
and D.M. Metcalf (eds), East and West in the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean I: Antioch 
from the Byzantine Reconquest until the End of the Crusader Principality, (Leuven, 2006), 
pp. 217-246. 
Burgtorf, J., ‘Der antiochenische Erbfolgekrieg’, Ordines Militares: Colloquia Torunensia 
Historica, 18 (2013), pp. 219-239. 
Burgtorf, J., ‘The Hospitaller Lordship of Margat’, in K.N. Ciggaar and V. Van Aalst (eds), 
East and West in the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean II: Antioch from the Byzantine 
Reconquest until the End of the Crusader Principality (Leuven, 2013), pp. 11-50. 
Cahen, C., La Syrie du Nord à l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque d’Antioche 
(Paris, 1940). 
Cahen, C., Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and 
history c.1071-1330, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968). 
Chevalier, M.-A., Les ordres religieux-militaires en Arménie cilicienne: templiers, 
hospitaliers, teutoniques et Arméniens à l’époque des croisades (Paris, 2009). 
202 
 
Coleman, E., ‘The Italian Communes: Recent Work and Current Trends’, Journal of 
Medieval History, 25 (1999), pp. 373-397. 
Coleman, E., ‘Representative Assemblies in Communal Italy’, in P.S. Barnwell and M. 
Mostert (eds), Political Assemblies in the Earlier Middle Ages (Turnhout, 2003), pp. 193-
210. 
Coleman, E., ‘Cities and Communes’, in D. Abulafia (ed.), Italy in the Central Middle Ages 
(Oxford, 2004), pp. 27-57. 
Coleman, E., ‘Bishop and Commune in twelfth-century Cremona: the interface of secular and 
ecclesiastical power’, in F. Andrews (ed.), Churchmen and Urban Government in Late 
Medieval Italy c.1200-c.1450 (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 25-41. 
Dédéyan, G., ‘Le rôle politique et militaire des Arméniens dans les Etats croisés pendant la 
première partie du XIIe siècle’, in H.E. Mayer and E. Müller-Luckner (eds), Die 
Kreuzfahrerstaaten als multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Einwanderer und Minderheiten im 12. 
und 13. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1997), pp. 153-163. 
Dédéyan, G., Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés: Étude sur les pouvoirs 
arméniens dans le Proche-Orient méditerranéen (1068-1150), 2 vols. (Lisbon, 2003). 
Dédéyan, G., ‘The Founding and Coalescence of the Rubenian Principality, 1073-1129’, in 
R.G. Hovannisian and S. Payaslian (eds), Armenian Cilicia (Costa Mesa, 2008), pp. 79-92. 
Dédéyan, G., ‘Les Arméniens au Liban (X-XIII siècle)’, in G. Dédéyan and K. Rizk (eds), Le 
Comté de Tripoli : État Multiculturel et Multiconfessionnel (1102-1289) (Paris, 2010), pp. 
73-99. 
Der Nersessian, S., ‘The Armenian Chronicle of the Constable Smpad or of the “Royal 
Historian”’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 13 (1959), pp. 143-168. 
Der Nersessian, S., The Armenians (London, 1969). 
Der Nersessian, S., ‘The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia’, in K.M. Setton (ed.), A History of 
the Crusades, 6 vols. (Madison, WI, 1969-1989), 2, pp. 630-659. 
Deschamps, P., Les Châteaux des Croisés en Terre Sainte III: La défense du comté de Tripoli 
et de la principauté d’Antioche (Paris, 1973). 
Edbury, P.W., The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374 (Cambridge, 1991). 
Edbury, P.W., John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (Woodbridge, 1997). 
Edbury, P.W., ‘The Lyon Eracles and the Old French Continuations of William of Tyre’, in 
B.Z. Kedar, J.S.C. Riley-Smith and R. Hiestand (eds), Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History 
(Aldershot, 1997), pp. 139-153. 
203 
 
Edbury, P.W., ‘New Perspectives on the Old French Continuations of William of Tyre’, 
Crusades, 9 (2010), pp. 107-113. 
Edbury, P.W., ‘The Assises d’Antioche: Law and Custom in the Principality of Antioch’, in 
K.J. Stringer and A. Jotischky (eds), Norman Expansion: Connections, Continuities and 
Contrasts (Farnham, 2013), pp. 241-248. 
Eddé, A.-M., La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep (579/1183 – 658/1260) (Stuttgart, 1999). 
Eddé, A.-M., ‘Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Umar Ibn al-‘Adīm’, in A. Mallett (ed.), Medieval Muslim 
Historians and the Franks in the Levant (Leiden, 2014), pp. 109-135. 
Edgington, S.B., ‘Antioch: Medieval City of Culture’, in K.N. Ciggaar and D.M. Metcalf 
(eds), East and West in the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean I: Antioch from the Byzantine 
Reconquest until the End of the Crusader Principality (Leuven, 2006), pp. 247-259. 
Edwards, R.W., ‘Bağras and Armenian Cilicia: A Reassessment’, Revue des Études 
Arméniennes, 17 (1983), pp. 415-455. 
Edwards, R.W., The Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia (Washington, DC, 1987). 
Ellenblum, R., Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge, 
1998). 
Epstein, S.A., Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996). 
Favreau-Lilie, M.-L., Die Italiener im Heiligen Land vom ersten Kreuzzug bis zum Tode 
Heinrichs von Champagne (1098-1197) (Amserdam, 1989). 
Folda, J., Crusader Art in the Holy Land: From the Third Crusade to the Fall of Acre, 1187-
1291 (Cambridge, 2005). 
Ghazarian, J.G., The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia during the Crusades: The integration of 
Cilician Armenians with the Latins 1080-1393 (Richmond, 2000). 
Greenwood, T., ‘Armenian Sources’, in M. Whitby (ed.), Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-
Greek Sources 1025-1204 (Oxford, 2007), pp. 221-252. 
Grousset, R., Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem, 3 vols (Paris, 1934-
1936). 
Halfter P., ‘Papacy, Catholicosate, and the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia’, in R.G. 
Hovannisian and S. Payaslian (eds), Armenian Cilicia (Costa Mesa, CA, 2008), pp. 111-129. 
Hamilton, B., ‘The Armenian Church and the Papacy in the Time of the Crusades’, Eastern 
Churches Review, 10 (1978), pp. 61-87. 
Hamilton, B., The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church (London, 1980). 
204 
 
Hamilton, B., The Leper King and his Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of 
Jerusalem (Cambridge, 2000). 
Hamilton, B., ‘The Growth of the Latin Church of Antioch and the Recruitment of its 
Clergy’, in K.N. Ciggaar and D.M. Metcalf (eds), East and West in the Medieval Eastern 
Mediterranean I: Antioch from the Byzantine Reconquest until the End of the Crusader 
Principality (Leuven, 2006), pp. 171-184. 
Heygate, C., ‘Marriage Strategies among the Normans of Southern Italy in the Eleventh 
Century’, in K.J. Stringer and A. Jotischky (eds), Norman Expansion: Connections, 
Continuities and Contrasts (Farnham, 2013), pp. 165-186. 
Hillenbrand, C., ‘Sources in Arabic’, in M. Whitby (ed.), Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-
Greek Sources 1025-1204 (Oxford, 2007), pp. 283-340. 
Hodgson, N.R., Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative (Woodbridge, 
2007). 
Hodgson, N.R., ‘Conflict and Cohabitation: Marriage and diplomacy between Latins and 
Cilician Armenians, c.1097-1253’, in C. Kostick (ed.), The Crusades and the Near East: 
Cultural Histories (Abingdon, 2011), pp. 83-106. 
Holt, P.M., The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517 
(Harlow, 1986). 
Houben, H., Die Abtei Venosa und das Mönchtum im normannisch-staufischen Süditalien 
(Tübingen, 1995). 
Humphreys, R.S., From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260 
(Albany, NY, 1977). 
Irwin, R., ‘The Mamlūk Conquest of the County of Tripoli’, in P.W. Edbury (ed.), Crusade 
and Settlement (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 246-250. 
Jackson, P., ‘The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260’, English Historical Review, 95 (1980), pp. 
481-513. 
Jackson, P., ‘The Crusades of 1239-41 and Their Aftermath’, Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 50 (1987), pp. 32-60. 
Jackson, P., The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410 (Harlow, 2005). 
Jacoby, D., ‘The Economy of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia: Some Neglected and 
Overlooked Aspects’, in C. Mutafian (ed.), La Méditerranée des Arméniens: XIIe-XVe siècle 
(Paris, 2014), pp. 261-291. 
Jones, P.J., The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria (Oxford, 1997). 
205 
 
Jotischky, A., ‘Manuel I Comnenus and the Reunion of the Churches: The Evidence of the 
Conciliar Mosaics in Bethlehem’, Levant, 26 (1994), pp. 207-223. 
Jotischky, A., ‘Ethnographic Attitudes in the Crusader States: The Franks and the Indigenous 
Orthodox People’, in K.N. Ciggaar and H. Teule (eds), East and West in the Crusader States: 
Context – Contacts – Confrontations III, (Leuven, 2003), pp. 1-19. 
Jotischky, A., ‘The Mendicants as missionaries and travellers in the Near East in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’, in R. Allen (ed.), Eastward Bound: Travel and 
Travellers, 1050-1550 (Manchester, 2004), pp. 88-106. 
Kedar, B.Z., ‘Latins and Oriental Christians in the Frankish Levant, 1099-1291’, in A. 
Kofsky and G.G. Stroumsa (eds), Sharing the Sacred: Religious Contacts and Conflicts in the 
Holy Land (Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 209-221. 
Kennedy, H., Crusader Castles (Cambridge, 1994). 
Khowaiter, A.-A., Baibars the First: His Endeavours and Achievements (London, 1978). 
Köhler, M.A., Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle 
East: Cross-Cultural Diplomacy in the period of the Crusades, trans. P.M. Holt, revised, 
edited and introduced K. Hirschler (Leiden, 2013). 
La Monte, J.L., Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1100 to 1291 
(Cambridge, MA, 1932). 
Lansing, C., Passion and Order: Restraint of Grief in the Medieval Italian Communes 
(Ithaca, NY, 2008). 
Lawrence, A.W., ‘The Castle of Baghras’, in T.S.R. Boase (ed.), The Cilician Kingdom of 
Armenia (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 34-83. 
MacEvitt, C., The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance 
(Philadelphia, PA, 2008). 
Madelin, L., ‘La Syrie franque’, Revue des deux mondes, 38 (1916), pp. 314-358. 
Major, B., ‘The Medieval Mill of Bānyās and some Notes on the Topography of the Town of 
Valenia’, in K.N. Ciggaar and V. Van Aalst (eds), East and West in the Medieval Eastern 
Mediterranean II: Antioch from the Byzantine Reconquest until the End of the Crusader 
Principality (Leuven, 2013), pp. 367-390. 
Marshall, C., Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291 (Cambridge, 1992). 
Mayer, H.E., The Crusades, trans. J.B. Gillingham, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1988). 
Mayer, H.E., ‘Angevins versus Normans: The New Men of King Fulk of Jerusalem’, 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 133 (1989), pp. 1-25. 
206 
 
Mayer, H.E., Varia Antiochena: Studien zum Kreuzfahrerfürstentum Antiochia im 12. und 
frühen 13. Jahrhundert (Hannover, 1993). 
Metcalf, D.M., ‘Three Recent Parcels of Helmet Deniers of Bohemund III of Antioch 
Concealed at about the Time of Saladin’s Conquests’, in P.W. Edbury and D.M. Metcalf 
(eds), Coinage in the Latin East: The Fourth Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary 
History (Oxford, 1980), pp. 137-145. 
Metcalf, D.M., Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum, 
Oxford, 2nd edition (London, 1995). 
Metcalf, D.M., ‘Monetary Questions Arising out of the Role of the Templars as Guardians of 
the Northern Marches of the Principality of Antioch’, in Z. Hunyadi and J. Laszlovszky (eds), 
The Crusades and the Military Orders: Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin 
Christianity (Budapest, 2001), pp. 77-87. 
Molin, K., Unknown Crusader Castles (London, 2001). 
Molin, K., ‘Teutonic Castles in Cilician Armenia: A Reappraisal’, in V. Mallia-Milanes (ed.), 
The Military Orders: Volume 3: History and Heritage (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 131-137. 
Moore, J.C., ‘Peter of Lucedio (Cistercian Patriarch of Antioch) and Pope Innocent III’, 
Römische Historische Mitteilungen, 29 (1987), pp. 221-249. 
Morgan, M.R., The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre (Oxford, 
1973). 
Morton, N.E., The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land 1190-1291 (Woodbridge, 2009). 
Murray, A.V., ‘Ethnic Identity in the Crusader States: The Frankish Race and the Settlement 
of Outremer’, in S. Forde, L. Johnson and A.V. Murray (eds), Concepts of National Identity 
in the Middle Ages (Leeds, 1995), pp. 59-73. 
Murray, A.V., ‘How Norman was the Principality of Antioch? Prolegomena to a Study of the 
Origins of the Nobility of a Crusader State’, in K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (ed.), Family Trees and 
the Roots of Politics: The prosopography of Britain and France from the tenth to the twelfth 
century (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 349-359. 
Murray, A.V., ‘Franks and Indigenous Communities in Palestine and Syria (1099-1187)’, in 
A. Classen (ed.), East Meets West in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: 
Transcultural Experiences in the Premodern World (Berlin, 2013), pp. 291-310. 
Mutafian, C., La Cilicie au Carrefour des Empires, 2 vols. (Paris, 1988). 
Mutafian, C., Le Royaume Arménien de Cilicie: XIIe-XIVe siècle (Paris, 1993). 
Mutafian, C., ‘The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia’, in R.G. Hovannisian and S. 
Payaslian (eds), Armenian Cilicia (Costa Mesa, CA, 2008), pp. 93-110. 
207 
 
Mutafian, C., L’Arménie du Levant (XIe-XIVe siècle) (Paris, 2012). 
Nicholas, D., The Growth of the Medieval City: From Late Antiquity to the Early Fourteenth 
Century (London, 1997). 
Otten-Froux, C., ‘L’Aïas dans le dernier tiers du XIIIe siècle d'après les notaires génois’ in 
B.Z. Kedar and A.L. Udovitch (eds), The Medieval Levant (Haifa, 1988), pp. 147-171. 
Perry, G., John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c.1175-1237 
(Cambridge, 2013). 
Petit-Dutaillis, C., The French Communes in the Middle Ages, trans. J. Vickers (Amsterdam, 
1978). 
Prawer, J., The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages 
(London, 1972). 
Prawer, J., Crusader Institutions (Oxford, 1980). 
Prawer, J., ‘Social Classes in the Latin Kingdom: the Franks’, in K.M. Setton (ed.), A History 
of the Crusades, 6 vols. (Madison, WI, 1969-1989), 5, pp. 123-144. 
Pryor, J.H., Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the maritime history of the 
Mediterranean, 649-1571 (Cambridge, 1988). 
Redford, S., ‘Trade and Economy in Antioch and Cilicia in the Twelfth and Thirteenth 
Centuries’, in C. Morrison (ed.), Trade and Markets in Byzantium (Washington, D.C., 2012), 
pp. 297-309. 
Richard, J., ‘Le comté de Tripoli dans les chartes du fonds des Porcelets’, Bibliothèque de 
l’école des chartes, 130 (1972), pp. 339-382. 
Richard, J., ‘Les comtes de Tripoli et leurs vassaux sous la dynastie antiochénienne’, in P.W. 
Edbury (ed.), Crusade and Settlement (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 213-224. 
Richard, J., ‘The Political and Ecclesiastical Organization of the Crusader States’, in K.M. 
Setton (ed.), A History of the Crusades, 6 vols. (Madison, WI, 1969-1989), 5, pp. 193-250. 
Richard, J., Saint Louis: Crusader King of France, trans. J. Birrell (Cambridge, 1992). 
Richard, J., ‘Les familles féodales franques dans le comté de Tripoli’, in G. Dédéyan and K. 
Rizk (eds), Le Comté de Tripoli : État Multiculturel et Multiconfessionnel (1102-1289) 
(Paris, 2010), pp. 7-30. 
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus c.1050-1310 (London, 
1967). 
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1174-1277 (London, 
1973). 
208 
 
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., ‘The Templars and the Teutonic Knights in Cilician Armenia’, in T.S.R. 
Boase (ed.), The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 92-117. 
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., The Crusades: A History, 3rd edition (London, 2014). 
Rüdt-Collenberg, W.H., The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans: The Structure of the 
Armeno-Cilician Dynasties (Paris, 1963). 
Runciman, S., A History of the Crusades, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1951-1954). 
Ryan, J.D., ‘Toleration Denied: Armenia between East and West in the Era of the Crusades’, 
in M. Gervers and J.M. Powell (eds), Tolerance and Intolerance: Social Conflict in the Age 
of the Crusades (Syracuse, NY, 2001), pp. 55-64. 
Smail, R.C., Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1995). 
Smith, J.M., ‘Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies, 44 (1984), pp. 307-345. 
Sourdel, D., ‘Bohémond et les chrétiens à Damas sous l’occupation mongole’, in M. Balard, 
B.Z. Kedar and J.S.C. Riley-Smith (eds), Dei gesta per Francos: Études sur les croisades 
(Aldershot, 2001), pp. 295-299. 
Stewart, A.D., The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the 
Reigns of Het’um II (1289-1307) (Leiden, 2001). 
Stewart, A.D., ‘The Armenian Kingdom and the Mongol-Frankish Encounter’, in K.V. 
Jensen, K. Salonen and H. Vogt (eds), Cultural Encounters during the Crusades (Odense, 
2013), pp. 263-281. 
Stewart, A.D., ‘Alliance with the Tartars: the Armenian kingdom, the Mongols and the 
Latins’, in C. Mutafian (ed.), La Méditerranée des Arméniens: XIIe-XVe siècle (Paris, 2014), 
pp. 207-229. 
Tabacco, G., The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy: Structures of Political Rule, trans. 
R.B. Jensen (Cambridge, 1989). 
Tabbaa, Y., Constructions of Power and Piety in Medieval Aleppo (University Park, PA, 
1997). 
Thorau, P., ‘The Battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt: a Re-examination’, in P.W. Edbury (ed.), Crusade and 
Settlement (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 236-241. 
Thorau, P., The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century, 
trans. P.M. Holt (London, 1992). 
Upton-Ward, J., ‘The Surrender of Gaston and the Rule of the Templars’, in M. Barber (ed.), 
The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick (Aldershot, 1994), pp. 
179-188. 
209 
 
Van Tricht, F., The Latin Renovatio of Byzantium: The Empire of Constantinople (1204-
1228), trans. P. Longbottom (Leiden, 2011). 
Vorderstrasse, T., ‘Archaeology of the Antiochene Region in the Crusader Period’, in K.N. 
Ciggaar and D.M. Metcalf (eds), East and West in the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean I: 
Antioch from the Byzantine Reconquest until the End of the Crusader Principality (Leuven, 
2006), pp. 319-336. 
Waley, D. and T. Dean, The Italian City-Republics, 4th edition (Harlow, 2010). 
Webber, N., The Evolution of Norman Identity, 911-1154 (Woodbridge, 2005). 
Weltecke, D., ‘On the Syriac Orthodox in the Principality of Antioch during the Crusader 
Period’, in K.N. Ciggaar and D.M. Metcalf (eds), East and West in the Medieval Eastern 
Mediterranean I: Antioch from the Byzantine Reconquest until the End of the Crusader 
Principality (Leuven, 2006), pp. 95-124. 
Yildiz, S.N., ‘Reconceptualizing the Seljuk-Cilician Frontier: Armenians, Latins, and Turks 
in Conflict and Alliance during the Early Thirteenth Century’, in F. Curta (ed.), Borders, 
Barriers, and Ethnogenesis: Frontiers in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Turnhout, 
2005), pp. 91-120. 
Unpublished Secondary Sources 
Donnachie, S., Reconstruction and Rebirth: The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1187-1233 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Swansea University, 2013). 
Murray, A.V., ‘The Nobility of the Principality of Antioch, 1098-1187: Names, Origins and 
Identity’, in A. Jotischky and A. Metcalfe (eds), The Norman Edge: People, Places and 
Power (Forthcoming). 
